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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN ILLINOIS IN 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE RYAN 
COMMUTATIONS: REFORMS, ECONOMIC 
REALITIES, AND A NEW SALIENCY FOR 
ISSUES OF COST 
LEIGH B. BIENEN 
Perhaps most telling is the view of Professor Joseph Hoffman, someone who has 
devoted enormous time and energy to death penalty reform, spearheading death 
penalty reform efforts in both Illinois and Indiana and serving as Co-Chair and 
Reporter for the Massachusetts Governor‘s Council on Capital Punishment.  Hoffman 
served as a member of an advisory group to discuss an earlier draft of this paper, and 
he strongly expressed the view that seeking reform of capital punishment in the 
political realm is futile.  This is a striking position to take by one who is not morally 
opposed to the death penalty and who has worked on numerous reform projects.  But 
Hoffman cited as grounds for his change of heart the example of Illinois, in which 
there were confirmed wrongful convictions in capital cases, a sympathetic Governor, 
and a bi-partisan reform commission, but still strong resistance in the state legislature 
to reforms specifically targeted at capital punishment.  In short, serious concerns 
about efficacy in the political realm militate against the undertaking of a new reform 




 Senior Lecturer, Northwestern University School of Law. 
 This Article is dedicated to Neil Alan Weiner, distinguished homicide researcher, 
coauthor with Marvin Wolfgang and many others, and my longtime collaborator and friend.  
At the time of his untimely death in 2009, Neil Alan Weiner was Research Director at the 
Vera Institute of Justice, New York, New York. 
1 CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, REPORT TO THE ALI CONCERNING CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 5 (2008), available at http://www.ali.org/doc/Capital Punishment_web.pdf 
(Annex B). 
 Note: The Northwestern University Law School Capital Crimes Database of all first-
degree murders in Illinois, 2003–2009 [hereinafter NULSCCD] will be posted on the 
Northwestern University School of Law website, along with all data received by the author 
in response to FOIA requests to the Illinois State Treasurer and other sources on the 
expenditures and appropriations of the Capital Litigation Trust Fund. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When I first came to Illinois from New Jersey in 1995, nothing 
suggested change was coming in the pattern or practice of capital 
punishment in Illinois.  There were more than 160 people on death row in 
Illinois.
2
  By contrast, in 1996 New Jersey had twelve people on death row.
3
  
The New Jersey Office of the Public Defender had a strong statewide 
administrative structure and a centralized budget.  The New Jersey 
Department of the Public Advocate spent millions of dollars for defense 
attorneys to challenge every aspect of every death sentence imposed after 
reenactment in 1982.
4
  The public defenders then brought each death 
sentence to the extraordinarily conscientious New Jersey Supreme Court for 
constitutional review and proportionality analysis.
5
  Capital practice in 
Illinois had none of these institutionalized traditions. 
 
 The author acknowledges the continuing and much appreciated support of the 
Northwestern University School of Law, and especially that of Dean David E. Van Zandt 
and Associate Dean Kimberly Yuracko.  The faculty research funds have supported this 
research and data collection effort over a far longer period than was required for this Article.  
I am deeply grateful.  Special thanks to Jonathan Sabo, Northwestern University School of  
Law, J.D. 2011, for his outstanding contributions, and to successive staff and editors of the 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology for their expertise, patience, and dedication.  
Thanks also to the members and staff of the Illinois Capital Punishment Reform Study 
Committee, and especially Thomas P. Sullivan, Richard D. Schwind, David Olson, Walter 
Hehner, and many others.  I am in your debt.  Many state and county staff members have 
also been extremely helpful.  Special thanks to Peggy Anderson at the office of the Cook 
County Clerk and to the many others who assisted.  The expertise and proximity of 
Northwestern University School of Law‘s Bluhm Legal Clinic and the Center on Wrongful 
Convictions were of great assistance and inspiration.  Special thanks to Rob Warden, Tom 
Geraghty, Jennifer Linzer, Dolores Kennedy, and many others.  Our expert librarians are 
always vital to my research: Marcia Lehr, Pegeen Bassett, and other library staff in Chicago 
and Evanston.  Many students and interns worked on this article and the data collection 
effort: Christopher Tansey devoted many hours and days to the tables; Jason Grago also 
provided great assistance; other helpers included Sarah Pfander, Cate Schur, Alex Yastrow, 
and many others.  Thanks always to Juana Haskin, and to Cecilia Torres. 
2 The Illinois death row population in 1996 was 164.  Leigh B. Bienen, The 
Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only “The 
Appearance of Justice”?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 169 tbl.2 (1996). 
3 Id. at 166 tbl.1.  New Jersey reenacted capital punishment in 1982, and it was not until 
1992 that the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a particular death sentence met the 
stringent requirements of judicially-mandated proportionality review.  See State v. Marshall, 
613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992).  See generally infra Part IV.D.  
4 See Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The 
Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27, 36 (1988) (describing the 
methodology and results of the extensive research project begun at the New Jersey Office of 
the Public Defender and later taken over by the Supreme Court of New Jersey). 
5 Bienen, supra note 2, at 139–40.  Proportionality review was one of the reforms 
instituted ―[s]o that death sentences would no longer be cruel and unusual in the same way 
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual,‖ along with a structure of aggravating 
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Nor was there any state court or institution in Illinois that would have 
been inclined to or capable of undertaking the kind of comprehensive 
system-wide review and analysis of capital case processing such as that 
conducted by the New Jersey Supreme Court under the rubric of 
proportionality review.  The Illinois Supreme Court was unreceptive to 
constitutional challenges to the statute or to the system.
6
  Since the 1970s 
the court has consistently refused to consider constitutional challenges to 
the application of the statute based upon evidence of racial or geographic 
disparities in death penalty prosecutions and sentencing.
7
  There were brief 
moments, first in 1979 and then again in 1984, when the constitutionality of 
capital punishment was a live issue before the Illinois Supreme Court and 
federal courts in Illinois.
8
  However, since that time the Illinois Supreme 
Court has indicated in numerous opinions and through other institutional 
 
and mitigating factors to guide the sentencing decision.  Id.  A court conducts proportionality 
review by ―comparing the death sentence on appeal with similar cases throughout the state‖ 
to ensure that the defendant is not being disproportionately punished.  Id.  ―Heightened 
judicial scrutiny at the appellate level, with the inclusion of proportionality review, has since 
been viewed by some justices as fundamental to the constitutionality of the death penalty 
itself.‖  Id.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey was exceptional in, immediately after 
reenactment, declaring its intention to review patterns and discrepancies introduced by 
prosecutorial charging practices, irrespective of their origin and whether caused by 
differences in charging patterns, sentences, or other factors.  See State v. Koedatich, 548 
A.2d 939 (N.J. 1988); Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in 
New Jersey: Felony Murder Cases, 54 ALB. L. REV. 709, 732–35 (1990) [hereinafter Bienen, 
Reimposition of Capital Punishment].  Additionally, in State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 
(N.J. 1992), and State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987), the court considered as 
axiomatic that it had the authority and duty to review county prosecutors‘ charging decisions 
in the selection of cases for capital prosecution. 
6 See, e.g., People v. Erickson, 641 N.E.2d 455, 459 (Ill. 1994) (dismissing defendant‘s 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his trial).  
7 See People v. Lewis, 473 N.E.2d 901, 914 (Ill. 1984), stating: 
The defendant‘s argument for proportionality review must also fail.  The Illinois Constitution, 
the death penalty statute, and the Supreme Court Rule 603 all provide for direct appeal to this 
court of any conviction for which the death penalty has been imposed.  The entire court record is 
available to the reviewing court for examination, thus disclosing the evidence which motivated 
the imposition of the death sentence.  This court has consistently found that these review 
procedures sufficiently protect against the arbitrary imposition of capital punishment. (citations 
omitted). 
8 See People v. Silagy, 461 N.E.2d 415, 433–34 (Ill. 1984) (Simon, J., dissenting) (noting 
that four of the seven sitting justices have said and continue to adhere to the view that the 
Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it allows prosecutors too much 
discretion in charging decisions); Lewis, 430 N.E.2d at 1363–85 (Ill. 1981) (concurring and 
dissenting opinions from six of the seven justices explaining their views on the 
constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute); People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins, 397 
N.E.2d 809 (Ill. 1979) (holding Illinois death penalty statute constitutional over vigorous 
dissent of three of seven justices); see also Leigh B. Bienen, The Quality of Justice in 
Capital Cases: Illinois as a Case Study, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193 (1998). 
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In 1984, the United States Supreme Court ruled that statewide 
proportionality review was not required in order to comply with the 
Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
10
  
Since then the Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that it need 
not and would not in the future use proportionality review to conduct a 
systematic statewide analysis of the patterns in the application of the death 
penalty arising from the fact that the 102 elected county state‘s attorneys 
each individually select cases for capital prosecution.
11
  The state high court 
has regularly affirmed death sentences, and has expressed the view that the 
scope of its review would be purely procedural.
12
  However, an external 
study of Illinois death sentences found that as of 1995, 40% of the death 
 
9 There has never been the institutional will or the leadership within the Illinois criminal 
justice system for an enterprise such as the comprehensive analysis of capital case 
processing undertaken by the Supreme Court of New Jersey under the leadership of Chief 
Justice Robert Wilentz in the 1980s and 1990s.  After his death, the character of that court 
changed significantly.  See Leigh B. Bienen, Not Wiser After 35 Years of Contemplating the 
Death Penalty, 42 STUD. L., POL. & SOC‘Y 91 (2008).  For a description of how a change in 
supreme court justices can influence outcomes of death penalty litigation positively, see Rob 
Warden, Illinois Death Penalty Reform: How It Happened, What It Promises, 95 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMONOLOGY 381, 389–391 (2005) (discussing how a change in justices affected the 
outcome in People v. Lewis) and Bienen, supra note 2. 
10 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50–51 (1984). 
11 See People v. King, 488 N.E.2d 949 (Ill. 1986); see also ex rel. Carey, 397 N.E.2d  
809 (Ill. 1979).  The Illinois Supreme Court will on occasion conduct intra-case 
proportionality review, that is, compare the death sentence under review with the sentences 
received by codefendants in the same case.  See, e.g., People v. Byron, 647 N.E.2d 946, 957–
58 (Ill. 1995).  See generally Warden, supra note 9.  [BB Check] 
12 See Erickson, 641 N.E.2d at 455.  In her dissent, Judge McMorrow noted: 
Illinois once had a well-publicized reputation for having devised post-conviction requirements 
that created a ―procedural labyrinth . . . made up entirely of blind alleys‖ that effectively 
insulated the court from ruling on the merits of a defendant‘s constitutional challenges to his 
criminal conviction and sentence.  Our Post-Conviction Hearing Act was adopted in 1949 to 
overcome these shortcomings.  Unfortunately, the majority‘s decision harkens back to this earlier 
era, when technical rules of procedure were manipulated in order to avoid or preclude 
substantive review of the criminal defendant‘s constitutional arguments. 
Id. at 468 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 The purpose of the Fundamental Justice Act, enacted in 2003, was to give the Illinois 
Supreme Court authority to review death sentences on grounds of fairness.  720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(i) (West Supp. 2010); see infra Appendix A, no. 14, p. 5.  The court has 
not yet overturned a single death sentence on the basis of the new amendment since its 
enactment.  
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sentences that reached the stage of federal habeas corpus under the former, 
more permissive federal rules were remanded for retrial or resentencing.
13
 
In 1995, capital punishment was firmly entrenched in Illinois and 
appeared impregnable.  Public support for the death penalty was high.
14
  No 
strong legal institutions or powerful political constituencies challenged it.  
The 102 elected county prosecutors, the state legislators, the attorney 
general, and the Governor all were strong supporters, and Illinois had begun 
conducting executions.
15
  No court or legal authority in the jurisdiction 
seemed likely to interfere with the steady accumulation of death sentences 
coming up from the county prosecutions or the inevitability of future 
executions.  Capital cases continued to be prosecuted; death sentences were 
imposed in the trial courts and affirmed on appeal; although the appeals 
took a while, executions had begun, and the prospect was only of more 
impending executions.
16
  Given the breadth and number of the aggravating 
factors in the Illinois death penalty statute,
17
 it seemed in 1995 as if there 
was always a capital case being zealously investigated and prosecuted, or an 
execution on deck.  Nothing seemed poised to interfere with that 
progression. 
By the year 2000, however, everything had changed.  In 1999, 
Governor George Ryan had been elected, though he was at that time a 
supporter of capital punishment.  As a legislator, Governor Ryan had voted 
for the reenactment of the death penalty, and in March of 1999, soon after 
taking office, he presided over an execution.
18
  However, accumulating 
 
13 Warden, supra note 9, at 381–82 (―A landmark study found that forty-three percent of 
Illinois death penalty cases had been reversed on direct appeal or at the post-conviction stage 
as of 1995.  Of the cases that graduated to the federal habeas corpus stage, the study found 
forty percent had been remanded for retrial or re-sentencing.‖). 
14 Samuel R. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty–It‟s Getting 
Personal, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448, 1448 (1998) (―In 1994, when Professor Phoebe 
Ellsworth and I published a review of research on death penalty attitudes in the United 
States, we began by noting that ‗support for the death penalty [is] at a near record high.‘  
That finding, like most of the others we reported, has not changed. . . . ‖) (footnotes omitted).   
15 Warden, supra note 9, at 382 (noting that 12 of the 289 individuals sentenced to death 
in Illinois after Furman had been executed). 
16 States that abolished capital punishment, such as New Jersey, New York, and New 
Mexico, either had not reinstated executions or had only executed volunteers prior to 
abolition.  See State by State Information Database, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state# (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) [hereinafter 
DPIC State by State].  Once a state begins executions, it is unlikely it will abolish the death 
penalty.  It is almost as if the state decisionmakers feel it would be unfair to those already 
executed to declare the system unconstitutional once someone has been executed under it. 
17 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010) 
18 See Warden, supra note 9, at 406 (describing Ryan‘s role in the Korkoraleis 
execution). 
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egregious evidence of many wrongfully convicted persons on death row in 
Illinois led Governor Ryan to impose unilaterally a moratorium on 
executions in the state as of January 2000.
19
  Illinois was the first state to 




Then the legislature established the Capital Litigation Trust Fund in 
1999, effective in 2000.  This fund was created partly in response to the 
highly publicized exonerations and the large number of innocent people 
found on death row in Illinois.
21
  By 1999, thirteen death row inmates had 
been exonerated by independent investigations of the facts supporting their 
convictions, including revelations that their confessions were coerced, and 
DNA tests had identified others as the actual murderers.
22
  Next, in 2000 
Governor Ryan appointed a high profile Governor‘s Commission on Capital 
Punishment (Governor‘s Commission or Commission).  The Commission 
was composed of respected members of the bar with a variety of 
backgrounds and perspectives, and reported its findings in April of 2002.
23
  
In January of 2003, Governor Ryan responded most dramatically to these 
findings by taking the unprecedented, historic step of commuting 161 
capital sentences in one fell swoop, emptying the Illinois death row.
24
 
These actions were completely contrary to the seemingly unshakable 
and widespread support for the current system of capital punishment in the 
state legislature, in the courts, and throughout other legal institutions in the 
 
19 See Lawrence C. Marshall, Walter C. Reckless Memorial Lecture: The Innocence 
Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573, 579 (2004).  Explaining 
Ryan‘s motivation, Marshall stated: 
Governor Ryan . . . understood that the system‘s error rate in determining guilt has implications 
not only on the accuracy of convictions, but also on the trustworthiness of capital sentences.  If a 
system had proven itself so flawed at answering the relatively easy, objective question of 
whether a defendant committed a crime, how could that system possibly be trusted with the far 
more complicated question of whether someone who has been convicted should be sentenced to 
death? . . .  Governor Ryan understood that even if all 171 Illinois death row inmates were, in 
fact guilty, that did not mean that the broken system‘s decision that they should die was one 
worthy of trust. 
20 For an up-to-date list of the status of the death penalty in various states, consult DPIC 
State by State, supra note 16. 
21 Barbara J. Hayler, Moratorium and Reform: Illinois‟s Efforts to Make the Death 
Penalty Process „Fair, Just and Accurate,‟ 29 JUST. SYS. J. 423, 424 (2008) (documenting 
the passage of the Capital Crimes Litigation Act following the exoneration of Anthony 
Porter). 
22 Warden, supra note 9, at 399–407. 
23 ILL. GOVERNOR‘S COMM‘N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/ 
commission_report/index.html [hereinafter ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR‘S COMM‘N REPORT]. 
24 One hundred fifty inmates were sentenced to life in prison without parole, three were 
sentenced to forty years in prison, and four were pardoned outright.  Id. at 382 n.6. 
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state.  The 2000 moratorium on executions and the 2003 commutations 
were without state or national precedent, and introduced an entirely new 
dynamic into the state capital punishment system.
25
  Both events had 
enormous repercussions in Illinois and elsewhere.  Other states also found 
innocent people on death row and declared moratoriums on executions in 
what became a cascading, national phenomenon.
26
  At the same time, some 
state courts imposed a statewide moratorium on executions while state and 
federal litigation over the constitutionality of lethal injection as a mode of 
execution was pending.
27
  This called to an immediate halt executions in the 
state without waiting for action by the legislature or the governor.  Soon the 
death penalty had been put on hold by courts throughout the country.
28
 
The cost of the death penalty has recently become a salient issue 
nationally because many states are in budget crisis, including Illinois, which 
has one of the largest budget deficits in the country.
29
  Illinois has never 
conducted a systematic study of the cost of the death penalty.  The 2002 
Governor‘s Commission focused on and found significant racial and 
geographic disparities in the operation of the Illinois capital punishment 
system, but did not address the issue of cost.
30
  Indeed, until recently, 
 
25 Marshall, supra note 19, at 573 (stating that the U.S. criminal justice system is in ―the 
midst of a revolution,‖ created by ―the advent of forensic DNA testing and hundreds of post-
conviction exonerations‖).  Ironically, public opinion supported both the continuance of 
capital punishment and the moratorium.  The public apparently approved of having a death 
penalty but not of executing anyone.  See Warden, supra note 9, at 406. 
26 See Austin Sarat, Introduction: Is the Death Penalty Dying?, 42 STUD. L., POL. & 
SOC‘Y 1 (2008).  In some states, litigation challenging lethal injection was the occasion for 
the declaration of a de facto moratorium on executions, thus relieving the governor of the 
state from having to take unpopular political action.  Id. 
27 Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Debate: Law and Science, 35 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 701, 703 (2008); see also The Honorable Jeremy Fogel, In the Eye of the Storm: A 
Judge‟s Experience in Lethal-Injection Litigation, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 735 (2008).  See 
generally Symposium: The Lethal Injection Debate: Law and Science, 35 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 701 (2008) [hereinafter Lethal Injection Symposium].  Also note that because a 
moratorium on executions had already been imposed in 2000, Illinois did not have a lethal 
injection challenge pending in the courts. 
28 See Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., Challenges Facing Society in the Implementation of the 
Death Penalty, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 763, 775–79 (2008). 
29 Mary Williams Walsh, Eight States Have Shortchanged Pensions, Study Finds, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010, at B3.  A major contributor to these budget shortfalls is the drastic 
underfunding of pension plans.  Id. (describing the $54 billion gap in Illinois between the 
cost of benefits promised to retirees over the next thirty years and the amount of money 
actually set aside). 
30 The Illinois 2002 Governor‘s Commission report contained an appendix by Pierce and 
Radelet, finding evidence of racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty in 
Illinois.  See GLENN L. PIERCE & MICHAEL L. RADELET, RACE, REGION, AND DEATH 
SENTENCING IN ILLINOIS 1988–1997 (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ 
ccp/ccp/reports/techinical_appendix/section_1/a_race_region death.pdf.  Subsequently, this 
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discussions of cost were not considered relevant to the issue of the 
reenactment or maintenance of the death penalty, and some continue to hold 
the view that the higher cost of sentencing someone to death should not be a 
factor for legislators or prosecutors to consider.
31
  Yet at a time when state 
governments are not meeting their most basic obligations, how can the 
state‘s policy of maintaining capital punishment alone be immune to 
considerations of cost and relative value? 
This Article references systematic cost studies from other states and 
reports how other states have addressed the issue of cost.
32
  There is no 
reason to think that the capital punishment system in Illinois is unique or 
different.  What other state studies have documented emperically is also 
observed in Illinois: 
 large trial and appellate costs associated with the prosecution and 
appeal of  capital cases, followed by capital retrials; delays in the 
carrying out of death sentences, with new and repeated challenges 
to the procedures for imposing the death penalty continually 
brought forward in the federal and state courts;
33
 
 additional corrections costs associated with maintaining a special 
segregated death row, with its own legally mandated requirements 
for security and access to legal counsel, increased costs associated 
with long pretrial incarcerations, and special training and 
personnel required for staff during capital trials and after the 




research was published in Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region and Death 
Sentencing in Illinois, 1988–1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39 (2002). 
31 See N.J. DEATH PENALTY COMM‘N, NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM‘N 
REPORT 80–81 (2007), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/ 
dpsc_final.pdf (Russo, J., dissenting) [hereinafter NEW JERSEY REPORT].  Russo‘s dissent 
states: 
The financial costs of capital punishment have been used both to justify and criticize the death 
penalty.  I have heard many justify the death penalty on the grounds that the State should not 
have to spend thousands of dollars per year to maintain a convicted killer for the rest of his life.  
Conversely, the argument has often been made that trial and appellate costs that result from fair 
enforcement of capital punishment make it too expensive.  Both of these arguments are utter and 
sheer nonsense.  If the death penalty is wrong, it is wrong; if it is not wrong, it is not wrong.  It 
doesn‘t matter what it costs.  The taking of a human life is something far too important to be 
influenced either way by costs. 
32 See infra Part IV. 
33 See CAL. COMM‘N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (Gerald Uelmen ed., 
2008), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf [hereinafter 
CALIFORNIA REPORT] (discussed infra Part IV.C). 
34 Id. at 141–42; Philip J. Cook, Potential Savings from Abolition of the Death Penalty in 
North Carolina, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 498, 523–24 (2009). 
2010] CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN ILLINOIS 109 
 large payments to judges, court personnel, defense lawyers, 
state‘s attorneys, and appellate lawyers on both sides to comply 
with the complicated and demanding requirements of capital trials 
and their direct and collateral appeals;
35
 
 arbitrary patterns in the selection of cases for capital prosecution 
and the imposition of the death penalty within the state, wide 
county disparities in policies and implementation, and vast 
differences in how capital punishment is prosecuted between 
states and within individual states;
36
 
 a decline in the number of murders unrelated to the imposition of 
the death penalty,
37
 a decline in the number of death sentences 
imposed, and a decline in the number of state executions during 
the period 2000–2009, along with an increase in the time to 
execution for those states which do carry out executions;
38
 and 
 a large number and proportion of exonerations relative to the 
number of persons sentenced to death, executed, or both, calling 
into question the effectiveness of the death penalty as a deterrent, 





35 See generally ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR'S COMM‘N REPORT, supra note 23. 
36 See infra Part II.C for discussion of sentencing disparities; see also James S. Leibman 
& Lawrence C. Marshall, Less Is Better: Justice Stevens and the Narrowed Death Penalty, 
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, 1659 (2006). 
37 Between 1995 and 2005, the murder rate fell over by 30% nationwide (8.2 to 5.5 per 
100,000) and by over 40% in Illinois (10.3 to 6.0 per 100,000). U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT tbl.301 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/ 
compendia/statab/2010edition.html (Homicide Trends: 1980 to 2005); U.S. Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Crime—State Level: State-by-State and National Trends, 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/State/StatebyState.cfm (select "State by 
State and national trends" table; then select "Illinois" under "Choose one or more States" and 
"Violent crime rates" under "Choose one or more variable groups"; then press "Get Table" 
button"). 
38 Denno, supra note 27, at 710; see Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The 
Transformation of Capital Punishment, Rosenthal Lecture at Northwestern University 
School of Law (Sept. 14, 2010) (on file with author).  
39 See Ruth D. Peterson & William C. Bailey, Is Capital Punishment an Effective 
Deterrent for Murder? An Examination of Social Science Research, in AMERICA‘S 
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:  REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 173 (James R. Acker, Rovert M. Bohm & Charles S. 
Lanier eds., 1998).  
On balance, deterrence hypotheses for capital punishment have fared quite poorly.  Considering 
severity, comparative studies consistently showed a pattern of higher or similar levels of 
homicide in death penalty compared to abolitionist jurisdictions. . . .  
. . . [M]ost criminologists seem convinced that capital punishment is not a more effective 
deterrent for murder than imprisonment.  In fact, the American Society of Criminology, the 
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Some of these developments are chronicled here for Illinois, 
particularly the documented costs and the current and recurrent patterns and 
practices in capital case prosecution and sentencing since the establishment 
of the Capital Litigation Trust Fund and the passage of the 2003 reforms.
40
  
The legal changes introduced by the Illinois legislature, the Illinois 
Supreme Court, police, prosecutors, and many other state agencies and 
principals were part of a complicated, serious effort to reform a state 
criminal justice system correctly perceived to be flawed.
41
 
The states are not alone in reassessing the cost and effectiveness of 
current capital punishment systems.  The American Law Institute (ALI), the 
institution charged with monitoring developing case law and the overall 
efficacy of criminal code provisions, has recently completed a national 
review of the effectiveness of the death penalty in the states.
42
  As a result, 
the ALI removed the death penalty provisions from its highly influential 
Model Penal Code in October 2009.
43
  This is momentous, as the Model 
Penal Code statutory formulations provided the theoretical foundation for 
almost all state statutes when state legislatures reenacted capital punishment 
after Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia.
44
  This means that the ALI 
has now repudiated the elaborate provisions for statutory aggravating and 
 
largest professional association of criminologists in the U.S., passed a resolution in 1989 
condemning the death penalty for a variety of reasons, including its lack of utility as a deterrent 
to murder.  This consensus may in part account for the fact that only a few capital punishment 
and deterrence analyses have appeared in the professional literature in the last few years.  In 
short, for many criminologists, the capital punishment and deterrence question is a dead issue. 
Id. at 173 (internal citations omitted). 
40 See infra Part II.C. 
41 For a description of the Illinois reforms, see John Cullerton, Kirk Dillard & Peter G. 
Baroni, Capital Punishment Reform in Illinois–A Model for the Nation, J. DUPAGE COUNTY 
BAR ASS‘N (April 2004), http://www.dcba.org/brief/aprissue/2004/art10404.htm; infra Part 
II.B. 
42 See AM. LAW INST., REPORT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMERICAN 
LAW INSTITUTE ON THE MATTER OF THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (2009) [hereinafter ALI COUNCIL 
REPORT]. 
43 Am. Law Inst., Message from ALI Director Lance Liebman (2009), 
http://www.ali.org/_news/ 10232009.htm. 
44 Bienen, supra note 2, at 139. 
So that death sentences would no longer be ―cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck 
by lightning is cruel and unusual,‖ the revised capital punishment statutes which followed Gregg 
introduced a structure of aggravating and mitigating factors intended to guide the discretion of 
the sentencer.  In Gregg the Court held that the infirmities of the former capital punishment 
schemes had been addressed by Georgia‘s revised statute.  The Georgia statute restructured the 
decision to impose the death sentence by requiring the jury to make specific factual findings as to 
the presence or absence of statutorily defined aggravating and mitigating factors. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976) (plurality opinion); 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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mitigating circumstances that introduced a weighing process for jury 
decisionmaking that almost all death penalty jurisdictions have followed 
since the time of reenactment.
45
  These exact provisions were instituted in 
Illinois.
46
  However, the state death penalty statutes based on these 
provisions, including Illinois‘s, remain in effect. 
In Illinois, the discovery of so many innocent people on death row, 
followed by the dramatic commutations and the emptying of a large death 
row, spurred the passage of a number of legislative and procedural reforms 
to capital punishment practice in Illinois and the establishment of the 
Committee to Study the Reform of the Death Penalty in 2004.  Now in 
2010, for the first time in decades, the abolition of the death penalty and the 
establishment of a permanent moratorium on capital prosecutions and 
executions have become possibilities in Illinois.
47
  This Article will provide 
an overview of the changes and developments in capital case prosecutions 
in Illinois after the Ryan commutations, summarize some of the findings 
and recommendations of the 2002 Governor‘s Commission and the Capital 
Punishment Reform Study Committee (CPRSC or Committee), and present 
new data on patterns in capital charging and sentencing in Illinois.  I hope 
this information will help to inform the present debate over maintaining the 
death penalty, in Illinois and elsewhere. 
This Article is not a cost study, but it does present a substantial amount 
of existing data on costs and expenses related to capital punishment in 
Illinois between 2000 and 2009.
48
  In the absence of a statewide, systematic 
 
45 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962) (withdrawn 2010); STEIKER & STEIKER, supra 
note 1, at 2–3; see Bienen, supra note 2, at 139–40: 
In Gregg the Court held that the infirmities of the former capital punishment schemes had been 
addressed by Georgia‘s revised statute. . . .  Gregg and its companion cases upholding the 
revised capital statutes sent a clear signal to the state legislatures: enact a capital punishment 
statute resembling the Georgia statute, including a provision for proportionality review, and that 
statue [sic] will be upheld by the Court. 
See also id. at 140 n.33 (―The majority of the 12 states whose mandatory capital punishment 
schemes were declared unconstitutional in 1976 responded by enacting statutes similar to the 
Georgia statute upheld in Gregg.‖). 
46 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, pt. 9–1 (1977). 
47 There is currently a bill in committee at the Illinois Legislature to abolish the death 
penalty.  Death Penalty Abolition, H.B. 5687, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2010); see 
also Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon‟s Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 964–65 (2005) 
(describing a ―shift in momentum‖ in favor of abolition prompted by a series of exonerations 
around the country during the late 1990s). 
48 See infra tbls. 1–7; NULSCCD, supra note 1.  These are data from the Illinois state 
treasurer and the Cook County treasurer given to the author of this article in response to a 
Freedom of Information Act request in 2010; see also Death Penalty Costs, S. Res. 297, 95th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009).  This resolution calls for a cost study of capital punishment  
conducted by the Illinois Criminal Justice Authority. 
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cost study, this Article aggregates data from various sources, most 
importantly the state and county expenditures on capital punishment from 
the recently established Capital Litigation Trust Fund, and from other state 
funding sources.
49
  New data on some part of the cost of wrongful 
convictions in Illinois are also included because those exonerated have 




While the cost data reported here are incomplete and do not purport to 
be comprehensive, when considered together the information presented here 
does tell us that Illinois would have saved tens of millions of dollars a year 
if at the time of the imposition of the moratorium in 2000, it simply had 
abolished capital punishment.  In this present time of budget crisis, the 
legislature and other state authorities need to reexamine the purpose and 
value of the capital punishment system. 
II. THE ILLINOIS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SYSTEM 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Illinois capital punishment system is similar to those in effect in 
the majority of states with a death penalty.  A defendant is ―death-eligible‖ 
if he is charged with a first-degree murder that includes at least one of the 
twenty-one ―special circumstances,‖ or enumerated statutory aggravating 
factors.
51
  If a county state‘s attorney decides that one or more of these 
circumstances exist and then decides to prosecute the case as a capital case, 
the state‘s attorney will file a ―notice of intent‖ to seek the death penalty.
52
  
If the state‘s attorney does not withdraw the notice of intent prior to trial 
(which has been estimated to occur in about 60% of the cases in Illinois)
53
 
and the defendant does not opt for a bench trial, the case will be tried before 
a special ―death-qualified‖ jury.
54
  Death-qualified juries must be composed 
of jurors who would be willing to impose the death penalty.  These 
specially qualified jurors are selected according to a set of complicated 
 
49 See infra Part II.C. 
50 See infra Part III.C. 
51 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010). 
52 Id. at 5/9-1(d).  The Guidelines for State‘s Attorneys included in Appendix A describe 
the criteria and principles which the state‘s attorneys have adopted as descriptive of their 
decisionmaking process at this first stage. 
53 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REFORM STUDY COMM., FINAL REPORT 90 (2010) [hereinafter 
CPRSC FINAL REPORT] avaliable at http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/dpsrc/ 
CPRSC – Sixth and Final Report.pdf.  This may be done as part of a plea agreement or for a 
variety of other reasons. 
54 Id. at 16. 
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procedural standards first announced in Witherspoon v. Illinois.
55
  After the 
death-qualified capital jury is seated, the case proceeds to capital trial. 
If the state‘s attorney intends to prosecute a murder as a capital case, 
he must file a notice of intent to do so within 120 days of arraignment.
56
  
The notice must include a reference to the specific aggravating factors that 
will be the basis of the capital prosecution.
57
  Under the present practice, 
however, the statutory time limit of 120 days from arraignment for the 
filing of a notice of intent is routinely waived by the defense or ignored by 
both parties.
58
  If the defense does not waive the time limitation, a state‘s 
attorney who is on the fence may be more likely to declare the case capital 
in order to meet the deadline and preserve the option, whereas additional 
time for the decision might make it less likely that the case would be 
declared capital.   
It is also relevant that as soon as the case is declared capital, the 
defense counsel must immediately begin preparation for a penalty phase 
trial and begin to develop mitigating evidence.  Thus, it may be in the 
interest of the public defender not to object to the waiving of the time 
 
55 Death qualification of jurors has generated an enormous amount of literature and 
litigation.  Its foundation was laid in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968), in 
which the Supreme Court decided that general objections to, or religious scruples against, 
the death penalty do not disqualify prospective jurors from service in a capital case.  For a 
small part of the extensive literature on Witherspoon and the effect of death qualification, see 
Samuel R. Gross, Determining the Neutrality of Death-Qualified Juries: Judicial Appraisal 
of Empirical Data, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 7 (1984); see also William J. Bowers, Marla 
Sandys & Benjamin D. Steiner, Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors‟ 
Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1476, 1484–86 (1998); Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury 
Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 450–54 (1998). 
56 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 416(c).  Prior to the establishment of this rule, the notice of intent 
could be filed any time prior to the beginning of the capital trial.  If the notice of intent was 
not filed until late in the proceedings, the defense was often unable to prepare for the 
possibility of a capital trial and unprepared at the time of trial. 
57 Id.  The notice shall specify any and all of the twenty-one statutory aggravating factors 
the state intends to prove at the penalty phase of the capital trial.  Id. 
58 In public testimony at the hearings conducted by the Capital Punishment Reform 
Study Committee, both defense counsel and state‘s attorneys testified that the 120-day filing 
requirement was routinely waived by the defense. 
A trial judge said that, in deciding whether or not to serve a capital punishment notice, there are 
often strong budgetary and public relations incentives for elected State‘s Attorneys to take 
advantage of the availability of funds from the CLTF, rather than using county funds to pay the 
expenses of first degree murder cases.  Another judge said this pressure exists in almost all 
downstate counties.  One of our own knowledgeable Committee members, who is involved in 
capital trials, said he suspected, although he could not prove, that some State‘s Attorneys from 
sparsely populated downstate counties filed Notices of Intent to seek the death penalty in order to 
avoid having the costs paid with county funds. 
CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 98. 
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limitation.  An extension of time beyond the 120 days allows more time for 
negotiation over a plea bargain as to either sentence or charge.  Plea 
bargaining to drop the capital charge occurs routinely.
59
  If the purpose of 
the 120-day time limit was to restrain the use of charge bargaining over the 
capital charge in potentially capital cases, then waiving the time 
requirement obviates that purpose. 
Assuming the notice of intent is filed and not dropped, the case 
proceeds to capital trial.  In the first phase of the capital trial, the guilt 
phase, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to the trial 
court judge or to the death-qualified jury that the defendant is guilty of first-
degree murder, as well as the other offenses in the indictment.
60
  The trial 
court jury does not address the statutory aggravating or mitigating factors at 
the guilt phase.  The indictment must specify the crime of first-degree 
murder and that the defendant committed the homicidal act or hired another 
to do so.
61
  If the jury does not acquit but also does not find the defendant 
guilty of death eligible first-degree murder, then the death-qualified jury is 
dismissed and the trial judge simply sentences the defendant in accordance 
with the law governing terms and sentences in noncapital cases.
62
 
If the jury finds the defendant guilty of death-eligible murder, the 
capital trial proceeds to the next stage, the penalty phase.  The death-
qualified jury or the trial court judge then must first decide as a matter of 
fact whether the state has proven the existence of one or more of the 
statutory aggravating factors before weighing them against statutory 
mitigating factors presented by the defense.
63
  Both the defense and the 
 
59 Id. at 124. 
60 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010).  For example, 
if a defendant is indicted for first-degree murder and armed robbery, the prosecutor at the 
guilt phase must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the murder 
with the requisite intent and by his own conduct (or paid another), and that the defendant is 
guilty of the robbery or other felony predicate. 
61 Non-slayer participants in felony murder are not eligible for capital prosecution in 
Illinois.  Id. at 5/9-1(b)(6)(a)(i).  ―The majority of states with capital punishment statutes 
have some version of the felony aggravating factor as one of the criteria for the imposition of 
the death penalty.‖  Bienen, supra note 5, at 727 (1991) (annotating state statutory provisions 
enumerating the felony factor). 
62 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(g).  
63 ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR‘S COMM‘N REPORT, supra note 23, at 138.  The state‘s attorney 
may then present evidence of nonstatutory aggravating factors at the penalty phase: 
The establishment of nonstatutory aggravating factors is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
authorize imposition of the death penalty.  Nonstatutory aggravating factors may be considered 
by the jury in selecting an appropriate sentence once a defendant is found eligible for the death 
penalty, but they are not, and cannot be, used to determine that eligibility, as the Supreme Court 
has explained: ―[S]tatutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function 
at the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death 
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prosecution may present any evidence at the penalty phase that is reliable 
and relevant.
64
  The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt the factual basis for one or more statutory aggravating 
factors.
65
  After the factual finding of the existence of one or more statutory 
aggravating factors, the prosecution may introduce evidence of nonstatutory 
aggravating factors, and the defense may present evidence of mitigating 
factors, under this reduced standard of admissibility.  The reason for the 
relaxation of the evidence rules at this stage of the penalty phase is so that 
the defense and the prosecution may present evidence of mitigation and 
aggravation that might not meet the ordinary rules of admissibility, e.g. 
testimony of relatives about events in his childhood, educational 
experience, or other relevant mitigating evidence, and for the prosecution to 
present additional aggravating evidence that might not have been 
admissible at the guilt phase.
66
 
The penalty-phase jury finds the factors and the judge sentences based 
upon the jury‘s findings.  If the death-qualified jury unanimously 
determines that there is at least one aggravating factor and no mitigating 
factors present, , or the trial court judge makes such a determination, the 
trial court judge is required to sentence the defendant to death.
67
  If the 
unanimous jury or the judge decides the statutory aggravating factors 
outweigh the statutory mitigating factors found, the judge is required to 
sentence the defendant to death.
68
  However, if in a jury trial, one or more 
jurors conclude that death is not the appropriate sentence, the trial judge is 
required to sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment pursuant to 
requirements of the sentencing statutes.
69
 
If the trial court judge imposes a death sentence, an execution date is 
set, and the appeal of the capital sentence bypasses the intermediate 
appellate division and goes directly to the Illinois Supreme Court.
70
  The 
 
penalty.  But the Constitution does not require the jury to ignore other possible aggravating 
factors in the process of selecting, from among that class, those defendants who will actually be 
sentenced to death. 
United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 325 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 
U.S. 862, 878 (1983)). 
64 In Illinois and elsewhere the rules for the admissibility of evidence at the penalty phase 
of a capital case are typically relaxed for both the defense and the prosecution.  The only 
requirement for admissibility is that the evidence be relevant and reliable.  See, e.g., People 
v. Banks, No. 103933, 2010 WL 572105, at *20 (Ill. Feb. 19, 2010). 
65 See ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR‘S COMM‘N REPORT, supra note 23, at 137–38.  
66 Id. 
67 Id. at  152. 
68 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(g) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010).  
69 Id. 
70 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b);  ILL. SUP. CT. R. 603. 
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Illinois Supreme Court may overturn the death sentence ―if the court finds 
that the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular 
case . . . [and] shall issue a written opinion explaining this finding.‖
71
  This 
is a new rule.  Previously, some Illinois Supreme Court precedent implied 
the court may have considered its jurisdiction to be limited to procedural 
matters.
72
  If the Illinois Supreme Court sets aside the death sentence, it may 
remand the case to the trial court for another capital trial, or in some 
circumstances the Illinois Supreme Court may hold that the defendant may 
not be re-prosecuted capitally.
73
  If the Illinois Supreme Court upholds the 
death sentence, a series of postconviction appeals will be made to both state 
and federal courts.
74
  As an appeal of last resort, the person sentenced to 
death may appeal for a commutation from the Governor.
75
 
Under the Illinois capital punishment statute, a large percentage of the 
first-degree murders committed in Illinois are technically eligible to be 
prosecuted as capital cases.
76
  The Illinois capital punishment statute 
contains twenty-one statutory aggravating factors that qualify a murder for 
capital prosecution.
77
  These factors are unusually expansive, creating a 
large pool of potentially death-eligible cases throughout the state.
78
  The 
most important and most frequently charged factor is the felony statutory 
aggravating factor, which renders death-eligible the actor who causes the 
death of the murdered individual with intent during the course of a felony 
that is an inherently violent crime, or during the attempt to commit an 
inherently violent crime.
79
  Although the 2002 Governor‘s Commission 
Report recommended narrowing the scope of the felony factor, the 
 
71 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(i). 
72 Cullerton et al., supra note 41.  Under its authority to set aside or modify death 
sentences on the grounds of the violation of state or federal constitutional principles, the 
court always could set aside death sentences. 
73 See e.g., People v. Morris, 848 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (2004) (prohibiting state from 
seeking death penalty when retrying defendant whose conviction was reversed after his 
original sentence had been commuted from death to life in prison). 
74 ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR‘S COMM‘N REPORT, supra note 23, at 165–66. 
75 ILL. CONST. art. V, § 12.  It was under the Governor‘s clemency powers that Governor 
George Ryan commuted the death sentences in 2003.  See also NULSCCD, supra note 1 
(Notices of Intent). 
76 ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR‘S COMM‘N REPORT, supra note 23, at 66. 
77 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010). 
78 This issue of the over-inclusiveness of the Illinois statutory aggravating factors was 
addressed, but not effectively changed, by the 2003 reforms.  The Governor‘s Commission 
unanimously recommended that the Illinois statute be revised to reduce the list of eligibility 
factors (then numbering twenty) that qualify a defendant for capital punishment.  See ILL. 
2002 GOVERNOR‘S COMM‘N REPORT, supra note 23, at 67–73. 
79 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b)(6) (emphasis added). 
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legislature has not been willing to strictly limit or remove it.
80
  When 
considered together, several other imprecise or expansive statutory 
aggravating factors could be used to characterize the circumstances of 
almost any first-degree murder.
81
  Since few first-degree murders are 
ineligible for capital prosecution, the discretion of county state‘s attorneys 
to declare a case capital is of paramount importance. 
B. THE REFORM AND ITS AFTERMATH 
1. The Impetus for Reform 
Illinois became the symbol for all that was wrong with the death 
penalty in America when, in a series of cascading revelations beginning in 
the late 1990s, more than a dozen persons on death row were discovered to 
be innocent of the crimes for which they had been convicted and sentenced 
to death.
82
  These death sentences had been upheld through all state and 
federal stages of direct and collateral review.  These cases, which were 
widely publicized in Illinois and elsewhere, involved false and coerced 
confessions, faulty eyewitness identifications, and cases in which the 
evidence of the defendants‘ guilt was primarily established through the 
testimony of jailhouse informants.
83
  The Illinois Supreme Court had even 
 
80 The 2002 Governor‘s Commission Report was highly critical of the overuse of the 
felony factor, and came close to recommending its elimination.  A majority of the members 
recommended a list of five factors that excluded the felony factor, while a minority 
recommended the same five factors plus retaining the felony factor.  ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR‘S 
COMM‘N REPORT, supra note 23 at 73–74.  Neither position, majority nor minority, was 
accepted by the general assembly.  Instead, the statute relating to homicides committed 
during the course of a felony was rewritten to reduce the former list of fifteen predicate 
felonies to nine, and a twenty-first eligibility factor was added, involving homicides 
committed in the course of an offense of terrorism.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b)(21). 
81 The other very broad statutory aggravating factors include: ―the murder was 
committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, 
scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant 
created a reasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result . . . ‖ 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b)(11); ―the murder was committed as a result of the intentional 
discharge of a firearm by the defendant from a motor vehicle and the victim was not present 
within the motor vehicle,‖ 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b)(15); and ―the murdered 
individual was subject to an order of protection and the murder was committed by a person 
against whom the same order of protection was issued under the Illinois Domestic Violence 
Act of 1986.‖  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b)(19). 
82 See Marshall, supra note 19, at 577–79; Warden, supra note 9, at 411–26. 
83 The lead up to the reforms and the establishment of the Ryan Commission are 
described in SCOTT TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT: A LAWYER‘S REFLECTIONS ON DEALING 
WITH THE DEATH PENALTY 16–46 (2003).  They are also described in Marshall, supra note 
19; and Warden, supra note 9; see also Michael P. Toomin, Capital Punishment Reform and 
the Illinois Supreme Court: At the Forefront of Change, 92 ILL. B.J. 642 (2004). 
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upheld the death sentences imposed by a trial judge who had been accepting 
bribes regularly during the time of the capital trials before him.
84
 
Most dramatic was the exoneration of Anthony Porter, who, although 
innocent of the murder for which he was sentenced to die, came within days 
of being executed.
85
  His and similar wrongful convictions were only 
discovered after extensive and longstanding investigations by journalists, 
lawyers, students, volunteers, and many others.
86
  Many of those whose 
convictions were overturned or commuted later sued the county, the City of 
Chicago, or the state for their wrongful convictions.
87
 
Governor Ryan‘s 2000 moratorium on executions was the first 
statewide moratorium on executions in the country.  It provoked 
considerable comment, not all of it favorable.
88
  Moratoria in other states 
quickly followed.
89
  At the same time, litigation regarding the 
constitutionality of lethal injection was gaining traction, and several states 
implemented moratoria on executions until this issue was settled.
90
  The 
history of the Governor‘s moratorium, the commutations, and other aspects 
of the reform movement in Illinois has been chronicled elsewhere.
91
  This 
 
84 For a discussion of this series of cases, see Bienen, supra note 8, at 212.  The Illinois 
Supreme Court upheld the death sentences imposed by Judge Maloney even though the 
petitioners argued the judge ―came down hard‖ in cases where he was not bribed in order to 
avoid what proved to be an accurate suspicion that he was ―on the take.‖  Indeed, this 
behavior was confirmed in the evidence presented during his trial and conviction.  During 
the time when he was accepting bribes, Judge Maloney imposed eight death sentences.  A 
divided Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to overturn these death sentences, but they 
were later reversed by the United States Supreme Court essentially adopting the stinging 
dissent.  Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 696 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 520 U.S. 899 (1997).  
Then, and only then, did the Illinois Supreme Court overturn these death sentences, although 
the State continued to argue even after the United States Supreme Court opinion that the 
defendants had waived their right to attack their convictions on due process grounds.  People 
v. Hawkins, 690 N.E.2d 999, 1004 (Ill. 1998). 
85 The story of the commutations has been chronicled elsewhere.  See Marshall, supra 
note 19; Sarat, supra note 26; Warden, supra note 9. 
86 Warden, supra note 9, at 410. 
87 The monetary awards to date from those lawsuits for those sentenced to death are 
presented in Table 7, infra. 
88 Austin Sarat, Mercy, Clemency, and Capital Punishment: Two Accounts, 3 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 273, 273 (2005) (describing how death penalty supporters ―demonized 
Ryan‖ while, among death penalty opponents, ―Ryan became an instant hero, and his 
decision became a signal moment in the evolution of new abolitionist politics‖).  The 
moratorium has continued to be controversial.  
89 States with a current moratorium on executions include Illinois, New Mexico, 
Arkansas, Nevada, North Carolina, California, Maryland, Kentucky, and Nebraska.  The 
Death Penalty in Flux, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-flux (last visited March 17, 2010). 
90 For a history of the lethal injection litigation, see Denno, supra note 27. 
91 See TUROW, supra note 83; Sarat, supra note 26; Warden, supra note 9. 
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section will focus on the effects of the reforms that followed the 
moratorium in 2000 and the Ryan commutations in 2003, including the 
work of the Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee and the practical 
effects of the Capital Litigation Trust Fund on capital prosecutions in 
Illinois. 
2. The Specifics of the Illinois Capital Punishment Reforms 
What are commonly referred to as the Illinois Capital Punishment 
Reforms of 2003 were enacted in several different legal forms (and some 
before 2003) and institutionalized in various governmental bodies and 
agencies.  They included: the Governor‘s unilateral moratorium on 
executions (in 2000) (discussed in Part I above); the establishment of the 
Capital Litigation Trust Fund by the legislature within the Illinois Treasury 
(effective 2000) (discussed in Part II.B.3 below); the establishment of the 
Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee by the legislature in 2003); 
rule changes put in place by the Illinois Supreme Court (recommended by 
the Report of the Special Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases in 
1999, adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in 2001); changes to police 
procedures and practices (recommended by the 2002 Governor‘s 
Commission and other sources, adopted piecemeal at various times and in 
various forms); and other miscellaneous recommendations regarding police 
and court procedures.
92
  Some recommendations that have not been adopted 
seem trivial and would require little effort, such as the recommendation that 
a copy of all notices of intent filed be sent to the Illinois Supreme Court.  
Yet this would actually have a profound effect upon the ability of 
researchers, and practitioners, to track the interpretation of the death penalty 
statute throughout the state over time. 
The patchwork nature of the reforms is confusing; nonetheless, several 
overarching features are noteworthy.  Although the well-regarded 2002 
Governor‘s Commission made eighty-five recommendations, very few of 
them were enacted or put into effect.
93
  Most importantly, the Commission 
recommended that the Illinois Supreme Court conduct proportionality 
 
92 For a description of these reforms, see Cullerton et al., supra note 41; Hayler, supra 
note 21; Toomin, supra note 83; Warden, supra note 9. 
93 The Commission‘s Report contained eighty-five recommendations, none of which 
were adopted by the 2002 general assembly.  The Ryan commutations took place in January 
2003.  During the 2003 general assembly, a number of the Commission recommendations 
were enacted and signed into law by then-Governor Rod Blagojevich.  For a detailed 
description of the work of the Commission by one of its members, see TUROW, supra note 
83, at 25–32, 63–102.  Thomas Sullivan was the Co-Chair of the 2002 Governor‘s 
Commission and later the Chair of the Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee. 
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review, and establish a statewide capital crimes database.
94
  The court and 
the legislature have consistently refused to adopt these recommendations.
95
  
Some of the reforms that were adopted, however, include: 
 Requirements for the electronic recording of custodial 
interrogations of suspects in homicide investigations; 
 Changes in recommended procedures for police lineups; 
 Recommendations for the processing of DNA evidence and 
defense accessibility to that evidence; 
 Requirements for a pretrial hearing on the reliability of evidence 
proffered by a jailhouse informant; 
 The recommendation that state‘s attorneys establish guidelines for 
the prosecution of capital cases;
96
 
 The establishment of training programs for prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and judges; 
 A provision authorizing the Illinois Supreme Court to overturn a 
death sentence if the court finds the death sentence is 
fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular case;
97
 and 
 The establishment of the Capital Punishment Reform Study 
Committee (CPRSC). 
The mandate of the CPRSC was to study and report to the general 
assembly regarding: 
The impact of reforms on the issue of uniformity and proportionality in the 
application of the death penalty including, but not limited to, the tracking of data 
related to whether the reforms have eliminated the statistically significant differences 
in sentencing related to the geographic location of the homicide and the race of the 





94 ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR‘S COMM‘N REPORT, supra note 23, at 166–68.  
95 Comparative proportionality review in death cases is not required by the United States 
Constitution, and has never been a feature of the review of capital sentencing under the 
Illinois constitution.  People v. Thompson, 853 N.E. 2d 378, 404–05 (Ill. 2006).  A statewide 
capital crimes database was authoirzed, but not funded, by the Illinois Capital Crimes 
Database Act in 2007.  20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3930/7.6. 
96 See infra Appendix A and Part II.E. 
97 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(i) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010).  That provision 
has never been acted upon or invoked by the Illinois Supreme Court, according to the 
attorney general‘s office.  Nor, some have argued, did the Illinois Supreme Court need any 
such authorization to overturn a death sentence in the interests of justice or procedural due 
process.  See Bienen, supra note 8, at 197–207. 
98 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3929/2(b)(1) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010).  The CPRSC 
formalized its purpose in the following language:  
A majority of the Committee members concluded that their function under the enabling statute is 
to evaluate the impact of the reforms to the Illinois capital punishment system enacted by the 
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The CPRSC collected data and commissioned surveys of police, 
prosecutors, judges, administrators and other criminal justice personnel.
99
  It 
addressed issues of proportionality and county-by-county disparities as part 
of its mandate to study the effect of the Ryan reforms on the previous 
finding of statistically significant differences in sentencing related to the 
location of the murder, geographical differences based upon where the 
homicide took place and was prosecuted, and the race of the victim.  The 
CPRSC‘s own commissioned research found that although geographic and 




3. The History of the Capital Litigation Trust Fund and Its Impact 
The Capital Litigation Trust Fund (CLTF) was created in 1999, 
effective January 1, 2000, to promote fairness in the defense and 
prosecution of death penalty cases.
101
  This bipartisan legislation was 
approved overwhelmingly after thirteen persons had their death sentences 
overturned.  Although the passage of the reform legislation was spurred by 
publicity surrounding wrongful convictions and inadequate representation 
by the defense in some capital cases, the CTLF was set up from its 
inception to provide funds to county state‘s attorneys as well as to public 
defenders in the trial regions and in Cook County.
102
  In some states, such 
 
93rd General Assembly against the backdrop of the reforms that have been implemented by the 
judiciary and other government agencies, as well as other reforms proposed by the Governor‘s 
Commission which may be necessary or advisable to adopt in order to make fully effective the 
reforms already adopted. 
CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 4.  For a description of the work of the CPRSC, its 
structure, compliance with the open meetings act, etc., see id. at 4–8. 
99 The author of this Article was the Chair of Subcommittee 2, with the authority to study 
proportionality review and geographic disparity.  This subcommittee took upon itself the 
task of beginning to create a database of first-degree murders throughout the state from 
2003–2008.  The results of this research and its methodology will be made public on the 
Northwestern University School of Law library website.  Survey research and data 
compilation for the Committee, reproduced in Appendix B infra, was conducted by Dr. 
David Olson and his colleagues at Loyola University.  Id. at 9. 
100 See infra Part II.D (discussion of Tables A–F); see also CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra 
note 53, at 108–09. 
101 Capital Crimes Litigation Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/124 (West 1993). 
102 The CLTF also allocates money to the Appellate Office of the Attorney General and 
the Appellate Office of the Public Defender, as well as to appointed defense attorneys from 
the private bar.  CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 84.  Attorneys from the private bar 
represent indigent capital defendants at a set hourly rate of reimbursement when there is a 
conflict of interest for the public defender, e.g. the public defender is representing a 
codefendant in the same crime, or when the Office of the Public Defender is unable to 
represent the indigent defendant for another reason.  Federal funding for the Capital 
Resource Center within the Office of the Public Defender ceased in Fiscal Year 1996.  
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as North Carolina, additional funds for capital cases have been allocated 
only for the defense.
103
  In Illinois, the purpose of the CLTF from the 
beginning was to grant funds to county prosecutors and to the attorney 
general, as well to public defenders, and to appointed counsel for the 
defense of capital cases. 
Prior to the enactment of the CLTF, some counties may not have had 
the economic resources to prosecute a capital case.
104
  In the current 
economic crisis in Illinois, that may again be the circumstance.  The 
establishment of the CLTF removed much of the financial burden from the 
counties in Illinois at least for a brief period of time.  Even with the 
assistance of funds from the CLTF, however, the state will not reimburse 
the county for all of the costs of a capital case.  The salaries of state‘s 
attorneys and staff public defenders may not be subject to reimbursement 
by the CLTF, although the state‘s attorney‘s office may charge the expenses 
of investigators and support staff, proportionate to the amount of work they 
do on capital cases, to the CLTF.
105
   
One purpose of enacting the CLTF was to provide competent counsel 
for the defense and prosecution of capital cases, especially in rural areas or 
in less populated counties.
106
  Assigned defense counsel in the counties, 
especially in rural counties, may have worried that taking on the defense of 
a capital case would dominate or even destroy their practices.  That concern 
 
MICHAEL J. PELLETIER, OFFICE OF THE STATE APPELLATE DEFENDER, ANNUAL REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2009, Part III.F , available at http://www.state.il.us/ 
Defender/ar09.html. 
103 Indigent Defense Services Act of 2000, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-498 (2009). 
104 In New Jersey, for example, there was a period after the reenactment of capital 
punishment when no capital cases were prosecuted in Essex County (the county which 
includes Newark) although there were at least fifteen felony murders during the relevant 
time period where there was a factual basis for seeking the death penalty.  See Bienen, supra 
note 2, at 199 n.250. 
105 The Cook County state‘s attorney used the CLTF to pay for attorney training; other 
general expenses, such as computer expenses and indirect costs; $8,914,685.66 in payroll 
expenses; and expenditures to send attorneys to capital punishment conferences.  Letter from 
Paul A. Castiglione, Exec. Assistant State‘s Attorney for Policy, Office of the State‘s 
Attorney, Cook County Illinois, to Leigh Bienen, Re: FOIA Request (July 20, 2010) (on file 
with author).  For example, the state‘s attorneys charged the state for the payment of fees to 
mitigation experts and DNA testing.  See Capital Litigation Trust Fund, Reports of 
Expenditures (on file with the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology). 
106 House Debate, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Session, at 19 (Ill. May 21, 1999), available 
at http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans91/t052199.pdf (statement of Representative 
Durkin): 
[P]rosecutors in downstate on a number of occasions have not been able to proceed with capital 
punishment cases, because they‘ve stated that it will bankrupt the county, cause these are very 
expensive and these are very long trials.  So, I think what we‘re doing is that we are going to 
allow money for both sides.  It‘s equal funding. 
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was not unrealistic.  A capital case with its many motions and extensive 
preparations can swamp a small town law office.  Yet the reported pattern 
of capital prosecutions in the rural areas, according to research reported to 
the CPRSC, was paradoxical.  Namely, more capital cases, proportionately 
and absolutely, were prosecuted before the reforms, including before the 
establishment of the CLTF, than after the reforms.
107
  We may once again 
revert to a situation in which some rural counties cannot afford to prosecute 
or defend capital cases because of the legislature‘s current budget crisis.
108
  
The counties have already been affected by the state delaying payment of 
allocated funds to the counties.  
The allocation of funds from the CLTF is made from an annual 
appropriation made by the legislature to the CLTF.  From the outset, funds 
were separately set aside for allocation to Cook County, which regularly 
accounts for more than 60% of the murders in the state.
109
  Until the 
enactment of a statute in 2010, the Illinois treasurer had no authority to 
question the request for funds.
110
  His job was simply to disburse the money 
that had been appropriated, which was done in response to specific requests 
for funds for individual cases from judges in the counties.  The mechanism 
was that the trial court judge approved the request from the public defender 
or appointed attorneys. 
The distribution of murders across the state also plays some role in 
determining how much money each county receives from the CLTF.  
However, outside of Cook County and one or two other urban areas with a 
large number of murders, there is a surprising lack of correlation between 
the number of murders in the county, the average number of murders per 
capita in the county, and the disbursement of funds from the CLTF to that 
county.  Many counties in Illinois receive no funding because they have no 
murders, or no death-eligible murders, or choose not to prosecute their 
death-eligible murders as capital cases.  Other counties regularly have 
 
107 See infra Part II.D (discussion of Tables A–F). 
108 This is not an unrealistic concern.  In some states, public defenders have declared that 
they do not have the economic resources to defend capital cases.  The recent across the board 
cuts to the salaries of public defenders and state‘s attorneys will increase the financial strain 
on these officials.  See Tony Arnold, Cook County Attorneys Running Out of Money to Try 
Death Penalty Cases, CHI. PUB. RADIO (May 18, 2010) http://www.chicagopublicradio.org/ 
Content.aspx?audioID=42045.  Nor is this situation unique to Illinois.  The New York public 
defenders are being sued by indigent defendants because they cannot provide assistance due 
to lack of money.  William Glaberson, Court Rules That Suit on Public Defender System 
Can Proceed, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, at A20. 
109 According to the state police, Cook County had 584 murders in 2008 and 522 
murders in 2007.  CRIME IN ILLINOIS 2008 ANNUAL UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 53 (2009) 
[hereinafter CRIME IN ILLINOIS], available at http://www.isp.state.il.us/crime/cii2008.cfm. 
110 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 124/10(d) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010). 
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several death-eligible murders per year, but prosecute some as capital and 
others as non-capital, and some urban jurisdictions have dozens of death-
eligible murders every year and relatively few capital prosecutions.
111
  How 
CLTF funds have been spent and to whom they have been allocated are set 
out in Tables 1–6, below.  The patterns are not what might be expected. 
C. COUNTY DISPARITIES IN THE PROSECUTION OF CAPITAL CASES 
The unusual structure of the Illinois criminal justice system contributes 
to anomalous patterns in the prosecution of capital cases in Illinois.  There 
are 102 counties in Illinois, each with the authority to bring criminal 
indictments and the independent discretion to decide whether to charge a 
murder as a death-eligible offense.
112
  Each of the 102 counties has its own 
elected state‘s attorney.  Although the 2002 Governor‘s Commission 
recommended the establishment of a statewide panel to review statewide 
patterns in capital case charging, that reform was not enacted.
113
  The 
recommendation has been endorsed again in 2010 by the Committee to 
Study the Reform of the Death Penalty.
114
  Some have even argued that it 
would be unconstitutional under the state constitution for any superior 
authority to review the decision to declare a case capital.
115
 
Each of the 102 individual state‘s attorneys is elected every four years 
solely by the electorate in his or her county, and each now has the 
independent, allegedly unreviewable authority to designate for capital 
prosecution any or all or none of the death-eligible cases in his or her 
 
111 See infra Table 2. 
112 ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR‘S COMM‘N REPORT, supra note 23, at 16. 
113 Id. at 84.  The 2002 Governor‘s Commission recommended that the review committee 
be composed of the attorney general or designee, the state‘s attorney of Cook County or 
designee, a state‘s attorney from another county chosen by lot, the president of the Illinois 
State‘s Attorneys Association, and a retired judge, preferably with experience in criminal 
law, to be appointed by the Governor.  Id. 
114 CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 79–80. 
115 See ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR‘S COMM‘N REPORT, supra note 23, at 86–87.  Addressing 
this argument, the 2002 Governor‘s Commission report stated: 
The recommended statutory review procedure will not give rise to constitutional problems.  
While the office of State‘s Attorney is created by the Illinois Constitution, the powers and duties 
exercised by the State‘s Attorneys are defined by statute.  See 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-9. . . .  
. . . 
In view of the fact that the prosecutor‘s authority to seek the death penalty in the first instance is 
derived from the statute creating the entire sentencing scheme, a statutory amendment reducing 
the breadth of prosecutorial discretion would comport with the Illinois Constitution and 
decisional law. 
Id. 
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jurisdiction.
116
  There is at present no central, institutionalized review 
system in place to ensure that the charging of capital murder across the state 
is uniform or even consistent under the laws of the state across the 102 
county jurisdictions.  As a result, there are significant county-by-county 
disparities in the prosecution of capital cases. 
Table 1 is a summary for the State of Illinois of the following for the 
period 2000–2009: the number of murders; the number of capital 
prosecutions; the amount of money appropriated to the Capital Litigation 
Trust Fund; the number of death sentences imposed; the number of 
exonerations; and the amount of state payments in cases of wrongful 
convictions.  The information is separately reported for Cook County and 
all other counties for years 2000–2009.  Cook County accounted for 
approximately three-quarters of all murders, with a significantly higher 
murder rate than the rest of the state.  The largest number of those murders 
in Cook County took place in the City of Chicago.
117
 
 It is noteworthy that while Cook County has the largest number of 
murders, as well as the highest murder rate and the largest absolute number 
of capital prosecutions, Cook County does not have the highest rate of 
 
 
116 While the decision to declare a case capital may be within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the individual state‘s attorney for that county, the Illinois Supreme Court and the attorney 
general of the state have the power to review the constitutionality of patterns and practices 
across the state as a whole.  Indeed, their mandate to enforce the laws requires them to do so. 
While the Office of the State‘s Attorney is created by the state constitution, the powers and 
duties exercised by the state‘s attorney are defined by statute.  See 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/3-9005 (West 1993 & 2010 Supp.).  The legislature and the Illinois Supreme Court have 
the authority and the duty to interpret and review the application of state statutes.  The 
legislature can amend or remove statutory aggravating factors, or even to repeal the entire 
capital punishment system.  It is also axiomatic that the state‘s attorney‘s duty is to comply 
with statutory law and to act in accordance with the constitution of the state and of the 
United States.  Id. 
117 The second most populous county in the United States, Cook County includes over 
5.29 million residents, making up 41% of the population of Illinois.  See CRIME IN ILLINOIS 
supra note 109 at 53–60. Cook County encompasses the City of Chicago along with an 
additional 128 municipalities, the largest of which include the suburbs of Evanston, 
Schaumburg, Skokie, and Arlington Heights.  About Cook County, COOKCOUNTYGOV.COM 
(2010) http://www.cookcountygov.com/portal/server.pt/community/government/ 
226/about_cook_county.  Of Cook County residents, 66.8% are white, 25.6% are black, 
23.2% are Hispanic or Latino and 5.8% are Asian.  Id.   
 The homicide rate for the state as a whole in 2008 was 6.1 murders per 100,000 people.  
In total, this comes to 790 murders committed in Illinois; 73.9%, or 584, of those murders 
took place in Cook County, a homicide rate of 11.0 murders per 100,000 residents.  See 
CRIME IN ILLINOIS , supra note 109, at 53–60.  Of those murders committed in Cook County, 
510, 87.3% took place within Chicago‘s city limits, while the remaining 74 murders, 
comprising 12.7%, occurred in the surrounding suburbs.  Id. at 10–18, 53–60.  
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Table 1 
SUMMARY TABLE: MURDERS, CAPITAL PROSECUTIONS, CAPITAL LITIGATION 










(Col. 1) (Col. 2) 
(Col. 3) 
(Col. 1 + Col. 2) 
Murders  
a
 6272 2131 8403 
Capital Prosecutions  
b
 294 213 507 
Amount Appropriated to 
CLTF 
$71,941,100 $37,718,000 $109,659,100 
Death Sentences Imposed 6 11
c
 17 




13 5 18 
State Payments for 
Wrongful Convictions  
e
 
$55,777,650 $9,195,397 $64,973,047 
Source: Illinois State Police; Cook County State‘s Attorney‘s Office; Illinois State 




a 2009 figures are pending, and at present unavailable.  The figures recorded for 2008 are 
projected as estimates for 2009. 
b For Cook County, the source is the Cook County State‘s Attorney‘s Office.  The figure 
includes 2009, and the first six months of 2010.  For all other counties, the source is number 
of cases to which disbursements were made from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund. 
c This figure includes the death sentences imposed on Brian Nelson and Laurence 
Lovejoy, whose sentences were subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court of Illinois. 
d This figure represents the total number of exonerations in Cook County and in all other 
Illinois counties, including those for convictions prior to the year 2000. 
e This figure includes the exonerees‘ court of claims awards, settlement awards, and legal 
fees accrued by defendant counties, cities, or both named in post-exoneration federal civil 
rights suits brought by exonerated persons as plaintiffs.  It excludes any awards or fees 
accrued in 2010.  For details, see infra Table 7 (State Expenditures on Wrongful 
Convictions). 
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declaring murders death-eligible (calculated by dividing the number of 
murders by the number of capital prosecutions).  Nor does Cook County 
account for the largest proportion of death sentences or the largest number 
of death sentences imposed over the period 2000–2009.
118
  Table 1 shows 
that there were some 500 cases which the state‘s attorneys noticed for 
capital prosecution.
119
  These cases resulted in the imposition of seventeen 
death sentences.  The Capital Litigation Trust Fund appropriated more than 
$109 million for the prosecution of these cases, with Cook County 
receiving less than three-quarters of the money appropriated.  Cook County 
accounted for about 70% of all murders.
120
  Cook County had the largest 
number of exonerations in capital cases, and also the largest awards in cases 
of wrongful convictions.  Details for these figures are reported in Tables 2–
7. 
Table 2 shows the number of murders by county for the years 2000–
2008, the per capita murder rate, the number of capital cases prosecuted, 
and the number of death sentences imposed (excluding Cook County), 
ranking counties by those with the highest number of murders.
121
  The 
number of capital prosecutions was calculated by totaling the number of 
individual cases funded by the CLTF by county.  This figure is not an 
estimate or a projection, but a count of distinctly identified cases 
individually funded by the CLTF.
122
  To the extent that counties served 
notices of intent to seek the death penalty and neither the defense nor the 
state‘s attorney asked for funds from the CLTF, those cases were excluded.  
The total of capital prosecutions reported would then be an undercount, 
although funds would be expected to be sought from the CLTF if a case 
 
 
118 Please note that in this discussion, some tables are for the period 2000–2010, some 
are for the period 2000–2009, and other tables are organized by fiscal year.  The time period 
used for each table was determined by the time period for the corresponding data received 
from the Illinois state treasurer, the Cook County treasurer, or the Illinois State Crime 
Reports. 
119 The number of capital prosecutions is a total of the distinct case numbers in each 
individual county to which the CLTF granted funds.  This allows for a tabulation of the 
number of cases by year and county.  Cook County detailed data by case were not available 
for the entire period.  See Capital Litigation Trust Fund, Reports of Expenditures (on file 
with the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology).  
120 This does not include the appropriations for 2010. 
121 Table 2 includes capital prosecutions during 2009 and 2010 and results in Cook 
County accounting for 53.5% of all capital prosecutions. 
122 In other words, this is not a prosecutor's or defense attorney's recollection of how 
many capital cases were prosecuted in the county, it is a record of how many individual 
cases the CLTF funded.  
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Table 2 
Murders, Capital Prosecutions, and Death Sentences Imposed by County, 




























 (Col. 1) (Col. 2) (Col. 3) (Col. 4) (Col. 5) 
St. Clair 311 34.6 13.36 17 1 
Winnebago 176 19.6 6.81 2 0 
Kane 154 17.3 3.94 14 0 
Will 152 16.9 2.92 8 1 
Peoria 130 14.4 7.9 4 0 
Lake 100 11.1 1.63 13 0 
Madison 100 11.1 4.24 18 0 
Sangamon 79 8.8 4.59 3 0 
DuPage 78 8.7 0.93 21 2 
Macon 71 7.9 7.07 14 0 
 
f The data for 2000–2008 includes the first year of the Capital Litigation Trust Fund and 
the last year for which county and state data for murders were available from the Illinois 
State Police. 
g Per 100,000 persons. 
h Column 4 includes capital cases that had been certified as death-eligible prior to the 
year 2000 and were pending during the date universe displayed.  The numbers of capital 
prosecutions for each county are the total number of cases, by case number, receiving funds 
from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund, as reported by the Illinois state treasurer for the years 
2000–2008.  Co-defendants prosecuted under the same case number were counted as one 
case. 





































5688 632 11.5 271
j
 6 
Source: Illinois State Police Uniform Crime Reports; Illinois State Treasurer‘s Office; 
Supreme Court of Illinois. 
 
was declared capital after 2000. There is little reason to think this is a 
significant undercount of the number of capital prosecutions in the state 
during the period. 
St. Clair County has the second highest absolute number of murders 
after Cook County and the highest murder rate in the state.
123
  St. Clair has a 
 
i This figure includes the death sentences imposed on Brian Nelson and Laurence 
Lovejoy, whose sentences were subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court of Illinois.  
The Supreme Court of Illinois ordered Brian Nelson to be re-sentenced to a penalty other 
than death.  People v. Nelson, 922 N.E.2d 1056 (2009).  It overturned Laurence Lovejoy‘s 
conviction and sentence and due to trial court error and remanded for a new trial.  People v. 
Lovejoy, 919 N.E.2d 843 (2009). 
j For Cook County, the source is the Cook County State‘s Attorney‘s Office.  This 
number includes cases which were certified as death penalty eligible prior to the year 2000 
and were pending during the date universe displayed.  It excludes capital cases originating 
during 2009 and 2010.   
123 St. Clair County, Illinois, which includes East St. Louis, is located on the 
southwestern border of Illinois.  The county makes up 1.7% of the state population, with 
216,316 residents.  U.S. Census Bureau, State and County QuickFacts (2008), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html [hereinafter U.S. Census Bureau, State and 
County QuickFacts 2008] (select ―Illinois;‖ select each county in Illinois and refer to 
"Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Area").  Of these, 67.5% of St. Clair County 
residents are white, 29.4% are black, 2.8% are Hispanic or Latino and 1.2%  are Asian.  Id.  
In the state as a whole, 79.1% of Illinois residents reported their ethnicity as white, 14.9% 
reported as black, 15.2% reported as Hispanic or Latino and 4.3% reported as Asian.  Id. 
According to the 2008 Illinois Annual Uniform Crime Report, 35 murders were committed 
in St. Clair County in that year.  CRIME IN ILLINOIS, supra note 109, at 162.  Of those 
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high murder rate (13.36/100,000) and a large number of cases were death-
noticed, but only one death sentence was imposed during the entire period.  
The total number of murders in other individual counties is significantly 
lower. 
After Cook County, among the counties with the largest number of 
murders, only DuPage County imposed more than one death sentence 
during the period 2000–2008.
124
  DuPage County accounted for two death 
sentences in the period.
125
  DuPage County has a low average per capita 
murder rate of 0.93, and a total of seventy-eight murders for the entire 
period 2000–2008.  DuPage County, however, prosecuted twenty-one cases 
as capital cases, the largest number of any of those counties with a 
relatively large absolute number of murders during the period 2000–2008. 
Madison County, with a per capita murder rate of 4.24, prosecuted 
eighteen cases as capital cases.
126
  Kane County, with a total of 154 murders 
and an average annual per capital murder rate of 3.94, prosecuted fourteen 
cases capitally.
127
  Macon County prosecuted fourteen cases capitally, with 
 
murders, 16, or 46.7%, were reported by the East St. Louis police department.  Id.  East St. 
Louis accounts for 13.4% of the total population of St. Clair County.  Id. at 162–64.  
124 DuPage County, located in the northeast corner of Illinois immediately west of Cook 
County, had a population of 929,192 in 2008.  U.S. Census Bureau, State and County 
QuickFacts 2008, supra note 123.   DuPage County makes up a little over 7% of the total 
population of Illinois.  Of the county‘s residents, 83.8% are white, 4.7% are black, 12.6% are 
Hispanic or Latino and 9.9% are Asian.  Id.  For comparison, in the state of Illinois 79.1% of 
residents are white, 14.9% are black, 15.2% are Hispanic or Latino and 4.3% are Asian.  Id.  
In 2008, six murders were committed in DuPage County, making the homicide rate 0.6 
murders for every 100,000 residents.  CRIME IN ILLINOIS, supra note 109, at 68. 
125 This figure does not include the Brian Dugan death sentence imposed in 2010.  For a 
discussion of the Brian Dugan case, see infra note 223 and accompanying text. 
126 Madison County borders St. Clair County to the north and had a population of 
267,347 residents in 2008.  U.S. Census Bureau, State and County QuickFacts 2008, supra 
note 123.  The county makes up approximately 2% of Illinois‘s total population.  Id.  Within 
Madison County, 89.6% of people are white, 8.1% are black, 2.2% are Hispanic or Latino 
and 0.7% are Asian.  Id. For a comparison to Illinois‘ demographical makeup, see supra note 
123 (providing demographic information for the state of Illinois).  The 2008 murder rate in 
Madison County was 5.6 murders for every 100,000 persons, or 15 murders committed 
during that year.  CRIME IN ILLINOIS, supra note 109, at 121. 
127 Bordering DuPage and Cook Counties to the west, Kane County had a population of 
501,021, or approximately 4% of the population of Illinois, in 2008.  U.S. Census Bureau, 
State and County QuickFacts 2008, supra note 123.  U.S. Census data reports from 2008 
indicate that 89.6% of people living in Kane County are white, 5.6% are black, 28.6% are 
Hispanic or Latino and 3.2% are Asian.  Id. For a comparison to Illinois‘ demographical 
makeup, see supra note 123 (providing demographic information for the state of Illinois).  
Kane County has a homicide rate of one murder for every 100,000 persons and five murders 
were committed within the county in 2008. CRIME IN ILLINOIS, supra note 109, at 99.   
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an average per capita murder rate of 7.07.
128
  Lake County, with 100 
murders during the period, and an average per capita murder rate of 
1.63/100,000, prosecuted thirteen murders as capital cases.
129
 
In short, the total number of murders during the period and the average 
annual murder rate do not correlate with the number of capital prosecutions 
in the county.  The counties with the most murders are not the counties 
most likely to declare a case capital.  Nor is this a pattern limited to Illinois.  
It has been documented in other states as well.
130
  Since so few persons 
were sentenced to death at all, commentary on the rate of death sentences 
imposed is not warranted. 
Noteworthy also is the distribution at the opposite end of the scale: 
Winnebago County, with 176 murders during the period and an average per 
capita murder rate of 6.81, prosecuted only two cases capitally.  Sangamon 
County with a total of seventy-nine cases and a murder rate of 4.59 per 
100,000, prosecuted three cases capitally.  The distribution, once Cook 
County is excluded, shows that the counties with the largest number of 
murders and the highest murder rates are not the most likely to prosecute a 




128 Macon County is located in central Illinois.  In 2008, it had a population of 108,732 
and made up 0.8% of Illinois‘s total population.  U.S. Census Bureau, State and County 
QuickFacts 2008, supra note 123.  82.2% of people in Macon County are white, 14.9% are 
black, 1.4% are Hispanic or Latino and 1.0% are Asian.  Id.  For a comparison to Illinois‘ 
demographical makeup, see supra note 123 (providing demographic information for the state 
of Illinois).  In 2008, nine murders were committed in the county at a rate of 8.3 murders for 
every 100,000 residents.  CRIME IN ILLINOIS, supra note 109, at 117.  
129 Lake County, which abuts Cook County to the north, had a population of 712,567 in 
2009, making up approximately 5.5% of Illinois's total population.  U.S. Census Bureau, 
State and County QuickFacts 2008, supra note 123.  In Lake County, 85.3% of residents 
reported their ethnicity as white in 2008, 6.9% reported as black, 19.6% reported as Hispanic 
or Latino and 5.8% reported as Asian.  Id.  For a comparison to Illinois‘ demographical 
makeup, see supra note 123 (providing demographic information for the state of Illinois).  
The most recent data on crime rates in Lake County recorded ten murders in the county in 
2008, a homicide rate of 1.4 murders for every 100,000 residents.  CRIME IN ILLINOIS, supra 
note 109, at 110. 
130 As in Illinois, all California county district attorneys (prosecutors) can declare a case 
capital, however, ―in almost half the counties, 28 of the 58, no death sentences were imposed 
during the 1990‘s, although 1,160 homicides took place in these counties.‖ CALIFORNIA 
REPORT, supra note 33, at 150 n.120. Furthermore: 
those counties with the highest death sentencing rates tend to have the highest proportion of non-
Hispanic whites in their population, and the lowest population density.  The more white and 
more sparsely populated the county, the higher the death sentencing rate. 
Id. at 150. 
131 The counties outside of Cook County accounted for 40% of all capital prosecutions 
(210/507), although these counties accounted for only 25% of all murders (2131/8403).  See 
CRIME IN ILLINOIS, supra note 109, at 32–187.  If St. Clair and Cook Counties are excepted, 
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Table 3 
Capital Litigation Trust Fund Expenditures, Individual Counties (Excluding 





No. of Capital 
Cases  
Prosecuted k 





from CLTF  
 Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 
Col. 4 
(Col. 1/Col. 2) 
Jefferson $2,599,553.01 2 0 $1,299,776.51 
St. Clair $2,066,226.19 17 1 $121,542.72 
DeWitt $1,833,270.66 3 0 $611,090.22 
Hancock $1,573,305.30 1 1 $1,573,305.30 
Kankakee $1,251,631.06 9 0 $139,070.12 
Gallatin $1,109,896.87 2 0 $554,948.44 
DuPage $1,027,729.41 21 3 $48,939.50 
Macon $943,858.64 14 0 $67,418.47 
Sangamon $911,876.98 3 0 $303,958.99 
Lawrence $836,985.50 2 0 $418,492.75 
Totals $14,154,333.62 74 5 N/A 
All Other 
Counties 
$10,760,595.21 139 6 N/A 
Sources: Illinois State Treasurer‘s Office for details of county disbursements; Supreme Court 
of Illinois for number of death sentences. 
 
 
all other counties accounted for approximately one-fifth (21.6% (2131–311)/8403) of all 
murders in the state.  Id.  If St. Clair and Cook Counties are removed from the number of 
capital prosecutions, then other counties account for 38.6% of all capital prosecutions.  Id.  
Without precise data on the number of capital trials by county, it is not possible to know 
whether St. Clair has a higher rate or number of pleas after notices are filed. 
k This includes capital cases that had been certified as death penalty eligible prior to the 
year 2000 and were pending during the date universe displayed.  The numbers of capital 
prosecutions for each county are the total number of cases, by case number, receiving funds 
from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund, as reported by the Illinois state treasurer for the years 
2000–2009.  Co-defendants prosecuted under the same case number were counted as one 
case. 
l This includes all death sentences imposed as of December 31, 2009.  
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Of course, these rates do not control for the seriousness or aggravated 
nature of the murders reported.  Only a systematic proportionality review 
study could do that.  However, with such a large number of murders in the 
state, it is unlikely that all of the serious or aggravated murders would be 
concentrated only in those counties that have a high propensity to declare a 
case capital.  Indeed Cook County with the most murders, and presumably 
with the highest number of aggravated murders, has a relatively low rate of 
declaring cases capital. 
Table 3 compares grants to individual counties from the CLTF for the 
total period that the CLTF has been in operation, ranked by the amount of 
funds received by individual counties, again excluding Cook County.  Once 
again, the amount of money received by individual counties seems to have 
little relationship to the murder rate or to the total number of murders, or 
even to the total number of capital prosecutions.  Jefferson County received 
the largest amount of money after Cook County.  Some fraction of this 
amount is accounted for by the disproportionately large payments to private 
counsel in a single case, over $1 million in the Cecil Sutherland case.  This 
case was one of the reasons why the legislature imposed restrictions and a 
reasonableness requirement on approval of the request for funds from the 
CLTF.
132
  Yet the appointment in that case, which was widely regarded as 
an abuse of the resources of the fund, did not prevent that same attorney 
from being appointed again in a capital case, although he had been declared 
incompetent in another case.
133
  
Outside of the ten counties that received the largest amounts from the 
CLTF, an additional five death sentences were imposed in seventy-four 
capital prosecutions across the rest of the state.  DuPage County did not 
receive the most money from the CLTF, although it had the most capital 
prosecutions and the largest number of death sentences imposed (three) in a 
single county.  As Table 3 shows, counties received widely disparate 
amounts not particularly related to the number of capital prosecutions or 
death sentences imposed.  After Cook County, Jefferson County, with two 
capital prosecutions, received the most money from the CLTF.  Hancock 
County, however, received more than $1.5 million for one case.  DeWitt 
County spent $1.8 million on three cases, whereas Kankakee spent $1.25 
million on nine capital prosecutions.  These stark discrepancies go beyond 
differences attributable to differences or idiosyncrasies in individual cases. 
 
132 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 124/10 (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010). 
133 CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 110 n.174.  
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Table 4 
Capital Litigation Trust Fund Appropriations, Fiscal Years 2000–2010 
Fiscal 
Year m 
Cook County Counties Outside of Cook 
2000 
Appointed Counsel: $3,457,100 
Public Defender: $812,500 
State‘s Attorney: $1,095,600 
 
Total: $5,365,200 
Appointed Counsel: $962,000 
Public Defender: $212,000 




Appointed Counsel: $6,914,200 
Public Defender: $1,625,000 
State‘s Attorney: $2,191,200 
 
Total: $10,730,400 
Appointed Counsel: $1,924,000 
Public Defender: $424,000 




Appointed Counsel: $6,914,200 
Public Defender: $1,625,000 
State‘s Attorney: $2,191,200 
 
Total: $10,730,400 
Appointed Counsel: $1,924,000 
Public Defender: $424,000 




Appointed Counsel: $6,914,200 
Public Defender: $1,625,000 
State‘s Attorney: $2,191,200 
 
Total: $10,730,400 
Appointed Counsel: $1,924,000 
Public Defender: $424,000 




Appointed Counsel: $800,000 
Public Defender: $1,462,500 
State‘s Attorney: $2,191,200 
 
Total: $4,453,700 
Appointed Counsel: $3,000,000 
Public Defender: $500,000 




Appointed Counsel: $1,200,000 
Public Defender: $1,625,000 
State‘s Attorney: $2,691,200 
 
Total: $5,516,200 
Appointed Counsel: $3,000,000 
Public Defender: $500,000 




m Fiscal Years in this instance run from July 1–June 30. Fiscal Year 2000 began July 1, 
1999 and ended Jun 30, 2000.  Fiscal Year 2010 began July 1, 2009 and ended June 30, 
2010. 




Cook County Counties Outside of Cook 
2006 
Appointed Counsel: $1,200,000 
Public Defender: $1,625,000 
State‘s Attorney: $2,691,200 
 
Total: $5,516,200 
Appointed Counsel: $3,000,000 
Public Defender: $500,000 




Appointed Counsel: $1,200,000 
Public Defender: $1,625,000 
State‘s Attorney: $2,691,200 
 
Total: $5,516,200 
Appointed Counsel: $3,000,000 
Public Defender: $500,000 




Appointed Counsel: $2,000,000 
Public Defender: $1,750,000 
State‘s Attorney: $2,941,200 
 
Total: $6,691,200 
Appointed Counsel: $3,000,000 
Public Defender: $500,000 




Appointed Counsel: $2,000,000 
Public Defender: $1,750,000 
State‘s Attorney: $2,941,200 
 
Total: $6,691,200 
Appointed Counsel: $3,000,000 
Public Defender: $500,000 




Appointed Counsel: $2,000,000 
Public Defender: $2,750,000  o 
State‘s Attorney: $2,941,200 
 
Total: $7,691,200 
Appointed Counsel: $3,500,000 
Public Defender: $500,000 






Appointed Counsel: $34,599,700 
Public Defender: $18,275,000 
State‘s Attorney: $26,757,600 
 
Grand Total: $79,632,300 
Appointed Counsel: $28,234,000 
Public Defender: $4,984,000 
State‘s Attorney: $9,500,000 
 
Grand Total: $42,718,000 
Source: Illinois State Treasurer‘s Office.
 
n Governor vetoed appropriation. 
o The Cook County Public Defender‘s Office received an additional $500,000 
supplemental—over and above the $2,250,000 initially appropriated—that had lapsed from 
Fiscal Year 2009 and became effective in Fiscal Year 2010. 
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 Table 4 shows the appropriations made to the CLTF by fiscal year, 
2000–2010, by receiving agency.
134
  In all counties, including Cook 
County, appointed counsel were appropriated more funds than the public 
defender.  Does this imply that appointed counsel represented more 
defendants in capital cases than the public defender?  Also noteworthy is 
that the state‘s attorneys in all counties regularly and consistently were 
appropriated more money from the CLTF than were the public defenders.  
Only if all monies for appointed counsel and the public defender are 
counted together as funding for the defense of capital cases, are the funds 
for the defense more than the funds received by the state‘s attorneys.  
Outside of Cook County, the appropriations for appointed counsel are 
consistently higher than for the public defender or the state‘s attorney.
135
  
The amount of the appropriation may not signify the immediate receipt of 
that money.
136
  There are also sharp discontinuities in these appropriations 
across various years.
137
  Both state‘s attorneys and public defenders are 
state employees; both presumably use the funds for the same purposes when 
they stand off against one another in a capital trial.  The public defender 
cannot receive funds for its salaried attorneys from the CLTF, according to 
the statute.
138
  The public defender can only offload the expenses of 
investigation, the costs of DNA testing, and other similar documented 
expenses required for capital litigation.  When private counsel is appointed, 
 
134 The sole source of this data is information from the Illinois state treasurer in the 
NULSCCD, supra note 1. 
135 For example, in Cook County, the appointed counsel and the public defender were 
appropriated $2,825,000 and the state‘s attorney was appropriated $2,691,200 for Fiscal 
Year 2006 (FY 2006).  STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, ILLINOIS 
APPROPRIATIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2006 113 (2006), available at 
http://www.ioc.state.il.us/library/cr.cfm.  Outside of Cook County in FY 2006, the appointed 
counsel and public defender were appropriated $3.5 million and the state‘s attorney $1.0 
million.  Id. at 113–14.   
136 In 2009 and 2010, money from the CLTF has been significantly delayed. Arnold, 
supra note 108. 
137 C.f. STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, ILLINOIS APPROPRIATIONS: 
FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2003), available at http://www.ioc.state.il.us/library/cr.cfm; STATE OF 
ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, ILLINOIS APPROPRIATIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2004 (2004), 
available at http://www.ioc.state.il.us/library/cr.cfm (comparing Fiscal Year 2003 with 
Fiscal Year 2004, where appropriations for appointed counsel in Cook County decreased 
from $6.9 million to $800,000, and appropriations for appointed counsel outside of Cook 
increased from $1,924,000 to $3,000,000). 
138 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 124/15(e) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010), which 
provides that moneys in the CLTF shall be expended only: ―(3) To pay the compensation of 
trial attorneys, other than public defenders or appellate defenders, who have been appointed 
by the court to represent defendants who are charged with capital crimes or attorneys . . . .‖ 
(emphasis added). 
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however, all costs, all incidental expenses, all office expenses, overhead, 
and all hourly fees to the lawyers are charged to the CLTF.  Even when the 
public defender is appointed in a capital case, the public defender does not 
receive the same remuneration as the appointed counsel, either absolutely or 
by the hour.  This is another kind of systemic inequity, and it pushes cases 
towards the assignment of counsel, even if this costs the state more money. 
The bureaucratic incentive is always to spend money once it is 
appropriated and available for expenditure.  State‘s attorneys have an 
economic incentive to declare a case capital if they can offload the expenses 
of prosecution to the CLTF, even if they cannot charge salaries to the 
CLTF.
139
  Both state‘s attorneys and public defenders have a bureaucratic 
and economic incentive to keep the present system going: the CLTF pays 
for the training of attorneys, as well as for some expenses of litigation, and 
for expenses that can be segregated out of general expenses for both 
sides.
140
  There may be an unintended incentive to declare a case capital 
when the CLTF money is actually in the county account in Cook County.  
Across the state, there may be an economic incentive not to declare cases 
capital when the transfer of money is delayed by state budgetary cuts, or 
refusals to release funds, or when state funds are not expected to appear at 
all, as has happened recently. 
Table 5 summarizes all county appropriations from the CLTF, by 
recipient, for the life of the fund to date, 2000–2010.
141
  The total amount 
appropriated to state‘s attorneys over the period for prosecuting 
 
 
139 See CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 97–98.  The CPRSC has been 
informed by downstate judges and lawyers that in several downstate counties, state‘s 
attorneys served notices of intent to seek capital punishment, and just before trials were 
to begin, withdrew the notices; it appeared (or was suspected) that the notices were filed 
for the purpose of transferring the costs of investigation and trial preparation from the 
local county to the CLTF.  The motive for doing this was attributed to economic pressure 
on prosecutors owing to a shortage of funds in county budgets to pay for the cost of 
investigation and trial preparation.  Id. 
 The Committee was also told that when this occurred, and the notices of intent were 
withdrawn on the eve of trial, the appointed defense lawyers immediately lost  the ability 
to obtain fees from the CLTF for the preparation for trial or for the trial itself, and instead 
are required to seek funding from county boards, which often were not receptive to their 
requests, had inadequate funds to meet the requests, or both. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
REFORM STUDY COMM., FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 33 (2008), available at 
http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/dpsrc/ 
CPRSC Fourth Annual Report.pdf. 
140 See CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 98 (testimony of trial judge explaining 
strong budgetary and public relations incentives considered by state‘s attorneys when 
deciding whether to serve a capital punishment notice; the pressure is particularly strong in 
counties other than Cook County). 
141 The source of this data is the Illinois state treasurer in the NULSCCD, supra note 1. 
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Table 5 
Summary Table: Capital Litigation Trust Fund Appropriations, by Type of 
Recipient, Fiscal Years 2000–2010 p 





 (Col. 1) (Col. 2) 
(Col. 3)  
(Col. 1 + Col. 2) 
Appointed 
Counsel 
$34,599,700 $28,234,000 $62,833,700 
Public 
Defender 
$18,275,000 $4,984,000 $23,259,000 
State‘s 
Attorney 
$26,757,600 $9,500,000 $36,257,600 
Totals: $79,632,300 $42,718,000 $122,350,300 
Source: Illinois State Treasurer‘s Office. 
 
approximately 500 murders as capital cases, in which seventeen death 
sentences were imposed, was over $35 million.  Much less, $23 million, 
went to public defenders.  The bulk of the money from the CLTF, $63 
million, went to appointed counsel, presumably overwhelmingly for trial 
work.  These trial counsel typically do not continue to represent the 
defendant if a death sentence is imposed, or for other appeals.  Since over 
500 cases were noticed and seventeen death sentences were imposed, most 
of that money was spent on cases where the jury or the judge did not find 
death to be the appropriate sentence.  The capital defense unit of the 
Appellate Office of the Public Defender takes over the appeals of death 
sentences after the cases have been tried, perhaps expertly, perhaps not, by 




p Fiscal Years in this instance run from July 1–June 30.  Fiscal Year 2000 began July 1, 
1999 and ended Jun 30, 2000.  Fiscal Year 2010 began July 1, 2009 and ended June 30, 
2010. 
142 See, e.g., the case of Robert O. Marshall, discussed infra note 186.  In the case of 
Robert Marshall in New Jersey, private trial counsel represented the defendant when he was 
sentenced to death.  After many legal proceedings, the private trial counsel was declared to 
have been ineffective at trial, twenty-six years after the death sentence was imposed.  During 
the entire twenty-six years and through many, many appeals, Robert Marshall was 
represented at the state‘s expense by the Office of the Public Defender.  See Marshall v. 
Cathel, 428 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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Whether appointed counsel represent capital defendants more 
competently or even as well as public defenders is an open question which 
will only be answered when the final judgments are handed down on 
effective or ineffective representation many years later.  Another important 
question is whether the assignment of appointed counsel by trial court 
judges in the county, or even by the assignment judge in the county, is a 
process without conflict of interest.  In Illinois, there is no ethical 
prohibition against an attorney contributing to the election campaign of a 
judge before whom he appears.
143
  The assignment of private counsel to 
represent a capital defendant typically represents the award to that attorney 
of hundreds of thousands of dollars in the direct payment of legal fees, and 
perhaps more than a million dollars in revenue for that law office.
144
  
Especially in counties where the judges and the attorneys who try cases are 
likely to know one another, it would be surprising if the trial counsel 
assigned did not contribute to judges‘ election campaigns.  There are no 
objective criteria or guidelines governing the assignment of trial counsel in 
a capital case.  There is no one who asks if the trial court judge assigned 
counsel appropriately, or upon whose recommendation the judge assigned 
that attorney.
145
   
In Illinois, where judges are elected in partisan elections and attorneys 
contribute monetarily to the judges‘ election campaigns, the questions 
regarding the standards for appointment of trial counsel in capital cases and 
who appoints should be examined closely.  This is another fault line in the 
present system.  A stated purpose of the requirement of the special 
certification of trial counsel for capital cases was to ensure a minimal level 
of competency for defense trial counsel, yet the requirement of certification 
also reduces the list of eligible attorneys to be appointed.  It has been 
alleged that some trial attorneys in the smaller counties do not seek 
certification because they do not wish to be appointed to capital cases.
146
  
The state‘s attorneys are exempt from the requirements of training and 
 
143 Michael Sneed, Chuck Neubauer & John Carpenter, Donor Had Case Before 
Swick; Law Permits Contributions, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 26, 2000, at A1 (describing 
case in which gifts to appellate judge by law firm with case in front of judge were found 
to be legal).  
144 See details on payments to assigned counsel in CLTF county records, NULSCCD, 
supra note 1. 
145 See also Marshall, supra note 47, at 958 (describing a concern that local judges may 
appoint counsel as a form of patronage rather than credentials). 
146 The records of expenditures of the state‘s attorneys and public defenders in Cook 
County, however, indicate that a number of attorneys from both offices were newly certified 
as death-qualified attorneys in recent years. ILL. COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH 
PENALTY, DEATH PENALTY REFORM IN ILLINOIS: FIVE YEARS OF FAILURE 11 (2008), available 
at http://www.icadp.org/docs/ICADPannualreport08.pdf.  
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experience for capital certification.  Certainly, the prospects of receiving 
adequate assistance are improved if there are funds to pay for 
representation.
147
  However, the availability of funds alone does not 
guarantee effective defense representation, especially in a system where 
appointments and compensation may be rife with possibilities for conflicts 
of interest, and especially if attorneys are picked from a small pool. 
The total of all appropriations for the CLTF for its entire period of 
operation through Fiscal Year 2010 (ending June 30, 2010), all of which 
has presumably been spent as of July 1, 2010, was more than $122 million, 
a nontrivial amount of state resources by any measure of accounting. 
 
Table 6 
Capital Litigation Trust Fund Expenditures, Cook County, 2004–2009 
q
 
Cook County Disbursements to                
Public Defender‘s Office 
$9,973,595.20 
Cook County Disbursements to 
State‘s Attorney‘s Office 
$15,873,082.62 
Cook County Disbursements to 
Cook County Court System 
$7,409,979.19 
Total Cook County Disbursements 
r
 $33,256,657.01 
Source: Cook County Treasurer‘s Office. 
 
Table 6 shows the expenditures in Cook County for the years 2004–
2009.  The source of these figures is the Cook County treasurer, since Cook 
County, unlike all other counties in the state, receives its funds directly 
from the CLTF as block grants.  For the other counties, the state treasurer 
disburses money to the counties for individual cases upon request.  Until 
recently the state treasurer had no authority to question or challenge the 
amount of a request or its reasonableness.  If a trial court judge approved 
the request, the state treasurer was obliged to pay.  The fact that payments 
were requested for individual cases has allowed for a count of the number 
of individual capital prosecutions by county, based upon the number of 
 
147 See Marshall, supra note 47, at 958 (describing the dangers of underfunding legal 
services for indigent defendants).  
q Figures are only available for 2004–2009. 
r This figure accounts for a date range of November 2003 through November 2009. 
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cases for which funds were requested.
148
  Once again, it is noteworthy that 
the amount of money disbursed to public defenders is significantly less than 
the amount of money granted to the state‘s attorneys.  Again, without 
knowing how many and what proportion of cases were handled by public 
defenders in Cook County, as opposed to the number and proportion of 
cases assigned to private counsel, it is impossible to know whether this 
allocation of funds is disproportionately or appropriately disbursed.
149
  Nor 
is there any way to judge whether appointed counsel, which as a group 
received more money than the public defender but less than the state‘s 
attorney, received payments appropriately or whether the appointment of 
counsel was made appropriately.
150
   
Absent some independent evaluation of many cases, it is impossible to 
know the quality of representation by appointed counsel in Cook County 
cases.  Most cases declared capital in Cook County were decided by plea. 
Did this mean that the capital charge was simply an instrument to extract a 
plea, or a plea to a longer sentence?  Were defendants effectively 
represented during plea negotiations, whether by private counsel or public 
defenders?  Sentences imposed after a plea negotiation will not be 
examined carefully on appeal, if they are examined at all.  Without detailed 




148 There was a supplemental appropriation of $500,000 to the public defender in 2009, 
and this may account for the fact that the figures from the Cook County treasurer do not 
exactly coincide with the amount of appropriations to Cook County.  STATE OF ILLINOIS 
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, ILLINOIS APPROPRIATIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 113 (2009),  
available at http://www.ioc.state.il.us/library/cr.cfm.  Also note that details on disbursements 
from Cook County are only available for the years 2004–2009.  For the period 2000–2004, 
the Cook Country treasurer did not have automated accounts for the amounts spent from the 
Capital Litigation Trust Fund. 
149 In Cook County, no account of expenditures for individual cases was available for the 
years prior to 2004, although money was disbursed during that period.  
150 Together, appointed counsel and the public defender in Cook County received more 
state funding than the Cook County state‘s attorney.  Since appointed counsel can charge all 
expenses, including office expenses and staff expenses, which the public defender and state‘s 
attorney cannot in Cook County, this is not surprising.  A breakdown of how the money was 
spent in individual cases is not available at present. 
151 Detailed information on the individual charges in indictments for all first-degree 
murders during 2003–2009 by county is available in the Northwestern School of Law 
Capital Crimes data set.  Coupled with data on sentences imposed, which are a matter of 
public record, the record of charges with the record  of sentences imposed would at least be a 
starting place for that investigation. 
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D. OTHER EVIDENCE OF DISPARITIES IN THE PROSECUTION AND 
DISPOSITION OF DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES BEFORE AND AFTER THE 
2003 REFORMS 
At the request of the Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee, 
Professor David Olson and research criminologists from Loyola University 
examined the patterns of imposition of the death penalty across Illinois and 
prepared for the Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee detailed, 
offender-level data based upon information from the official records of the 
Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC).
152
  A summary of this research 
is presented in Appendix B.  This systematic research analyzed information 
pertaining to 9,592 offenders convicted of and sentenced for first-degree 
murder and admitted to prison in Illinois from July 1988 through June 2010.  
This is a longer time period than that reported earlier, and it includes cases 
and convictions prior to 2000.  The study design allows for the assessment 
of long-term changes by period. 
Tables A through F in Appendix B detail the patterns in capital case 
prosecutions in Illinois as measured by the number of offenders convicted 
of first-degree murder in Illinois, and the number and proportion of these 
offenders who received a sentence which was determinate (i.e. a sentence to 
a specific number of years in prison), a sentence of natural life, or a death 
sentence across different regions and time periods.  The data are classified 
by type of county, and across the three periods described above.
153
 
Data is reported on the basis of the state fiscal year (SFY) from SFY 
1989 (July 1, 1988 to June 30, 1989) through SFY 2010 (July 1, 2008 to 
June 30, 2010).  During this twenty-one-year period, a total of 150 persons 
were convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.  The collection of 
data over such a long period allowed for an analysis of patterns in three 
distinct periods: the pre-moratorium period (from July 1988 to December 
 
152 Note, this is an entirely different and independent set of data than that reported in 
Tables 1–7, infra.  The Tables published here were distributed to the Capital Punishment 
Reform Study Committee at its meeting in September 2009.  They are available to the public 
as part of the Reform Study Committee‘s Final Report.  Dr. Olson and his colleagues also 
conducted surveys of police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and administrators and prepared 
other data relevant to the 2003 reforms.  See infra Appendix B. 
153 Note, these records do not indicate whether the sentence was imposed at trial or 
pursuant to a plea bargain. 
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1999); the moratorium period (January 2000 to June 2005);
154
 and finally 
the post-reform period (July 2005 to 2010).
155
 
In addition to separating the convictions by time period, the data on 
convictions are broken down by geographic region: All Illinois; Cook 
County, Illinois; Illinois outside of Cook County; the Illinois ―Collar 
Counties‖ (those that border Cook County); the Illinois Urban Counties 
(excluding Cook and the Collar Counties); and the rural counties.  These 
standard geographic distinctions are based upon the census categories for 
metropolitan areas.  Cook County accounts for the largest absolute number 
and proportion of murders in the state and must always be examined 
separately in order to understand the extent to which it drives the numbers 
for the entire state. 
These tables compare statewide patterns in prosecutions and 
sentencing in the period prior to the Ryan commutations and the 
establishment of the CLTF, with patterns in prosecution and sentencing 
during the moratorium period and after the commutations, and then with 
patterns in sentencing during the post-reform period, after 2003, while 
controlling for county size and type.
156
  The periods are designed to allow 
for lags in the effect of changes in policy.
157
  For example, some changes, 
such as the requirement of two defense attorneys for a capital case, imposed 
by a rule of the Illinois Supreme Court, were instituted immediately after 
pronouncement. Other changes, such as the requirement that interrogations 
be recorded, or changes in line up procedures, were implemented 
piecemeal, and sooner in some counties than in others. 
It is also important to note what these tables do not measure or include.  
They do not include data on the number of capital prosecutions or the 
number of first-degree murders, or the number of murder charges that 
 
154 This includes the appointment of the Governor‘s Commission and the publication of 
the Governor‘s 2002 Report; the establishment of the Capital Litigation Trust Fund in 2000; 
the Ryan commutations emptying death row in 2003; and the passage of an additional set of 
reforms by the legislature in 2003 and 2004. 
155 Beginning the post-reform period with fiscal year 2005 allows for the 2003 reforms to 
have taken effect.  The effective dates of various reforms differed.  By June 2005, however, 
all would have been in effect.  Cullerton et al., supra note 41. 
156 The moratorium on executions, imposed in 2000 by Governor George Ryan and 
continued by Governor Blagojevich, remains in effect in 2010, but it is not a moratorium on 
capital prosecutions.  CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 2.  
157 Because the effect of the reforms will be uneven, the length of the time periods 
addresses that discontinuity as well.  By separating out Cook County and by grouping the 
remainder of the counties, the unevenness is smoothed out to some extent.  The goal of these 
groupings is to get away from an analysis which simply points to one county, say Cook 
County, or DuPage County, and compares data across counties without controlling for 
county type or size.  Looking at patterns across hundreds of murder convictions allows for 
generalizations beyond a single case analysis. 
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resulted in either an acquittal or a conviction for an offense other than first-
degree murder.
158
  Tables A–F do not identify the incidence of the decision 
not to charge capital murder when there was a factual basis for a statutory 
aggravating factor.  The tables do not measure the incidence of the decision 
to prosecute a case capitally, although a conviction and sentence for first-
degree murder is at least an indication that there might well have been a 
factual basis for a capital charge in that case.  Tables A–F begin at the end 
of the trial stage, at the point of sentencing and analyze patterns in 
prosocutions, retrospectively. 
These tables do not indicate how many first-degree murder cases were 
noticed or identified for possible capital prosecution.  They also do not 
show how many first-degree murders were death-eligible for that period, 
nor do they show how many times a capital charge resulted in a sentence 
other than death, whether because the capital charge was dropped during 
pretrial plea bargaining or because a verdict of death-eligible first-degree 
murder was not found at capital trial.  Further, these tables do not indicate 
the total number of capital trials in the state during the period.  The tables 
measure the end, not the beginning or middle, of the stages of a prosecution 
for first-degree murder, and they report only the end stage of a capital 
prosecution for murder. 
These tables highlight strong changes in patterns and trends in 
sentencing by period and type of county.  The tables corroborate that there 
has been a significant shift in patterns in the incidence of murder and 
homicide, and in patterns of capital prosecution across the state, both since 
the Ryan commutations and since the moratorium on executions.  Some of 
these patterns mirror patterns in the country as a whole.
159
  During this 
period, the reported number of homicides in Illinois fell.
160
  The same 
pattern was observed across the country and especially in other urban 
jurisdictions.
161
  During this entire period, the number of capital 
prosecutions dropped in Illinois generally and across all categories of 
 
158 In other words, they do not include capital prosecutions in which the capital charge 
was dropped, or where the first-degree murder charge was dropped and the defendant pled to 
a charge less than first-degree murder (e.g. felony murder, manslaughter, or another felony 
such as robbery or arson or burglary). 
159 See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 38; John Schwartz, Death Sentences Dropped 
but Executions Rose in „09, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, at A22 (noting decline in death 
sentences nationally). 
160 See Chicago Homicides Drop, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 30, 2009, at A4 (reporting 453 
homicides in Chicago for 2009 through December 28, 2009 and analyzing the 2009 
homicides in Chicago by type, e.g.  gang-related, type of weapon, etc). 
161 Al Baker, Homicides Near a Record Low Rate in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
29, 2009, at A1, (describing decline in homicide rates in Atlanta, Chicago, and Boston, 
and increase in homicide rates in Detroit, Baltimore, and New Orleans). 
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Over the time periods examined, the proportion of first-degree 
murderers sentenced to death statewide fell from 1.9% in the pre-
moratorium period (118/6,224 per col. 2 Table A) to 0.6% in the post-
reform period (10/1,525 per col. 2 Table A).  In other words, a defendant in 
a first-degree murder case in Illinois was three times as likely to be 
sentenced to death in the pre-reform period as in the post-reform period.  
The death-sentencing rate in Illinois declined significantly during the period 
measured; this is a significant overall difference. 
Across all separate geographic regions (Tables B–F) the proportion of 
first-degree murderers sentenced to death fell significantly and unevenly 
between the pre-moratorium and post-reform periods.  Significant 
differences were also found between the likelihood of receiving a death 
sentence in the pre-moratorium period and the post-moratorium period 
within specific geographic categories, and within Cook County in 
comparison to outside of Cook County.  While this is not surprising, the 
extent of the differences is startling, especially given the nature of the data 
set.  These discrepancies have been found after sentencing.  Thus, they 
represent the outcome of disparities in capital case charging at a late stage 
of the process, as measured by sentences imposed, death sentences, and 
other sentences. 
These results are not based upon a tabulation of persons prosecuted for 
capital murder or an estimate of the proportion of death eligible murders, 
where there may be errors in the reporting of cases or inaccuracies in data 
collection at the local level.  These findings are based upon persons found 
guilty of first-degree murder, sentenced for murder, and actually in prison 
in Illinois, according to Department of Corrections records.
163
  The data 
collection here is not subject to the allegation that it was biased or 
incomplete.  It is the Department of Corrections‘ own record of the number 
of people they have in prison convicted for first-degree murder and what 
sentences they received from the trial courts, sentences presumably upheld 
after appeal, during the identified time periods.  These are not estimations 
of sentences, or speculations as to who might be guilty or eligible for the 
death penalty.  These are 9,592 defendants who were convicted of at least 
9,592 actual first-degree murders, with the sentences actually imposed by a 
trial court in 9,592 sentencing proceedings.  The data were collected 
without reference to the death penalty, except that the number of death 
sentences was recorded. 
 
162 See infra Appendix B, tbls.A–F. 
163 See infra Appendix B. 
146 LEIGH B. BIENEN [Vol. 100 
Within the post-reform period, for example, 1.0% of all sentences in 
Cook County were death sentences (72/7,189 per col. 2 Table B); whereas 
in the counties outside of Cook, 3.1% of all sentences were death sentences 
(78/2,543 per col. 2 Table C).  In other words, during the pre-reform period 
a defendant was three times more likely to be sentenced to death outside of 
Cook County than in Cook County, other things being equal. 
A defendant was more than four times more likely to receive a death 
sentence in a rural county than in Cook County.  In the rural counties, 4.3% 
of all sentences for first-degree murder were death sentences (25/577 per 
col. 2 Table F).  These disparities, between Cook County and rural counties, 
and between Cook County and other categories of counties, result in large 
discrepancies in odds ratios and persist across all time periods.  These 
disparities have been reduced, but not removed, by the passage of the 2003 
reforms, as can be seen by comparing the percentages and odds ratios for 
the pre-moratorium period with the post-reform period.
164
  Nor is this 
pattern unique to Illinois.  The discrepancy between rural and urban 
counties, or large differences based upon individual prosecutors‘ charging 
policies, has been well documented in other states.
165
 
Some of these disparities between Cook and other counties, and 
between types of counties, were reduced after the reforms.  Nonetheless, in 
the period after the passage of the reforms, the likelihood of being 
sentenced to death if found guilty of first-degree murder in a rural county is 
still almost eight times higher than the likelihood of being sentenced to 
death in Cook County.
166
  Subsequent empirical analysis, were it to be 
made, could conceivably show that the relative seriousness of the crimes 
partly accounts for these discrepancies in both jurisdictions, but the 
geographic disparity remaining even after the reforms is striking.  There is 
no reason to assume the most serious or aggravated murders regularly occur 
in nonurban jurisdictions.  In fact, there is reason to assume the opposite: 
 
164 For example, in the pre-moratorium period 5.4% of the sentences for first-degree 
murder were death sentences in Illinois rural counties (18 of 331 per Table F); and the 
percentage of death sentences imposed in the collar counties was 4.7% in the pre-
moratorium period (20 of 424 per Table D).  The disparities between Cook County and the 
rural and collar counties remains. 
165 See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33; Katherine Barnes, David Sloss & Stephen 
Thaman, Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Decision-Making in 
Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 305, 329 (2009) (―The broad discretion afforded 
prosecutors in Missouri translates directly into disparities in outcomes across different 
geographic regions.‖); Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 38. 
166 Compare Table F, with Table B.  Overall, 3.8% of all sentences for first-degree 
murder in Illinois rural counties resulted in a death sentence in the post reform period, while 
in Cook County during the post-reform period, 0.5% of all sentences for first-degree murder 
resulted in a death sentence being imposed. 
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more aggravated murders are likely to occur in Cook County, where there is 
the largest absolute number of murders.  The result is again somewhat 
contradictory: urban jurisdictions generally have more murders and 
presumably more aggravated murders, but a lower rate of prosecuting cases 
capitally.  
The issue of county disparities is not limited to Illinois; it exists in 
every capital punishment state.
167
  The findings from systematic research in 
this area are similar in every state: the likelihood of being prosecuted for 
death-eligible capital murder is generally lower in a high crime, urban 
jurisdiction than it is in a rural or suburban jurisdiction with a relatively low 
homicide rate.
168
  According to study after study, the chance of prosecution 
for capital murder is significantly higher in rural and suburban counties.
169
  
The offered explanations for this are many, multilayered, and largely 
speculative.
170
  Whatever the reason, a defendant in Illinois is more likely to 
be prosecuted for capital murder and sentenced to death in some counties 





167 Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 38. 
168 See Leibman & Marshall, supra note 36, at 1676–82 (identifying high death 
sentencing counties in Arizona, Nevada, Florida, and Oklahoma, and showing a death 
verdict in 64 out of every 1,000 homicides and an error rate of 71% in Pima, Arizona 
(Tucson), the highest county;  counties with low death sentencing rates had significantly 
lower error rates; a few counties had error rates of 100%). 
169 See Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating 
Counties‟ Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307 (2010); Leibman & Marshall, 
supra note 36, at 1676–82; see also Scott W. Howe, Race Death and Disproportionality, 37 
N. KY. L. REV. 213 (2010); Ronald J. Tabak, The Continuing Role of Race in Capital Cases, 
Notwithstanding President Obama‟s Election, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 243 (2010). 
170 Some of the offered explanations include: that the greater likelihood of being 
prosecuted for a capital case in a rural or suburban district is a proxy for embedded racism in 
the system; that the likelihood of actually getting a death verdict is higher in counties where 
the juries are from rural or suburban counties; that murders are less frequent and 
consequently more ―shocking‖ when they occur in rural or suburban counties; that state‘s 
attorneys in rural or suburban counties must, or perceive they must, campaign more 
vigorously as being ―tough on crime‖ whereas urban state‘s attorneys or prosecutors are less 
visible in the prosecution of individual cases and judged by their constituents on other 
criteria; that the voting population in urban areas is less in favor of capital punishment than 
the voting constituencies in rural and suburban counties, and many other reasons.  The 
reasons may be multiple; the pattern is observable across states, and seems to be 
characteristic of northern and southern states, states with many capital cases, and states with 
few.  See infra Part IV. 
171 For example, in California, ten counties (Los Angeles, Riverside, San Bernardino, 
Alameda, Orange, Contra Costa, San Diego, Sacramento, Tulare, and Ventura) accounted for 
more than 70% of all death sentences between 1977 and 1999.  Since 2000, these ten 
counties accounted for 83% of all death sentences.  ROMY GANSCHOW, ACLU OF N. CAL., 
DEATH BY GEOGRAPHY: A COUNTY BY COUNTY ANALYSIS OF THE ROAD TO EXECUTION IN 
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E. THE 2006 GUIDELINES FOR STATE‘S ATTORNEYS IN ILLINOIS 
The publication of guidelines for state‘s attorneys was one of the 
reforms recommended by the 2002 Governor‘s Commission and adopted by 
the State‘s Attorney‘s Association in 2006.  They are published here as 
Appendix A.  The 2006 guidelines for the selection of cases for capital 
prosecution in Illinois are the first formal articulation of a uniform 
statewide standard to govern the selection of cases for capital 
prosecution.
172
  They were issued in response to the 2002 Governor‘s 
Commission finding, documenting county-by-county disparities in charging 
and sentencing.
173
  The guidelines state that following these 
recommendations is ―voluntary‖ and that the guidelines do not ―have the 
force of law.‖
174
  This was also part of the recommendation of the 2002 
Governor‘s Commission.  There are no sanctions or penalties for failure to 
follow the guidelines.
175
  The guidelines state that they articulate the current 
law and practice regarding the charging of capital murder currently used by 
state‘s attorneys throughout Illinois.  No empirical evidence is presented in 
support of this statement.  
According to the guidelines, ―each capital case is unique and must be 
evaluated on its own facts, focusing on whether the circumstances of the 
crime and the character of the defendant are such that the deterrent and 
retributive functions of the ultimate sanction will be served by imposing the 
death penalty.‖
176
  The guidelines urge state‘s attorneys to ―resist the 
temptation or public pressure to seek a death penalty based solely on the 
brutality of the crime without reference to other relevant factors.‖
177
  The 
Illinois guidelines further state that, ―[t]he probability of a conviction is the 




CALIFORNIA 3 (2007), available at http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/ 
death_penalty/death_by_geography/death_by_geography.pdf. 
172 The guidelines are reproduced in Appendix A.  The Illinois guidelines are similar to 
the New Jersey Prosecutors‘ Guidelines for  the  Designation of  Homicide Cases for Capital 
Prosecution, reprinted in Leigh B. Bienen et al., supra note 5, at 791–93 (Appendix B). 
173 ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR‘S COMM‘N REPORT, supra note 23, at 24–25. 
174 See infra Appendix A. 
175 By contrast, in New Jersey the state attorney general has supervisory authority over 
the twenty-one county prosecutors in New Jersey.  N.J. STAT. ANN. 52:17B-103 (West 2006) 
(―The Attorney General shall consult with and advise the several county prosecutors in 
matters relating to the duties of their office and shall maintain a general supervision over 
said county prosecutors with a view to obtaining effective and uniform enforcement of the 
criminal laws throughout the State.‖). 
176 See infra Appendix A, at 7 (quoting People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253 (1989)).  
177 Id. at 5. 
178 Id. 
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The ―probability of a conviction,‖ however, could mean several things: 
that the evidence of guilt must be overwhelming; that the crime itself was 
―super-aggravated,‖ i.e., that it was characterized by multiple statutory 
aggravating factors, or that the circumstances were unusually antisocial, 
heinous, or depraved, such as a shooting of innocent children in a school.
179
  
Alternatively, the high probability of a conviction could mean that a jury 
would be more likely to sentence a defendant to death because the 
defendant is a member of a despised or unpopular group, has a criminal 
history, because the victim was a member of a highly valued segment of 
society, or because juries in that county generally are willing to recommend 
a sentence of death. 
The statement that state‘s attorneys should consider mitigating and 
aggravating factors in the decision to charge capital murder raises another 
set of issues.  According to the statutory structure embraced in Gregg v. 
Georgia, it is the exclusive and special province of the capital jury at 
penalty phase to weigh the statutory aggravating factors against the 
statutory mitigating factors in deciding whether to impose death.
180
  It is the 
province of the jury as representatives of the community to decide who, 
ultimately, should be sentenced to death and executed. 
Another troubling issue with regard to the state‘s attorney weighing of 
statutory mitigating factors in the decision to charge capital murder is that 
typically, the evidence presented to the jury in the penalty phase of a capital 
trial as mitigating evidence includes factors that would not be relevant or 
exculpatory at the guilt phase, but nonetheless might be appropriate to the 
consideration of mitigating factors at sentencing.  Such factors include 
childhood abuse, mental incapacity or infirmity, or other issues related to 
the defendant‘s mental state or developmental issues (e.g., stress 
syndromes, a history of drug or alcohol abuse, or other aspects of family 
history).  Mitigating evidence need not meet the evidentiary standards for 
relevence or admissibility during the capital trial.
181
  The defense will 
almost certainly not know of the existence of any of this evidence in the 
early stage of the case when the state‘s attorney is deciding whether or not 
to serve a notice of intent to seek the death penalty.
182
  And if the case is 
going to be assigned to appointed counsel after the filing of a notice of 
intent, the public defender is even less likely to know of such evidence or to 
 
179 See CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 93–95. 
180 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976). 
181 Mitigating factors may be something as simple as the testimony of the defendant‘s 
mother, wife, or children. 
182 The Committee considered and voted to recommend that the state‘s attorney be 
required to offer an opportunity to the defense to meet in person prior to the serving of a 
notice of intent.  See CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 75. 
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be motivated to develop it, or to have such evidence to present to the state‘s 
attorney prior to the filing of a notice of intent. Nor will the public defender 
have the resources to begin those investigations so early in the case, when 
the public defender does not have access to funds from the CLTF because 
the notice of intent has not yet been filed. 
The facts supporting mitigating evidence for submission at the penalty 
phase typically take months or years to develop for presentation to the 
capital jury.
183
  Both the defense and the prosecution may call special 
mitigating experts, psychologists, and forensic social workers.
184
  The 
detailed records of expenditures from the CLTF show large amounts 
allocated to mitigation specialists.
185
  The difficulty of discovering and 
presenting mitigating evidence is one of the reasons capital trials in all 
capital jurisdictions take so much longer to prepare than non-capital trials.  
In the 120-day period in which the state‘s attorney must decide whether to 
serve a notice, the defense will not have discovered all or perhaps any of the 
mitigating evidence which might be presented at penalty phase, if there 
were to be a penalty phase.  Moreover, by the time the case reaches a 
penalty phase, if it ever does, a different attorney will probably be 
representing the defendant and will have developed the mitigating evidence 
differently. 
The testimony before the Committee that the 120-day requirement for 
filing a death notice is routinely waived does not address this concern.  The 
purpose of the 120-day notice requirement is to put the defense on notice to 
prepare for the capital trial and penalty phase, not to expect that the defense 
counsel will be prepared for capital trial in 120 days.  During the 120-day 
period prior to the filing of a notice of intent, the public defender will not 
have access to funds from the CLTF.  Defense attorneys are concerned that 
if they are required to present mitigating evidence prior to the filing of a 
notice, they will be precluded from presenting newly found evidence later.  
The failure of defense counsel to bring forward mitigating evidence is a 
 
183 See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 38, at fig.2. 
184 The detailed annotation of capital expenditures from the CLTF includes repeated 
expenditures for mitigation specialists by appointed defense counsel and state‘s attorneys.  
See, for example, extensive payments to clinical psychologists, neuropsychological experts, 
forensic psychologists, forensic social workers etc. in Case No. 96-CF 46, Hancock County, 
in Capital Litigation Trust Fund, Reports of Expenditures (on file with the Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology). 
185 See, e.g., Capital Litigation Trust Fund, Reports of Expenditures (on file with the 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology). 
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frequent reason for a subsequent finding of ineffectiveness of counsel, and 
this is not a trivial concern.
186
 
Capital cases are complicated and difficult to defend, both at trial and 
on appeal, and a capital defendant may go through several defense attorneys 
before being represented by an attorney who is competent, able, and willing 
to look for and find the appropriate and convincing mitigating evidence to 
present at the penalty phase.  Many strategic decisions are involved in 
presenting mitigating evidence at the penalty phase.
187
  For strategic 
reasons, the defense may not wish to divulge otherwise incriminating 
mitigating evidence (for example, evidence of prior violent or antisocial 
behavior by a defendant that did not result in a criminal conviction) before 
the penalty phase (i.e., to try to convince the prosecutor not to seek death) 
or even at the penalty phase.  The potentially mitigating evidence may turn 
into evidence of nonstatutory aggravating factors and be admissible and 
unfavorable to the defense at penalty phase.  
One reason for waiver of the 120-day filing requirement by the defense 
may be the lack of knowledge of the presence of mitigating factors, or how 
the evidence will develop as to mitigating or aggravating factors.
188
  
Another reason may be that the defense has not yet decided upon any plan 
or strategy for the penalty phase, especially if the expectation on the part of 
 
186 See, e.g., Marshall v. Cathel, 428 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 2005).  In Marshall, Robert 
Marshall‘s death sentence in New Jersey was set aside by the Third Circuit after twenty 
years of state and federal litigation on the grounds that his original defense attorney at trial 
did not present, prepare, or discover mitigating evidence for the penalty phase of his capital 
trial.  In 2005, the Third Circuit held that Robert Marshall‘s death sentence should be 
overturned, fourteen years after it had first been upheld by the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey, on the grounds of incompetence of the private defense counsel who represented him 
at trial because that attorney called no witnesses in mitigation at his penalty phase trial, 
although Robert Marshall had children who might have testified in his defense, and other 
members of his community who might have testified on his behalf.  Id. 
187 It is the difficulty of finding and developing such mitigating evidence which has 
resulted in the use of mitigation evidence specialists, adding another layer of specialty and 
expense to the capital trial.  Mitigation specialists are typically not lawyers, but investigators 
who are specially trained to work with families and to uncover decades-old evidence of 
circumstances relevant to mitigation.  Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned If You Do, Damned If 
You Don't: The Use of Mitigation Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
359, 366–68 (1997). 
188 Take, as an example, the potentially death-eligible defendant who is an Iraq War 
veteran.  That fact, perhaps itself known immediately, could be a mitigating factor.  Should it 
influence the state‘s attorney‘s decision to charge death-eligible murder?  What if it were not 
yet known that this same defendant had committed violent acts in the military and was 
dishonorably discharged, or, in contrast, that the defendant was suffering from post traumatic 
stress disorder or depression?  The interpretation of the fact that the defendant is a war 
veteran will require a great deal of expert research and the compilation of records prior to the 
presentation of evidence at the penalty phase. 
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all attorneys is that another defense attorney will be trying the case.  If the 
defense does not yet know of the presence of mitigating evidence, or if the 
public defender does not think it will be representing the defendant at the 
time of a hypothetical penalty phase, why or how should the defense bring 
mitigating evidence to the attention of state‘s attorneys prior to trial?
189
  In 
fact, if the filing of the notice is to allow for the appointment of private 
counsel, and to gain access to funds from the CLTF, why is it in the interest 
of either side to waive the 120-day notice requirement?  The state‘s 
attorney‘s knowledge or awareness of statutory mitigating factors will 
necessarily be incomplete at the 120 day point, since the defense attorneys 
themselves are unlikely to be aware of any or all mitigating factors prior to 
the filing of a notice of intent.  Certainly there is no obligation for the 
state‘s attorney to investigate or take into account mitigating evidence.
190
 
The Illinois guidelines further state that race, income, and geographic 
disparity shall not be factors in charging a defendant with capital murder.
191
  
However, without systematically examining charging patterns throughout 
the state, there can be no measure of whether capital notices are filed 
consistently or without bias.  This is especially the case with regard to 
geographic disparity.  In addition, geographic disparities can rise to the 
level of constitutional infirmity.  The counties are widely separated, and 
while in theory a single set of rules governs all counties in Illinois, in fact 
 
189 As a example of how a capital case can involve many more procedural and strategic 
issues than an ordinary prosecution for murder, see People v. Ramsey, 2010 WL 3911466 
(Ill. Oct. 7, 2010).  The offense occurred on July 9, 1996.  The defendant was convicted of 
two counts of murder and sentenced to death in 1996 by a jury in Hancock County.  His 
convictions were reversed in 2000 by the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Ramsey, 735 
N.E.2d 533 (Ill. 2000).  He subsequently pled guilty to the intentional murders, and was 
again sentenced to death.  A series of issues regarding capital punishment procedures were 
raised again on appeal, the status of his plea, including incompetence of counsel, 
prosecutorial misconduct, insanity and other mental mitigating factors, and the retrospective 
applicability of Amended Supreme Court Rule 701 requiring defense attorneys in capital 
cases to be members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar and the applicability of the 
fundamental justice act.  Ramsey, 2010 WL 3911466 at *35, *60.  The Supreme Court 
affirmed the conviction and upheld the imposition of the death penalty. 
190 The CPRSC recommended that the state‘s attorney offer the defense an opportunity to 
meet prior to the filing of a notice.  CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 75. 
191 Appendix A, infra.  The comparable provision in New Jersey provides:  
The twenty-one County Prosecutors in the State of New Jersey reaffirm the fact that race, sex, 
social or economic religion [sic] and/or national origin of a defendant or victim has not in the 
past, nor will in the future be considered in any fashion to determine whether or not a case 
warrants capital prosecution. . . . 
NEW JERSEY PROSECUTOR'S GUIDELINES FOR DESIGNATION OF HOMICIDE CASES FOR CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT (reproduced in Bienen et al., supra note 5, at 792). 
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The guidelines mention that Illinois state‘s attorneys may consult one 
another or the Office of the Attorney General; however, it is not required 
that they do so before deciding whether to charge a case as a capital case.
193
  
Death penalty experts from the state Office of the Attorney General are 
available to advise on capital cases and to travel to counties to assist with or 
take over the prosecution of capital cases in the counties.
194
  However, the 
local state‘s attorney must call in these lawyers from the central Office of 
the Attorney General.
195
  Capital prosecutions, especially in high profile 
cases, have always been characterized by the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, and political maneuvering has long been accepted and is well 
documented.
196
  One purpose of centralized review is to allow for an 
objective review of decisions made in a politically charged atmosphere.  
Even if arbitrary or capricious patterns were shown by individual 
county differences in charging, as is suggested by the data reported here, 
there is at present in Illinois no central authority to review or discover such 
 
192 The state‘s attorneys have very different constituencies.  As a matter of practice they 
may not spend time travelling to other jurisdictions to hear what other state‘s attorneys are 
doing. 
It is to a certain extent in the eye of the beholder whether a murder case is capital eligible or not.  
You know, when I would make my trips to Springfield three or four years ago when we were in 
the midst of the, I don‘t know, it was pre-communication and the post-communication fallout.  
We were testifying, and coming here, and going to meetings, and there were statements made 
that were on both sides of it.  Well, you know, the prosecutors can prosecute every murder case 
as a death case, and then the other side.  So it is somewhat problematic, and I don‘t know if there 
is enough money in the Capital Litigation Trust Fund.  That would be a legislative budget issue, 
to fund the defense of every murder case. I am sure there is not. 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REFORM STUDY COMM., PUBLIC HEARING NOV. 13, 2006, at 84 (2006), 
available at http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/dpsrc/PublicHearings/ 
CPRSC_Public_Hearing_Nov._13_2006_transcript.pdf (testimony of Robert B. Haida). 
193 Appendix A, infra. 
194 E-mail from Richard D. Schwind, Chief, Criminal Enforcement Division, Illinois 
Attorney General‘s Office, Chicago, IL to Leigh Bienen (Jan. 15, 2010) (on file with author).  
In contrast to this relatively unstructured decisionmaking, at the federal level the Attorney 
General of the United States requires all ninety-four United States Attorneys to submit for 
their centralized review the decision to prosecute a case as a capital case.  U.S. DEP‘T OF 
JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL § 9-10.040, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/ (―In all cases subject to the 
provisions of this Chapter, the Attorney General will make the final decision about whether 
to seek the death penalty.‖). 
195 E-mail from Richard D. Schwind, supra note 194. 
196 See, e.g., GILBERT GEIS & LEIGH B. BIENEN, CRIMES OF THE CENTURY: FROM LEOPOLD 
AND LOEB TO O.J. SIMPSON 102 (1998) (summarizing the case of Bruno Richard 
Hauptmann). 
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patterns.  The record of federal death penalty prosecutions, which can only 
take place after centralized review, indicates that an institutionalized 




Even in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct, bias, or undue 
influence, the decentralized nature of decisionmaking and the fact that the 
102 local state‘s attorneys from very different parts of the state are 
answerable only to the county electorate makes it inevitable that there will 
be geographic disparity in the interpretation of the statute.  The question 
becomes, is it constitutionally acceptable for a state capital punishment 
system to tolerate such significant disparities in practice across a single 
legal system ostensibly governed by a single set of laws? 
Since the Illinois guidelines have only been in effect since 2006, and 
there is no sanction for not following them, nor any record of whether they 
have been followed or if they do indeed represent the current or past 
practice, it is difficult to attribute any direct effect to their passage.  Since 
there has not been any systematic data collection on the notices of intent 
filed by state‘s attorneys since 2003, it is impossible to measure whether the 
anecdotal reports of significant differences in the political policies of 
individual prosecutors are important or accurate.  There is no reason to 
think that Illinois is different from other state capital punishment systems, 
however, where such geographic disparities have repeatedly been identified 
and evaluated, and where they have risen to a level to imply a due process 
violation. 
III. THE DOCUMENTED COSTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN ILLINOIS 
A. INSTITUTIONAL AND BUREAUCRATIC INCENTIVES TO MAINTAIN 
THE CURRENT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SYSTEM 
As soon as the notice of intent to seek the death penalty is filed, the 
state‘s attorney and the public defender are both immediately eligible to 
apply to the CLTF for the reimbursement of non-salaried expenses in 
connection with that case.  The typical pattern is that as soon as the case is 
 
197 A recent summary and review of the patterns in capital cases charging at the federal 
level indicated that the Attorney General of the United States approved less than 25% of all 
requests from the United States Attorneys in districts throughout the United States.  Federal 
Death Penalty Resource Counsel, Recent Summaries of the Results of Federal Capital 
Prosecutions, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (Sept. 4, 2010), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-penalty#statutes.  Note, the federal central 
reviewing process cannot recommend a capital prosecution where none was sought.  The 
federal review can only grant or deny the local prosecutor‘s request that the case be brought 
as a capital case. 
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declared capital the case is usually out of the Public Defender‘s Office.  
Nonetheless, state‘s attorneys, public defenders, and assigned counsel all 
expend monies from the CLTF prior to trial on capital cases once a notice is 
filed, as well as on training for staff and other expenses.
198
  None of these 
agencies or actors repay the monies granted for the preparation of a 
particular capital case to the CLTF if the notice of intent is later 
withdrawn.
199
  This provides a strong economic incentive to file a notice of 
intent, even if there is no intention to actually prosecute a case to capital 
trial.
200
  On the other hand, postponing the filing of the notice of intent does 
not hurt the defense if the defense is not required to do any work on the 
case because the case is going to be transferred to appointed counsel.  There 
is, however, no incentive for the defense to prepare for capital trial or to 
discover or investigate possible mitigating factors.  
There is no significant cost to filing the notice of intent to seek the 
death penalty; the state‘s attorney assigned to the case simply files a piece 
of paper with the clerk of the court upon the approval of the trial court 
judge in the county.  At that moment the CTLF monies are available to be 
drawn upon by both the state‘s attorney and the defense, whether private 
counsel or public defender.  In this sense the public defender also ―benefits‖ 
from the filing of a notice of intent.  There is no requirement that a central 
agency or court review the charge.  The Office of the Illinois Attorney 
General does not receive information that a notice has been filed, unless it 
receives a request for trial assistance.  There is no requirement that the 
Illinois Supreme Court be notified.
201
  There is no systematic record kept of 





198 See Capital Litigation Trust Fund, Reports of Expenditures (on file with the Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminology). 
199 At any time prior to the imposition of a capital sentence, the state‘s attorney may 
unilaterally withdraw the notice of intent, immediately transforming a capital case into a 
non-capital case.  The withdrawal typically occurs prior to trial, and typically occurs as part 
of the defendant‘s acceptance of a sentence of years, or a sentence of life without possibility 
of parole, pursuant to a plea bargain.  See CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 105–08. 
200 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REFORM STUDY COMMITTEE, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra 
note 139, at 31–32. 
201 The establishment of a statewide review committee was, however, a principal 
recommendation of the 2002 Governor‘s Commission. ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR‘S COMM‘N 
REPORT, supra note 23, at 25 (Recommendation 30). 
202 Given that neither the Illinois Supreme Court nor the Office of the Illinois Attorney 
General keep centralized records, the only organization attempting to keep a statewide 
record of the number of notices filed and their disposition is the Illinois Coalition Against 
the Death Penalty.  Their tabulation is made publicly available in their Annual Reports.  Cf. 
ILL. COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, ANN. REP. (2003–2010), 
http://www.icadp.org/content/annual-reports.  The ICADP reported the following: 
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Every state‘s attorney‘s office and every public defender‘s office need 
more resources, more attorneys, and more money for training attorneys.
203
  
Especially when state agencies have been mandated to cut costs across the 
board, and state employees are taking mandatory furlough days without 
pay, more funds, from whatever source, are needed for the responsible 
prosecution and defense of all criminal cases, not just capital cases.  The 
availability of funds from the CLTF creates an economic incentive for a 
county state‘s attorney to declare a case capital, since this gives the state‘s 
attorney immediate access to previously unavailable funds, and it also 
makes funds available to the public defender, or it may remove a 
troublesome and expensive case from the public defender‘s office.
204
 
The public defender may be off of the case as soon as it is declared 
capital, and that may be welcome.  Or, if the case is declared capital and the 
public defender represents the defendant, the public defender‘s office at that 
point can request monies unavailable before from the CLTF.  There is a 
 
 
Footnote Table A 
Pending Capital Cases in Illinois 
Year Pending Cases in 
Cook County 
Pending Cases 
Outside of Cook 
Resolved Cases 
in Cook County 
Pending Cases 
Outside of Cook 
County 
2009 154 * 68 * 
2007 169 22 55 6 
2006 151 16 53 14 
2005 170 26 * * 
2004 164 30 * * 
2003 175 24 22^ 15 
Source: Illinois Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty Annual Reports 2003–2010. 
203 John Byrne, Public Defender: No Money, No Death Penalty, 
CHICAGOBREAKINGNEWS.COM (June 3, 2009, 5:58 PM CST), 
http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2009/06/public-defender-no-money-no-death-
penalty.html.  According to the article: 
Cook County Public Defender Abishi Cunningham Jr. said this money shortage means attorneys 
in his office will file dozens of motions this week asking judges to either bar the state from 
seeking death or allow public defenders to withdraw from capital cases because the attorneys can 
no longer mount adequate defenses.  The Cook County State‘s Attorney‘s Office opposes the 
move, spokeswoman Sally Daly said.  Cost should not be a factor in determining whether a 
defendant is eligible for capital punishment, she said. 
204 The money from the CLTF is not to be designated for salaries, yet disbursements to 
the state‘s attorneys and the public defenders include payments listed as ―salaries.‖  In 
testimony before the CPRSC, a trial judge stated that budgetary concerns often weigh 
heavily on the state‘s attorney‘s decision of whether to seek the death penalty.  See CPRSC 
FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 97–98. 
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demonstrated inequity in the fact that appointed counsel are reimbursed for 
attorney‘s fees and the public defender is not.  On the other hand, by 
declaring a case capital the state‘s attorneys may find themselves facing a 
relatively well-funded private attorney rather than the public defender.  
Testimony was presented at the public hearings of the CPRSC that some 
state‘s attorneys did use the availability of funds from the CLTF 
strategically, rather than substantively.
205
  The decision to file a notice of 
intent may be influenced by several contradictory economic and strategic 
incentives. 
The defense may also have a bureaucratic and economic incentive not 
to oppose the state‘s attorney‘s motion to declare the case capital as this 
opens up accessibility to CLTF funds to the defense as well, or may even 
allow the case to be offloaded from the public defender‘s staff to outside 
paid counsel.  However, as soon as the notice of intent is withdrawn, access 
to funds from the CLTF is removed.  At that point, the case will probably 
come back to the public defender, as appointed trial counsel will have no 
further access to funds from the CLTF.  Given these considerations, the 
strategic timing of when a case is noticed and when the notice is withdrawn 
become critical, and perhaps inappropriately the subject of plea 
negotiations. 
If the case remains within the public defender‘s office, the expenses of 
investigation and of experts can be paid for by the CLTF as long as the case 
is designated capital, giving the public defender more resources, and an 
incentive not to oppose the filing of a notice of intent.  If the defendant is 
represented by appointed counsel, paid for by the CLTF, that defense 
counsel has an economic incentive to postpone the decertification, or the 
―de-deathing‖ of the case as long as possible, in order to continue to be paid 
from the CLTF.  These bureaucratic and economic incentives are likely to 
differ radically from county to county, depending upon the budgetary 
situation of the county and the number of first-degree murders in that 
county.   
While the Illinois CLTF may be a step towards ensuring adequate 
representation and investigation for capital defense attorneys and may 
provide needed funds for state‘s attorneys, the establishment of the CLTF 
by itself is not enough to result in indigent defendants receiving the best, or 
even adequate, representation, contrary to the public perception and the 
intent of the legislature.  Indeed the establishment of the CLTF, with its 
 
205 Id.; see also CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REFORM STUDY COMMITTEE, FOURTH ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 139, at 33 (summarizing testimony that notices of intent were in 
some cases withdrawn on the eve of trial, preventing appointed defense attorneys from 
obtaining fees from the CLTF). 
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ready access to large amounts of cash reimbursements for attorney‘s fees 
and unreviewed expenses, may have created yet another layer of bizarre 
bureaucratic and economic incentives which further encumber the effective 
representation of defendants by public defenders and private counsel, 
because they provide monetary incentives to declare a case capital and to 
keep it as a capital case as long as possible.
206
 
Furthermore, delays in the receipt of disbursements of already-
appropriated state funds due to the state budget crisis have become 
commonplace in Illinois.
 
 State‘s attorneys might have an incentive to 
declare a case capital soon after funds are appropriated and received, while 
they might be less likely to declare cases capital after the year‘s 
appropriated funds have run out.  The incentives would be very different in 
Cook County than in other counties because of the different way CLTF 
monies have been appropriated to Cook County compared with other 
counties.  The delay in the receipt of funds from the CLTF might also result 
in capital cases remaining pending for longer than they would otherwise, so 
that money can continue to be drawn from the CLTF.
207
 
The expenditures from the CLTF outside of Cook County go primarily 
to costs associated with appointed outside counsel.  Outside counsel might 
or might not provide more effective representation for the defense than the 
public defender in the county.
208
  Absent an independent investigation 
 
206 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 124/15(e) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010) (Capital 
Litigation Trust Fund). 
―Moneys in the Trust Fund shall be expended only as follows: 
(3) To pay the compensation of trial attorneys, other than public defenders or appellate 
defenders, who have been appointed by the court to represent defendants who are charged 
with capital crimes. . . .  Moneys expended from the Trust Fund shall be in addition to county 
funding for Public Defenders and State‟s Attorneys, and shall not be used to supplant or 
reduce ordinary and customary county funding.‖ 
 Id. (emphasis added). 
207 The Illinois Coalition Against the Death Penalty‘s tabulation of the number of 
pending capital cases in Cook County suggests that shortage of funds might be one reason 
for cases being pending for so long, being neither pled nor going to capital trial.  See 
Footnote Table A supra note 202. 
208 Private counsel must be capital-crimes certified.  ILL. SUP. CT. R. 714.  The quality of 
private counsel nonetheless may be uneven.  The relative competence of public defenders 
and private counsel can only be evaluated by seeing how many persons sentenced to death 
raise incompetence of counsel on their appeals, and in how many capital cases appellate 
courts have granted that claim in public defender cases versus in private counsel cases, in the 
state and federal courts.  Those appeals take years, and often involve changes in 
representation.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that public defenders may provide better 
representation due to their experience in defending capital cases.  For example, in Marshall, 
the Third Circuit overturned the defendant‘s death sentence on the basis of the incompetence 
of his private counsel at the penalty phase of his initial trial.  The private counsel called no 
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showing to the contrary, there are economic incentives for judges as well 
when a case is declared capital.  The judge decides who of the eligible 
attorneys in the county will receive substantial disbursements from the 
CLTF.  This may turn out to benefit the judge when collecting campaign 
funds or in numerous other ways.
209
  The court may also be able to offload 
certain expenses to the CLTF if a case is declared capital. 
As discussed previously there are substantial county disparities in the 
allocation of funds from the CLTF.
210
  Outside of Cook County, the 
counties with the greatest number of murders are not the counties receiving 
the largest disbursements from the CLTF.  The funding of capital cases in 
Illinois, as elsewhere, has always been a mix of county and state funds, with 
counties paying some but not all of the salaries of state‘s attorneys and 
public defenders.  And different counties are in different states of fiscal 
health.  All counties have been hurt by recent across-the-board cuts in the 
Illinois budget. 
For the first nine years of its operation, the administrators of the CLTF 
had no authority to deny or approve requests for funds.  The trial court 
judge alone approved the application of funds.  There were some 
restrictions on the use of the funds, such as the general restriction on using 
funds for the CLTF to hire county staff, but no centralized state agency 
made any review of these substantial expenditures of tens of millions of 
dollars.  As of 2010, an amendment to the CLTF statute mandates that trial 
court judges require appointed defense lawyers to provide a proposed 
litigation budget under seal.  The amendment further provides that no 
payment will be made from the CLTF without a properly itemized and 
detailed bill examined ex parte and approved by both the trial and presiding 
court trial judge.
211
  Under this legislation, for the first time in nine years 
the state treasurer is authorized to question or conduct an independent 
review of applications for payments from the fund.
212
  This review and 
 
witnesses at penalty phase.  See Marshall v. Cathel, 428 F.3d 452, 474 (3d Cir. 2005).  It is 
unlikely that a public defender at the time would have made that mistake. 
209 The state regulation of public officials, including judges, state‘s attorneys and others, 
has recently been the subject of much attention in the aftermath of the trial of former Illinois 
Governor Rod Blagojevich. However,  an indicted state‘s attorney was recently allowed to 
continue his job.  See Robert McCoppin & Amanda Marrazzo, Indicted State's Attorney to 
Fight, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 2010, at A7.  
210 See supra Part II.C. 
211 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 124/10(a) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2010). 
212 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 124/10(a)(b).  This legislation was passed after publicity 
concerning payments of over $1 million to a court appointed defense attorney from out of 
state in the Cecil Sutherland case, tried in Jefferson County in 2006.  See CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT REFORM STUDY COMM., SECOND ANN. REP. 9 (2006); CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
REFORM STUDY COMM., THIRD ANN. REP. 24–25 (2007).  The new legislation provides that 
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approval, however, is not required for the disbursement of funds to state‘s 
attorneys. 
The CLTF has helped defense attorneys provide adequate defense in 
capital cases, and has substantially benefitted state‘s attorneys and the 
attorney general, if benefits are measured by the fact all those agencies 
received money they would have not had otherwise for the prosecution and 
defense of Illinois capital cases.  In fact, it is unclear whether the 
availability of more than $100 million from the CLTF over nine years has 
improved the quality of counsel.  All that is clear is that this money has 
been spent. 
B. THE HIGH COST OF CAPITAL PROSECUTIONS 
It is well established by national research and systematic, detailed 
studies in other states that capital cases cost more to prosecute and defend 
than non-capital cases.
213
  Capital cases are particularly costly for defense 
counsel because it is the ethical obligation of defense counsel to present any 
and all mitigating evidence that might conceivably influence a jury, or even 
a single juror, not to impose the death penalty.
214
  If a defendant is 
sentenced to death, defense counsel‘s every action at trial will be 
scrutinized during subsequent state and federal appellate proceedings.
215
  If 
subsequent investigation uncovers evidence that might have persuaded the 
jury not to impose death, the failure to investigate and present such 
evidence may result in a reversal of the capital sentence on grounds of 
 
the state treasurer may object to submitted expenses as unreasonable, unnecessary, or 
inappropriate.  The appointed lawyer then has seven days to respond, and the trial court must 
promptly rule on the treasurer‘s objections.  The CPRSC endorsed this provision.  CPRSC 
FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 111.  
213 See infra Part IV (discussing cost studies).  For an analysis of the differing costs of 
the prosecution of capital cases and non-capital murders, see Robert M. Bohm, The 
Economic Costs of Capital Punishment: Past, Present, and Future, in AMERICA‘S 
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 573–94 (James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm, & 
Charles S. Lanier, eds. 1998).  This article provides specific dollar figures for the five stages 
of a capital prosecution and future costs of appellate and postconviction procedures, 
concluding that capital punishment systems in the United States are always more expensive 
than non-capital punishment systems.  Id. at 592.  
214 AM. BAR ASS‘N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE 
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 104–06 (2003), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/deathpenaltyguidelines2003.pdf. 
[hereinafter ABA GUIDELINES]. 
215 Those sentenced to death generally acquire new counsel after being convicted.  
Additional funds may be available through the federal public defender system if the 
procedural standards for habeas corpus have been met.  This may allow for a complete 
investigation of mitigating factors to be conducted for the first time, years after the trial. 
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incompetence of counsel.
216
  The United States Supreme Court found this 
standard appropriate based on the American Bar Association‘s Guidelines 
for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Capital 
Cases,
217
 even though these guidelines may be aspirational as a matter of 
practice.
218
  This high standard makes the preparation for the penalty phase 
of a capital trial particularly compelling, complicated, expensive, and 
burdensome for the defense.
219
  It also results in both the defense and the 
prosecution seeking expert testimony from mitigation specialists to support 
the verdict at penalty phase.  If a death sentence is imposed the performance 





216 See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003).  The public discussion typically 
focuses on public defenders; however, there are noteworthy cases where private counsel has 
been found incompetent after failing to conduct investigation into mitigation.  See, e.g., 
Marshall v. Cathel, 428 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 2005). 
217 ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 214. 
218 Many of the attorneys appointed to represent defendants in capital cases do not even 
live up to the standards that any lawyer would be expected to meet: 
Before dismissing the stories of the sleeping and drunk lawyers in capital cases as freak 
occurrences, consider that in Illinois, thirty-three defendants who were sentenced to death were 
represented at trial by an attorney who had once been, or was later, disbarred or suspended.  One 
of these lawyers had been the subject of seventy-eight disciplinary complaints.  Another had 
been disbarred but was later reinstated despite serious issues regarding his emotional stability 
and drinking.  He soon proceeded to represent four men who landed on death row.  Shortly 
thereafter he was disbarred again.  Among the other attorneys who have been appointed in 
Illinois to represent indigent defendants in capital cases are ―a tax lawyer who had never before 
tried a case, an attorney just two years out of law school‖ who was juggling his capital case with 
one hundred other criminal cases, and ―another attorney just ten days off a suspension for 
incompetence and dishonesty‖ exhibited in six separate cases. 
Marshall, supra note 47, at 958–59. 
219 A competent, thorough investigation into the defendant‘s mental health and social 
history often requires travel to other jurisdictions and hiring of death penalty investigation 
experts, persons experienced and trained in finding and gaining access to school and health 
records, finding family members, and investigating circumstances and events which occurred 
decades ago which the family and others may be reluctant to discuss.  There may no longer 
be living family members available as potential witnesses.  Evidence of childhood neglect, 
abuse, abandonment and the brutality of family members to children or others is not easily 
discovered or authenticated, and it may take years to identify and reliably document.  
Sometimes, reliable records will only be found in institutions or schools.  In addition, capital 
defendants are often uncooperative, or unable to articulate or recall aspects of their family or 
institutional history which might be persuasive to a capital jury.  Head injuries are often 
important for the establishment of disabilities and incompetence, and the source of such 
injuries may be decades old.  Tomes, supra note 187, at 368–72. 
220 See Capital Litigation Trial Fund, Reports of Expenditures (on file with the Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology).  
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High visibility capital trials are the cases where trial errors due to 
prosecutorial misconduct are most likely to occur.
221
  When prosecutors 
aggressively pursue the death penalty, as in cases involving false 
confessions, often there is public pressure for a speedy conviction, and such 
public pressures may lead to errors, prosecutorial misconduct, and the 
imposition of guilty verdicts for defendants who are wrongfully 
prosecuted.
222
  The verdicts of the wrongfully convicted add another layer 
to the cost calculation. 
The cases of Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez provide an 
example of a prosecutor becoming so locked into a commitment to a capital 
prosecution and a death sentence that no contradictory evidence could 
change his mind or derail that prosecution.
223
  In these cases, the defendants 
were wrongfully convicted multiple times based on unreliable evidence 
including a statement that was not even a confession.
224
  Yet the DuPage 
County state‘s attorneys who tried these cases were able to persuade 
multiple juries to convict the wrong defendants and sentence them to death.  
In such cases, the cost of trial and appeal is multiplied as the case goes to 
 
221 Gershowitz, supra note 169, at 311. 
222 Public pressure in high-profile cases also can lead to police misconduct.  Burge 
Found Guilty, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 2010, at A1 (describing torture of criminal defendants by 
former Chicago police commander, Jon Burge, which resulted in false confessions and 
wrongful convictions); see also Warden, supra note 9, at 413–14 (discussing Cruz and 
Hernandez case); TUROW, supra note 83, at 28–46.  There is also public pressure on judges 
to be ―tough‖ on crime: 
Why is the death penalty such a salient issue for judges?  The media play an important role both 
in creating the culture in which being tough on crime is all, and in reducing judicial races and 
even judicial decision to simplistic sound bites.  Judges who seek to flout conventional wisdom 
and uphold procedural safeguards are pilloried.  The media, as we‘ve seen, are not often inclined 
to convey procedural complexities.  Even the most serious errors tend to be reduced to sound 
bites that translate to ―he let him off on a technicality because he is soft on crime.‖  In the 
particular context of judicial races, judges are placed in the position of needing to create those 
very sound bites, and there is no substitute for touting one‘s own demonstrated commitment to 
the death penalty, or attacking that of one‘s opponent, as a quick and easy way to garner media 
attention and prove that one is not soft on crime.   
Susan Bandes, Fear Factor: The Role of Media in Covering and Shaping the Death Penalty,  
1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 585, 596 (2004) (citations omitted). 
223 Cruz and Hernandez were falsely convicted of murdering Jeanine Nicarico.  People v. 
Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636, 639 (Ill. 1994).  Every time the death sentence was overturned, the 
prosecutor was committed to continuing the prosecution, even after additional evidence 
identified Brian Dugan as the actual perpetrator.  Eric Zorn, DuPage Got It Wrong, Wrong, 
Wrong, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 13, 2009, at C21: 
Dugan‘s public defender told DuPage County authorities that fact in 1985 after Dugan was 
arrested and confessed to a strikingly similar rape and murder in LaSalle County. But DuPage 
didn‘t get it.  They‘d already put Rolando Cruz and Alex Hernandez onto death row for the 
crime, and so dismissed Dugan as a liar. 
224 Warden, supra note 9, at 381–82. 
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capital trial, is appealed, is reversed, goes to capital trial again, results in 
another death sentence being imposed, is appealed, is reversed, and is 
brought to capital trial again. Along the way, the appeals become more 
technical, more controversial, and more costly.  While these appeals are 
proceeding, time passes, and the taxpayers pay for the costs of the trials and 
retrials and appeals, and for the defendant to sit on death row consulting 
with attorneys at state expense.  Meanwhile the actual murderer is out 
committing other crimes.  If the justification for the imposition of the death 
penalty is deterrence or retribution, then these cases teach us that deterrence 
and retribution are neither swift nor sure.  This wasteful charade is no 
solace for victims or the public. 
C. THE PRICE OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
A wrongful conviction for capital murder is like a doctor amputating 
the wrong leg: there is no positive benefit to society, to the victim of the 
crime, to the wrongfully prosecuted individual, or to the credibility and 
integrity of the professionals involved and their institutions.  Sometimes the 
wrongful conviction involves malice and deliberate wrongdoing, such as 
with the police torture cases or the cases where exonerating evidence was 
withheld or ignored deliberately by prosecutors, as in Cruz.
225
  These cases 
involve prosecutorial misconduct at its worst, and certainly a violation of 
the ABA‘s recommended ethical standards for prosecutors.
226
  Yet few, if 
any, sanctions have been meted out to state‘s attorneys in cases of wrongful 
convictions.  The stubborn, overly aggressive prosecutions of innocent 
defendants in Illinois resulted in the exoneration of ten persons on death 
row by January 2003, the time of the Ryan commutations.  Monetary 
compensation never will make those defendants whole, nor will it 
compensate the victims‘ families for undergoing unnecessary trials and 
retrials.  Some of those individual defendants can and have recovered some 
recompense from the city or county that prosecuted them as well as from 
the State of Illinois.  This money is another item in the cost of capital 
punishment in Illinois. 
Table 7 is an omnibus table for state expenditures for wrongful 
convictions.
227
  The total of more than $64 million for all cases includes 
 
 
225 See Zorn, supra note 223, at C21. 
226 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_3_8.html (Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor). 
227 The source for figures in individual cases is Rob Warden, Director of the Center on 
Wrongful Convictions, Bluhm Legal Clinic, Northwestern University School of Law (on file 
with the Center for Wrongful Convictions); see also CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/cwc/. 
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Table 7 
State Expenditures on Wrongful Convictions in Illinois Capital Cases, 
County and Date of Conviction, Court of Claims Awards, Civil Rights 
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s This does not include all capital cases, or all wrongful convictions, during the years 
1987–2010, but only those for whom final judgments or settlements have been reached.  
Pending cases, as of August 1, 2010 are not included.  Some cases remain under 
investigation. 
t Column 1 displays the year that the first death sentence was imposed.  In the case of 
Cruz, for example, a death sentence was imposed in 1985 and again in 1990.  Alejandro 
Hernandez, Cruz‘s co-defendant, was sentenced to death in 1985 and again in 1991. 
u There must be a court certified finding of innocence of the offense for which the 
petitioner was convicted before the court of claims can issue an award.  Section 505/8 (c) of 
the Illinois Court of Claims Act.  The amount received is a statutory amount based upon the 
number of days wrongfully imprisoned. 
v Column 3 displays the legal fees paid by defendant cities, counties, or both to defend 
against federal civil rights suits brought by exonerated persons as plaintiffs against the cities, 
counties, or both, and employees indemnified by them. 
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 Totals: $2,240,267 $15,172,431 $46,958,649 $64,371,347 
Source:  Freedom of Information Act requests by the Center on Wrongful Convictions and 
other public information, on file with Rob Warden, Director of the Center on Wrongful 
Convictions, Bluhm Legal Clinic, Northwestern University. 
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some, but not all, legal payments by counties and the City of Chicago for 
their defense in these cases.  The total does not include, for example, the 
2010 civil rights case against Jon Burge, the police officer in charge of the 
Area 2 police station in Chicago where the Ford Heights Four and others 
were tortured and then signed coerced confessions.
228
  Nor does it include 
the more than $10 million in legal fees the City of Chicago has paid to 
defend Burge and other detectives.
229
 
The Court of Claims provides statutory awards representing a 
particular dollar amount for each day the person was wrongfully 
imprisoned.  The statute is not new, however most of the claims in Illinois 
were awarded after 2000, perhaps because of the greater availability of 
counsel after the discovery of so many wrongful convictions.
230
  Awards in 
civil cases are likely to be larger if the defendant was sentenced to death.  
The statute for federal prisioners explicitly provides for a larger award if the 
defendant has been sentenced to death.
231
 
The costs and price of wrongful convictions can be measured in 
several ways.  First, there is the cost of the wrongful prosecution, the trial, 
and the appeals themselves—all money that has been wasted on the 
prosecution of an innocent person while the actual killer was not being 
sought or prosecuted.  The amount of wasted money amplifies with each 
retrial and re-prosecution of the wrongfully convicted person, as well as 
with the successive appeals and collateral reviews of the same case.  Then, 
there are additional specific costs to the state associated with state payments 
for the wrongful convictions.  Additionally, there are the relatively smaller 
 
228 See Marshall, supra note 47, at 967.  Marshall describes the large sums paid by 
Cook County in cases involving police and prosecutorial misconduct:  
Ultimately, Cook County paid the men [in the Ford Heights four case] thirty-six million dollars 
to settle their civil rights actions. . . .  Beyond these payouts, Cook County spent well over two 
million dollars in defending the civil rights lawsuits.  In addition, the State of Illinois has paid the 
five defendants approximately $600,000 under its compensation statute for the wrongly 
convicted.  In addition to these costs, the State also incurred the needless expense of imprisoning 
these innocent defendants for seventy-six years collectively.  At the current rate of approximately 
$22,000 per year to incarcerate an inmate, these seventy-six years cost Illinois taxpayers another 
$1.7 million in wasted resources.  Thus, without even trying to assess the costs of the multiple 
trials and appeals involving these innocent individuals, the tab for the errors in this one case 
come out to over forty million dollars in direct expenditures (with one major lawsuit still 
pending). . . . 
Id. 
229 See Matthew Walberg, Ex-Inmate Sues Daley, Burge; Lawsuit: Mayor Did Nothing to 
Stop Torture, CHI. TRIB., July 2, 2010, at C8. 
230 Infra Table 7.  See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West 1993 & West Supp. 
2010). The Ford Heights Four award of $36 million was a record-breaking amount at the 
time. 
231 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (2006). 
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Court of Claims payments.  A number of the wrongful conviction cases 
resulted in judgments amounting to millions of dollars paid for by the 
county, the City of Chicago, and the State of Illinois. 
Table 7 shows the particularities of the costs of some of those 
wrongful convictions that resulted in death sentences in Illinois.  These 
costs are not trivial, and the Illinois taxpayers in one form or another pay 
for them all.  Finally, there is the immeasurable cost to society of 
sentencing an innocent person to death.  Wrongful convictions not only 
allow the real murderer to remain at large to commit other crimes, thus 
perverting norms of civil protection, but they also erode public confidence 
in the criminal justice system.  Victims‘ families, as well as defendants and 
their families, are needlessly subjected to the rigors of a capital trial.  The 
total of over $64 million to date will only increase. 
What is exceptional in Illinois was not the number of wrongful 
convictions, but rather the long term commitment of Illinois lawyers, 
students, journalists and others willing and able to spend years on the 
laborious, often thankless task of uncovering evidence of innocence and 
prosecutorial misconduct, and to then pursue these cases until the death 
sentence is set aside.
232
  Newspaper staff and persistent journalists 
frequently uncovered critical factual evidence of wrongful convictions, 
thereby providing attorneys with the information needed to file civil rights 
suits and to bring actions against those responsible.
233
  The role of college 
students, law students, and faculty members from many institutions over a 
long period of time was also extensive.  There is little, however, in the 
chronicles of these cases to provide much faith in the accuracy or reliability 
of the Illinois capital punishment system.  Nor is there much reason to think 
that Illinois is unique in this respect. 
IV. COST STUDIES AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REVIEWS IN OTHER STATES 
On October 23, 2009, the Council of the American Law Institute voted 
overwhelmingly to withdraw § 210.6, the death penalty provisions of the 
 
232 The stories of these cases have been fully chronicled elsewhere.  See generally 
Warden, supra note 9; Marshall, supra note 19. 
233 The roles of the Chicago Tribune, the Chicago Reader, and the Chicago Lawyer in 
uncovering the wrongful convictions in Illinois have been pivotal.  Not only did the Tribune 
conduct its own research and maintain a database of homicides and capital prosecutions in 
Illinois, but it published a series of articles which were critical in educating the general 
public and galvanizing the legal community.  See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Posseley, Trial 
and Error; How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, at N1; John 
Conroy, House of Screams, CHI. READER (Jan 26, 1990), 
http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/house-of-screams/Content?oid=875107; see also 
articles cited in Warden, supra note 9, at 399 n.77. 
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Model Penal Code, due to ―the current intractable institutional and 
structural obstacles to ensuring a minimally adequate system for 
administering capital punishment.‖
234
  The Council‘s decision was based on 
a report prepared at the director‘s request by Professors Carol Steiker and 
Jordan Steiker, a report which sets forth in detail the major reasons why the 
American Law Institute no longer stands behind its own influential 
statutory formulation of provisions for the principled imposition of the 
death sentence: 
[M]any thoughtful and knowledgeable individuals doubt whether the capital-
punishment regimes in place in three-fourths of the states, or in any form likely to be 
implemented in the near future, meet or are likely ever to meet basic concerns of 
fairness in process and outcome.  These include (a) the tension between clear statutory 
identification of which murders should command the death penalty and the 
constitutional requirement of individualized determination; (b) the difficulty of 
limiting the list of aggravating factors so that they do not cover (as they do in a 
number of state statutes now) a large percentage of murderers; (c) the near 
impossibility of addressing by legal rule the conscious or unconscious racial bias 
within the criminal-justice system that has resulted in statistical disparity in death 
sentences based on the race of the victim; (d) the enormous economic costs of 
administering a death-penalty regime, combined with studies showing that the legal 
representation provided to some criminal defendants is inadequate; (e) the likelihood, 
especially given the availability and reliability of DNA testing, that some persons 
sentenced to death will later, and perhaps too late, be shown to not have committed 
the crime for which they were sentenced; and (f) the politicization of judicial 
elections, where—even though nearly all state judges perform their tasks 
conscientiously—candidate statements of personal views on the death penalty and 
incumbent judges‘ actions in death-penalty cases become campaign issues . . . .
235
 
The ALI report further notes that there is at present ―widespread 




One manifestation of this widespread reflection is the decision by 
many states to create commissions to study the operation of their death 
penalty system after becoming aware of systemic inequities or discovering 
 
234 Message from Lance Liebman, Director, American Law Institute (Oct. 23, 2009), 
http://www.ali.org/_news/10232009.htm.  The American Law Institute‘s Model Penal Code 
established the theoretical framework and legal architecture to address the constitutional 
problems with the application of capital punishment statutes identified by the United States 
Supreme Court.  In 1976, the Supreme Court relied explicitly upon the Model Penal Code to 
rule that Georgia‘s new death penalty statute addressed the constitutional infirmities 
identified in Furman v. Georgia.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976) (plurality 
opinion).  The states were eager to reenact capital punishment, and state legislatures quickly 
adopted statutes incorporating the Model Penal Code‘s structure of statutory aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances. See Bienen, supra note 2, at 139. 
235 STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 5. (emphasis added). 
236 Id. at 2–3. 
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innocent persons on death row.  These commissions typically make 
recommendations to the state legislature or the state governor.
237
  In the 
three decades since Gregg allowed for the reestablishment of capital 
punishment, the reenacting states have had generations of experience with 
the impact of capital punishment on state legal institutions.  The current 
economic situation and the fiscal crises in many states have encouraged 
states to investigate the costs and benefits of capital punishment as well.
238
  
It has been proven repeatedly that capital cases cost substantially more than 
sentencing a defendant to life in prison.
239
  State money is needed to pay for 
capital trials and adjudication, for extended pretrial incarceration and 
incarceration in special facilities for capital defendants, for the longer trials 
and protracted appeals of capital cases, and for the costs of the executions 
themselves.  Further state money is needed for the costs of defending legal 
challenges to all aspects of the prosecution and trial, as well as extensive 
legal challenges to the method and procedures concerning executions 
themselves and the conditions of confinement on death row. 
The methodology for conducting a cost and implementation study is 
now well settled: a statewide study must examine all cases of first-degree 
murder or potentially death-eligible murder, and those cases must be 
tracked through the entire state capital punishment system for the results to 
be credible.
240
  The identification of murders and death-eligible murders 
must be objective and systematic, and the study must disclose its data 
collection methodology and methods of analysis.  The state studies 
presented here, in order to compare their findings with patterns seen in 
Illinois, take somewhat different methodological approaches; however, they 
are all rigorous, exemplary, and, most important, transparent in the 
disclosure of their methodology, data collection, identification of cases and 
in the empirical support for their findings and recommendation.  These are 
some, but not all, of the leading case studies of state capital punishment 




237 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33. The 2002 Illinois Governor‘s 
Commission, with its extensive report, was among the first and most comprehensive of such 
Commissions.  See ILL. 2002 GOVERNOR‘S COMM‘N REPORT, supra note 23. 
238 See, e.g., infra Part IV.C (discussing CALIFORNIA REPORT). 
239 CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 146; Cook, supra note 34, at 524.  
240 For a detailed report on the capital punishment cost studies to date and how a credible 
study must be structured, see David Baldus et. al., Empirical Studies of Race and 
Geographic Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Primer on the Key 
Methodological Issues, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA‘S DEATH PENALTY: AN AGENDA FOR THE 
NEXT GENERATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT RESEARCH 153, 153–93 (Charles S. Lanier et 
al., eds., 2009). 
241 For a brief overview of cost studies performed in particular states and nationally, see 
CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at app. 10. 
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A. THE NORTH CAROLINA ECONOMETRIC STUDY 
A recent detailed study of the cost of the death penalty in a single state 
is the econometric analysis of the cost of the North Carolina death penalty 
system during the fiscal years 2007 and 2008.
242
  This study uses traditional 
econometric analytic techniques to compare the actual incurred costs of the 
death penalty over two years with what would have been spent had the 
death penalty not been the law during that time.
243
 
North Carolina has many similarities to Illinois.  Both states reenacted 
the death penalty in 1977 and both have seen a sharp decline in the number 
of death sentences imposed over the past few years.
244
  North Carolina and 
Illinois both have around 100 counties, and in both states the district 
attorney in each county has the independent authority to declare a case 
capital.
245
  In 2001, a special Office of Indigent Defense Services was 
created in North Carolina to provide a new source of funds for the defense 
of capital cases.
246
  North Carolina has not executed anyone since 2006 due 




The North Carolina study found that the state would have saved almost 
$11 million in each of the examined years had the death penalty been 
abolished prior to the two years under review.
248
  Much of the saving would 
have come in the form of reduced expenditures for specific legal 
requirements in the prosecution of a capital case.  For example, in an 
ordinary murder prosecution, there is no requirement for the selection of a 
death-qualified jury, which costs the state extra days in voir dire and in 
 
242 Cook, supra note 34. 
243 Id. at 499.  The study in North Carolina describes the research design used in detail.  
The empirical analysis was based upon a data set of 1,034 indictments for first-degree, 
potentially capital,  murder cases during the study period, fiscal years 2005 and 2006.  Id. at 
513 fig.3.  The actual disposition at trial for these cases was as follows: 174 individuals were 
convicted of first-degree murder, irrespective of whether the case was declared capital; 276 
cases resulted in a dismissal of the murder charge or a jury verdict of not guilty of murder; 
274 cases (26.5%) were designated capital; 58 cases went to capital trial and 9 death 
sentences were imposed in 49 penalty phase trials; 2 defendants received a death sentence 
after pleading guilty.  The most common outcome in the 1,024 cases was a conviction of 
second-degree murder.  Approximately five times more cases were declared capital (274) 
than actually went to trial as capital cases (54) and roughly one in twenty-five cases 
designated capital resulted in the imposition of a death sentence (11 out of  276).  Id. 
244 Id. at 504. 
245 Id. at 524. 
246 Id. at 503.  Note, this fund, unlike the CLTF, was created to provide state funds only 
to defense attorneys in capital cases, not to provide funds to prosecutors. 
247 Id. at 504.  See generally Symposium, The Lethal Injection Debate, supra note 27. 
248 Cook, supra note 34, at 525. 
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preparations.
249
  Without the possibility of a capital trial, there is no need 
for state‘s attorneys or defense attorneys to prepare for a penalty-phase trial.   
The North Carolina study documented the extra costs to the defense of 
prosecuting a case capitally.
250
  These itemized expenditures did not count 
the extra cost to the prosecution of proceeding capitally.  In addition, there 
are other system costs for the defense besides the direct payments to 
individual defense attorneys.
251
  The study also found that prisons would 
save a substantial amount per year if those on death row were reassigned to 
incarceration with the non-death populations.
252
 
The study distinguishes between ―cash costs‖ and ―in-kind costs.‖  
Cash costs are additional documented dollars that must be spent 
immediately out of the state budget to prosecute capital cases.
253
  In-kind 
 
249 Id. at 520: 
An additional savings from abolishing the death penalty would be a reduction in jury costs.  The 
thirty-two capital cases concluding in the two-year window (FY 2005 and 2006) lasted an 
average of 11.7 days longer than noncapital trials of cases that had once proceeded capitally.  
Given that North Carolina pays jurors $40 per day after the first five days, I estimate $224,640 of 
extra juror payments.  That figure does not include the extra payments for the jury pool during 
voir dire, or the reimbursement for parking and meals. 
250 Id. at 511.  Extra defense costs for capital cases are by far the greatest extra expense 
for the state.  This is because of extra ―super due process‖ protections put in place for 
defendants by state law and constitutional precedent.  Id. 
251 Id. at 519–520.  Cook explains: 
In addition to expenditures on private attorneys who are appointed by IDS [Indigent Defense 
Services]  to represent defendants in capital cases, the IDS Office of the Capital Defender has a 
staff of full-time attorneys and investigators who assist with capital cases and other murder cases 
around the state.  The budget for this office totaled $3,296,795 for the two years under 
consideration.  IDS officials estimated that 23.8% of the office‘s budget currently goes to 
noncapital murder cases . . .  [Additionally,] the Center for Death Penalty Litigation (CDPL) 
helps recruit and train defense attorneys for capital case representation, and consults on specific 
cases.  While CDPL is a private nonprofit agency, it receives part of its budget from the state, 
amounting to $1,187,482 during the two years.  In sum, the state‘s extra expenditures on defense 
in trial phase of capital cases amounted to the following: 
$9,560,181  ‗Extra‘ payments to private attorneys and other fees 
2,432,722 IDS Office of the Capital Defender 
1,187,482 Center for Death Penalty Litigation 
$13,180,385 Total, two years [for FY2005 and 2006]. 
Id. at 519–20. 
252 Id. at 524 (finding a total savings of $169,617 in prison costs over the two years 
studied).  
253 Id. at 514.  The ―cash cost‖ includes such items as payments by Indigent Defense 
Services (IDS) for private attorneys retained to represent indigent defendants in capital 
cases, payments by IDS for expert witnesses on behalf of the defense, and payments to 
jurors for cases that go to capital trial.  For each of these cost items, there is a reasonable 
presumption that if the expenditures for any one case were reduced, the overall state 
expenditures on criminal justice as a whole would be reduced correspondingly.  For 
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costs include the allocation of existing staff and budgetary resources, for 
example staff salaries or office overhead, to a particular death-eligible 
murder case, resources that otherwise would have been available for other 
criminal cases within the same criminal justice agency.
254
 
The North Carolina Study concludes: ―If the death penalty had been 
abolished on July 1, 2004, it is likely that the $13 million in extra 
expenditures on defense in capital cases would have been available to fund 
other activities of state government or to be returned to taxpayers over the 
subsequent two years.‖
255
  Note, this is only the savings of costs incurred by 
the defense.  This represents savings of cash costs only, not in-kind costs.  
The study assumes that freed-up state resources in courts, prosecutors‘ 
offices, and the offices of public defenders would be devoted to other cases, 
rather than result in an overall reduction in state budgets for attorney and 
court costs, or a decline in staff at correctional institutions.
256
 
As in Illinois, North Carolina prosecutors can use the possibility of a 
capital trial and a death sentence as a bargaining tool, allowing prosecutors 
to extract pleas for longer sentences if a case is declared capital.  The North 
Carolina Study notes that the actual length of sentences for murder imposed 
might be affected by the absence of the possibility of a death penalty as a 
tool for the prosecutor in plea bargaining.
257
  However, the study found that 
―[r]emarkably, noncapital cases that went to trial had lower defense 
expenditures . . . than capital cases that were disposed of by pleas.‖
258
  This 
implies that the trials themselves are not high in cost; rather the designation 
of a prosecution as capital increases costs for both the prosecution and the 
defense. 
 
example, if IDS is not required to appoint a second defense attorney for a murder defendant 
(because the district attorney decides to proceed non-capitally), and as a result avoids paying 
$50,000 in attorney‘s fees, that $50,000 would not be reallocated to another IDS case, but 
rather could be used for other state government programs (education, Medicaid) or returned 
to the taxpayers in the form of lower tax rates.  Id. 
254 Cook, supra note 34, at 515.  Examples of in-kind costs include ―time spent by 
attorneys and other staff in the district attorney‘s office, and the use of courtrooms, judges‘ 
time, and all the associated personnel required for hearings and trial days‖ in capital cases.  
Id. at 515–16. 
255 Id. at 520. 
256 In the face of a proposed abolition of capital punishment, state employees in a variety 
of institutions might well be worried about losing jobs or having their institutional budgets 
cut.  This study found that North Carolina could realize significant savings without cutting a 
single state job.  See id. at 505. 
257 Id. at 510–11; see supra Part III.A. 
258 Cook, supra note 34, at 517. 
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B. THE MARYLAND STUDY 
The cost of capital punishment in Maryland was analyzed in detail in a 
2008 Report by the Urban Institute‘s Justice Policy Center.
259
  The 
Maryland Study measured the differential costs of a death-eligible case 
according to each stage of the capital prosecution, analyzing all death-
eligible cases since the reenactment of the death penalty in 1978.
260
  This 
study uses an individualized, ―bottom-up‖ approach to tabulate actual costs 
at the trial level.
261
  In other words, the Maryland study looked at the cost of 
an individual case starting at its inception.  Notice, however, that 
Maryland‘s relatively complete ―bottom-up approach‖ does not include the 
cost of retrials after reversal.
262
  Currently, capital punishment is on hold in 




The Maryland study found the cost of an average death-eligible case 
that went to trial in which prosecutors did not seek death was $1.1 million, 
including $870,000 in costs of imprisonment over the projected life span of 
the defendant, and $250,000 for the cost of trial adjudication.
264
  A death-
eligible case that went to trial as a capital case, but in which the death 
penalty was not imposed, cost the taxpayers $1.8 million, $670,000 more 
than a comparable case in which the death penalty was not sought.
265
  Most 
of this increased cost was due to a three-fold increase in the costs of 
 
259 See JOHN ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, THE COST OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
MARYLAND (2008), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/ 
411625_md_death_penalty.pdf. 
260 Id. at 4. 
261 This "bottom-up" approach is more complete than the more common ―top-down‖ 
analysis, which assumes that all cases cost exactly the same.  See id. at 5 for a summary of 
prior studies and description of these two types of analysis.  Several studies do not use 
random or other sampling procedures to estimate different costs among different cases but 
rather estimate the cost of a typical case and multiply that by the number of death sentences 
imposed.  Id. at 6 tbl.1.  This is a less precise estimate of the costs of a capital trial. 
262 Id.  The study also did not examine ―the costs of cases where the death notice did not 
‗stick‘ and was not prosecuted as a death notice case at trial.‖  Id. at 31. 
263 Scott Calvert & Kate Smith, In Secret Move, Death Row Inmates Sent to W. Md., 
BALTIMORE SUN, June 26, 2010, at 1A (―Maryland‘s death penalty has been on hold since 
the Court of Appeals ruled in December 2006 that executions could not continue until a 
regulatory committee of the legislature adopted lethal injection protocols.  That hasn‘t 
happened, creating a de facto moratorium on state executions.‖); see also John Wagner, 
Ehrlich Takes Issue with Death Penalty Delays, WASH. POST, May 8, 2010, at B1. 
264 JOHN ROMAN ET AL., supra note 259, at 2. 
265 Id. 
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adjudication ($850,000). The current and projected costs of incarceration 
were roughly the same ($950,000).
266
 
A death-eligible case in Maryland that resulted in the death sentence 
being imposed cost considerably more: approximately $3 million, $1.9 
million more than a case where the death penalty was not sought.
267
  Costs 
of imprisonment were 150% higher (roughly $1.3 million), but the majority 
of the increased costs were associated with adjudication, which, at $1.7 
million, was double the cost of a case where the death penalty was not 
imposed and almost seven times the cost of a case where the death penalty 
was not sought.
268
  This number includes the additional costs of appeals, 
collateral motions, and other legal proceedings unlikely to be necessary or 
used in non-capital cases.
269
 
Between reenactment in 1978 and 1999, the study identified 6,000 
first- and second-degree murders, 1,227 of which were death-eligible under 
the Maryland statute.
270
  A death notice was filed in 173 of these cases 
(roughly one in seven), which resulted in 162 capital trials and 56 death 
sentences imposed.
271
  The vast majority of those death sentences were 
overturned on appeal.  As of March 2008, five persons had been executed 
and five others were awaiting execution on death row.
272
 
The Maryland Study estimates that reenacting the death penalty will 
cost Maryland taxpayers over $186 million over the life of the cases that 
have been brought to present.
273
   It will have cost the Maryland taxpayers 
more than $107.3 million to have sentenced fifty-six persons to death in the 
 
266 Id. (―About 70% of the added cost of a death notice case occurs during the trial phase.  
These additional costs are due to a longer pre-trial period, a longer and more intensive voir 
dire process, longer trials, more time spent by more attorneys preparing cases, and an 
expensive penalty phase trial that does not occur at all in non-death penalty cases.  In 
addition, death notice cases are more likely to incur costs during the appellate phase even if 
there is no death sentence.‖). 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
269 For example, capital trials involve a more lengthy voir dire processes, and consume 
greater judicial resources.  Id. at 11.  They also include a penalty phase, a second trial in 
which the jury is required to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors.  Id. at 11–12.  Cases 
in which a death sentence have been imposed often have multiple post-sentencing reviews at 
the trial court level, while non-death cases are limited to one.  Id. at 13.  Death sentences also 
undergo a more lengthy and involved appeals process.  Id. at 13–16. 
270 Id. at 15. The study identifies 1,311 death-eligible cases, but eighty-four of them were 
―multiple records of the same event, (usually retrials for the same homicide).‖  Id. 
271 Id. at 3, 15.  In comparison to Illinois, relatively few notices of intent to seek capital 
punishment were withdrawn prior to trial (11 of 173).  See comparable figures for Cook 
County, Footnote Table A, supra note 202. 
272 JOHN ROMAN ET AL., supra note 259, at 1. 
273 Id. at 3. 
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twenty-one years prior to 1999, and to have executed five.
274
  
Unsuccessfully seeking the death penalty in an additional 117 cases cost an 
additional $71 million.
275
  The state spent an additional $7.2 million for the 
Maryland Capital Defender‘s Division.
276
  Much of the $186 million in 
identified costs are expenses that have not yet been incurred, and will need 
to be paid out of future state budgets.  Furthermore, the $186 million does 
not include the costs of any new capital prosecutions.  
These costs were estimated conservatively, including only 
expenditures that could be empirically verified.
277
  They do not include 
cases where the death notice was served, but then was waived or dropped 
because of a plea bargain, or cases where a death notice was filed but there 
was a verdict of not guilty.
278
  Nor do these enumerated costs of state capital 
prosecutions include the attorney and court costs of a federal habeas corpus 
proceedings and appeals to the Fourth Circuit or the United States Supreme 
Court.
279
   
The study considered the possibility that capitally prosecuted cases 
contain more egregious acts, and consequently would be more expensive to 
prosecute than cases that are not death-eligible, even if no capital statute 
were to exist.  The actual cost of maintaining the present system of capital 
punishment in Maryland, which must include these additional expenditures, 
therefore must be higher than this study‘s estimate of an additional $3 
million for every new capital sentence imposed after 1999. 
C. THE CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE 
California represents an extreme example of the contradictions of 
death penalty jurisprudence, with over 670 inmates on death row at the time 
of the report (the largest number in the country) but only thirteen executions 
since the death penalty was reenacted in 1978.  Like Illinois, the California 
 
274 Id. at 28–29.  The capital cases continue to cost more than non-capital cases after the 
imposition of the death penalty for several reasons: the costs of direct appeal for a capital 
case are more expensive, and the appeals are more extensive and raise issues which would 
only be raised in capital cases.  Then, there are additional costs for collateral and federal 
appeals in capital cases.  The special legal issues related to challenges to the method of 
execution, for example, raise issues on appeal, which, of course, would not come up if the 
defendant were sentenced to life.  See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 143–44. 
275 JOHN ROMAN ET AL., supra note 259, at 28–29. 
276 Id. at 28.  A substantial amount of the public defender‘s budget in every state which 
has capital punishment goes to the defense of capital cases.  See supra Part III.B for a 
discussion of costs to the defense in Illinois. 
277 See JOHN ROMAN ET AL., supra note 259, at 3. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. at 14–15. 
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legislature created a commission to study and review the administration of 
criminal justice in capital cases, and to determine the extent to which that 
legal process has failed in the past, resulting in wrongful executions or the 
wrongful convictions of innocent persons.
280
  The California Commission 
was composed of persons representing a broad spectrum of views and 
backgrounds, and conducted its own research.  Like the Illinois 2003 
CPRSC Committee and the 2002 Illinois Governor‘s Commission, the 
California Commission did not view its charge as calling for a judgment or 
recommendation on the morality of the death penalty itself, or whether 
capital punishment should be retained.
281
  However, the California 
Commission did conclude that the California death penalty system is 
dysfunctional.
282
  California is currently considering reinstating lethal 
injection under a new procedure that addresses concerns with its previous 




As in Illinois, most first-degree murders are technically death-eligible 
under California‘s broad statutory definition of special circumstances that 
provide the legal foundation for a capital charge, but the majority of death-
eligible murders are not charged as capital cases.
284
  Also like Illinois, the 
individual county prosecutors in California decide whether to prosecute a 
murder as a capital case, and there is no statewide review panel.
285
  Again 
like Illinois, patterns of racial and geographic disparities have been 
identified in California.
286
  As in Illinois, there are vast differences in the 
 
280 CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 113.
 
281 As in Illinois, the members of the Committee held a broad spectrum of views on the 
death penalty.  See id. at 114.
 
282 Id. at 114 n.6 (citing testimony of California Chief Justice Ronald M. George, January 
10, 2008).
 
283 In the early 1980s, Michael Morales was convicted of raping and murdering 
seventeen-year- old Terri Lynn Winchell and sentenced to death.  He was scheduled to die 
on Feb. 21, 2006, but his execution was stayed when the two anesthesiologists who were to 
monitor his execution backed out at the last minute.  Without their oversight, there is no 
guarantee that the three-drug lethal injection will not subject Morales to excruciating pain, 
which would violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  Sam Stanton & 
Denny Walsh, California Has High Hopes of Reinstating Death Penalty, SACRAMENTO BEE, 
June 5, 2010, at 1A. 
284 It is estimated that 87% of first-degree murders are technically death-eligible under 
the broad definitions of the California statute.  CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 120.  
285 Id. at 150 n.120.  However, ―in almost half the counties, 28 of the 58, no death 
sentences were imposed during the 1990‘s, although 1,160 homicides took place in these 
counties.  The current District Attorney for San Francisco, Kamala Harris, and her 
predecessor, Terrence Hallinan, pledged never to seek the death penalty.‖  Id.  
286 Id. at 150 (noting that those counties with the highest death sentencing rates tend to 
have the highest proportion of non-Hispanic whites in their population and the lowest 
population density; and that those who kill African-Americans or Hispanics are less likely to 
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handling of death cases in different California counties, in part due to 
different political climates in the counties and the proclivities of individual 
prosecutors, and in part due to funding issues.
287
   
It takes an average of two decades for California to execute a prisoner 
who has been sentenced to death.
288
  ―To keep cases moving at this snail‘s 
pace‖ costs the taxpayers roughly $137 million every year.
289
  The 
Commission further found that: 
[t]he strain placed by these cases on our justice system, in terms of the time and 
attention taken away from other business that the courts must conduct for our citizens, 
is heavy.  To reduce the average lapse of time from sentence to execution by half, to 
the national average of 12 years, we [the State of California] will have to spend 
nearly twice what we are spending now.  The time has come to address death penalty 
reform in a frank and honest way.  To function effectively, the death penalty must be 
carried out with reasonable dispatch, but at the same time in a manner that assures 
fairness, accuracy and non-discrimination.
290
  
To support its factual conclusions regarding the cost of the death 
penalty, the Commission relied on a series of conservative 
approximations.
291
  It estimated that, under the current system in place in 
California, the cost of a capital trial is $500,000 more than an equivalent 
non-capital trial.
292
  The Commission had more precise data regarding the 
annual costs of postconviction appeals and habeas reviews, which it found 
was at least $54.4 million per year.
293
   
The Commission was also able to estimate, in collaboration with the 
state department of corrections, that confining a prisoner on death row costs 
an additional $90,000 per year in addition to the normal confinement costs 
of $34,150 for a prisoner sentenced to life in prison without the possibility 
 
be sentenced to death); see also ROMY GANSCHOW, ACLU OF N. CAL., DEATH BY 
GEOGRAPHY: A COUNTY BY COUNTY ANALYSIS OF THE ROAD TO EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA 1, 
3 (2009) (providing statistics on the disparities in capital sentencing among California 
counties).   
287 CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 92–93.  The California Commission 
recognized that under the present system the provision of funds for the prosecution and 
defense of capital cases was a critical need. 
288 Id. at 116.
 
289 Id. at 116–17.
 
290 Id. at 116 (emphasis added). 
291 Id. at 144–46. 
292 Id. at 145.  The Commission compares its estimates to the conclusion of a recent 
ACLU study, which found that the least expensive death penalty trial was $1.1 million more 
expensive than the most expensive non-death penalty trial.  See NATASHA MINSKER, THE 
HIDDEN DEATH TAX: THE SECRET COSTS OF SEEKING EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA 32 (2008), 
available at http://www.deathpenalty.org/downloads/The_Hidden_Death_Tax.pdf.
 
293 CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 146. 
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of parole.
294
  Thus, California pays $63.3 million more every year than it 
would if its death row population of what was at the time of the report 670 
were sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
295
 
The California Commission reported significant county-by-county 
disparity in sentencing, with death sentences being ten times more likely to 
be imposed in some counties than in others.
296
  The trends in these data are 
similar to Illinois: death sentences are more likely to be imposed in rural 
counties than urban areas.
297
  California prosecutors testifying before the 
Commission argued that this disparity ―is not a problem, because locally 
elected District Attorneys are responding to the demands of the electorate 
which they represent.‖
298
  The Commission, however, concluded that 
―evidence of disparities in the administration of the death penalty 
undermines public confidence in our criminal justice system.‖  However, 
the Commission was ―unwilling to recommend that death penalty decisions 
be reviewed by a statewide body . . . without additional data and 
research.‖
299
  Due to the difficulty of obtaining data from county 
prosecutors‘ offices individually, the Commission recommended that the 
state legislature impose reporting requirements upon prosecutors to collect 
and make publicly available data regarding the charging decisions made by 
prosecutors in murder cases at the county level.
300
 
The primary concern of the California Commissioners was not that the 
death penalty was being applied unfairly, but rather that not enough 
resources were being appropriated to carry it out expediently.  The delay 
between sentencing and execution is longer in California than in any other 
state; the Commission projects that it takes twenty-five years for a 
defendant to exhaust the available stages of review, as compared with the 
national average of eleven to fourteen years.
301
  These delays largely are a 
 
294 Id. 
295 Id.  As of the writing of this article in November 2010 there are 697 people on death 
row.  For a current count of the number of people on death row in each state, see DPIC State 
by State, supra note 16. 
296 Id. at 150.  The Commission‘s report relied on a study that found that death 
sentencing ratios varied from between 0.58% of murder prosecutions to more than 5% of 
murder prosecutions (after excluding counties with five or fewer death sentences during the 
study period).  See Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally 
Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990–1999, 46 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2005). 
297 CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 150. 
298 Id. at 151. 
299 Id. at 152. 
300 Id. at 153–54. 
301 Id. at 123–25.  A study by Senior Judge Arthur Alacon of the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals identified five major periods of delay: 
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result of inadequate resources in the capital punishment system; a defendant 
can expect to wait three to five years after sentencing for counsel to be 
appointed to handle a direct appeal.
302
  After the direct appeal is decided, 
the defendant will have to wait for habeas counsel to be appointed, which 
generally does not occur until eight to ten years after sentencing.
303
  To 
address these delays the Commission unanimously recommended that the 
California legislature immediately address ―the unavailability of qualified, 
competent attorneys‖ to handle various death penalty appeals by hiring 
additional government lawyers, reimbursing counties for death-penalty 




Even after a lawyer has been appointed and has conducted the 
extensive investigation required to prepare a direct appeal of a death 
sentence, there is still a substantial delay in scheduling court hearings to 
have those appeals heard.
305
  At the time of the Commission‘s report, the 
California Supreme Court had a backlog of eighty fully briefed death 
penalty cases on direct appeal awaiting argument, making the average wait 
for oral argument after the filing of a motion two-and-a-quarter years.
306
  
There is an additional two-year wait to receive a decision from the supreme 
court in a state habeas proceeding.
307
  After that comes the federal habeas 
appeal, which takes an average of 6.2 years in federal district court and 
another 2.2 years before the case is decided by the Ninth Circuit, in large 
 
"First is the delay in appointing counsel to handle the direct appeal. . . .   Second is the delay in 
scheduling the case for a hearing before the California Supreme Court . . .   Third is the delay in 
appointing counsel for the state habeas corpus petition . . .   Fourth is the delay in deciding state 
habeas corpus petitions. . . .   Fifth is the delay in deciding federal habeas corpus petitions." 
Id. at 122–23. 
302 Id. at 122. 
303 Id. (―Prompt appointment of habeas counsel would permit the habeas petition to be 
prepared while the appellate briefing is being prepared, so it can be promptly filed shortly 
after the direct appeal is decided.‖). 
304 Id. at 116–17.  The Commission further emphasizes that private council being 
appointed must be compensated at hourly rates, rather than on a flat fee basis.  Flat fee 
arrangements create conflicts of interest between a lawyer and his client by encouraging the 
lawyer to maximize his return by minimizing the time and expenses incurred in a case.  Id. at 
117. 
305 Id. at 122–23 (―The California Supreme Court currently has 100 fully briefed habeas 
corpus petitions awaiting decision. . . .  [T]here is now an average delay of 22 months 
between the filing of the petition and the decision of the California Supreme Court.‖). 
306 Id. at 122.  The California Supreme Court ordinarily hears twenty to twenty-five 
death penalty cases each year. 
307 Id. at 123. 
180 LEIGH B. BIENEN [Vol. 100 
part because inadequate records in the state proceeding make it difficult for 
the federal courts to determine why state relief was denied.
308
 
To address these delays, the Commission recommended that the 
California state legislature make more funding available to the state Public 
Defender‘s Office, the California Habeas Corpus Resource Center, the 
Office of the Attorney General, and to the California Supreme Court for the 
appointment of private counsel.
309
 
The Commission also recommended that the state legislature 
appropriate additional funds to reimburse the counties for payments for 
defense services and trial costs.
310
  The recommended reimbursement of the 
counties would be following through on an existing unmet obligation.  
When California‘s death penalty law was originally enacted in 1978, the 
legislature addressed the serious financial burdens that death penalty trials 
impose on counties by adding section 987.9 to the California Penal Code 
which provided that defense counsel in capital cases ―may request the court 
for funds for the specific payment of investigators, experts and others for 
the preparation or prosecution of the defense.‖
311
  The State of California 
was supposed to provide these funds.  However, 
no funds have been appropriated for such reimbursement for more than fifteen years, 
leaving counties to foot the bill.  As a result, the willingness of courts to grant section 
987.9 requests varies significantly from county to county, with greater reluctance to 
grant requests in cash-strapped counties.  Access to investigators and experts 




The exacerbation of the California budget crisis can only mean that 
such shortfalls will be more extreme and occur more often in the future.
313
 
The reforms suggested by the Commission, if fully implemented, are 
projected eventually to reduce delays in death penalty processing to the 
national average of eleven to fourteen years between sentencing and 
execution, at a price tag of $95 million per year above what currently is 
 
308 Id.  
309 Id. at 116–17. 
310 Id. at 117. 
311 CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West 2008).  This provision is analogous to law 
establishing the Capital Litigation Trust Fund in Illinois.  However, the funds are only 
granted to the defense. 
312 CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 128 (emphasis added).  ―The estimated annual 
cost of Section 987.9 payments for death penalty cases in Los Angeles County in 2007 was 
$4.5 million.‖  Id.
 
313 New Furloughs for State Workers in California, N. Y. TIMES, July 29, 2010, at A17 
(noting that California plans to add new mandatory furlough days for state workers, and that 
the state would probably be issuing I.O.U.s instead of paychecks after September). 
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being spent.
314
  However, California had over 670 inmates on death row at 
the time of the Commission report, and it is unclear how quickly the system 
could process their cases.  The Commission pointed out that: 
[i]f the current average of 20 new death judgments per year is maintained, full 
implementation of the Commission‘s recommendations could begin to reduce the size 
[of death row].  But the backlog is now so severe that California would have to 
execute five prisoners a month for the next twelve years just to carry out the sentences 
of those currently on death row.315  
California has executed thirteen prisoners since it reenacted capital 
punishment in 1978, and two of those were volunteers who withdrew their 
appeals.  It seems unlikely that California would move to executing five 
death row prisoners a month, even if the current moratorium were lifted.
316
 
Recognizing the impracticality of increasing the amount allocated to 
capital cases from $137 million per year to an estimated $232.7 million per 
year to cure California‘s systemic dysfunctions, the California Commission 
offers two alternative recommendations.
317
  First, California could 
significantly narrow the ―special circumstances‖ that allow for imposition 
of the death penalty from twenty-one to roughly five.
318
   The Commission 
heard testimony that the primary reason that California‘s death penalty law 
is dysfunctional is because it is too broad, and that twenty-one special 
circumstances ―open the flood gates beyond the capacity of our judicial 
system to absorb.‖
319
  This is similar to the situation in Illinois.  The 
Commission presented the findings of several other studies that have 
recommended narrowing the statutory aggravating factors for death-
eligibility to the five recommended by the Constitution Project:
320
 
The murder of a peace officer killed in the performance of his or her official duties 
when done to prevent or retaliate for that performance; 
 
314 CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 117, 123–24. 
315 Id. at 121 (emphasis added). 
316 Id. at 122 n.25.  Two of these executions were ―volunteers‖ who withdrew their 
appeals and requested execution.  Id. 
317 Id. at 117. 
318 Id. at 138. 
319 Id. (―A number of research projects have concluded that the narrower the category of 
those eligible for the death penalty, the less the risk of error, and the lower the rate of racial 
or geographic variation.‖). 
320 Id. (The Constitution Project is a ―blue-ribbon, bipartisan commission of judges, 
prosecutors, defense lawyers, elected officials, FBI and police officials, professors and civil 
and religious leaders‖ assembled to assess the death penalty.  It has achieved broad 
consensus that the death penalty should be reserved for the most culpable offenders.‖).  See 
generally THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, MANDATORY JUSTICE: THE DEATH PENALTY 
REVISITED xxiv–xxv (2005) available at www.constitutionproject..org/pdf/ 
MandatoryJusticeRevisited.pdf. 
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The murder of any person . . . occurring at a correctional facility; 
The murder of two or more persons . . . as long as the deaths were the result of an 
intent to kill more than one person, or a reckless disregard for such a possibility; 
The intentional murder of a person involving . . . torture; and 
The murder by a person who is under investigation for . . . a crime that would be a 
felony, or the murder of anyone involved in that investigation, prosecution, or defense 
of that crime . . .
321
 
These factors would be exhaustive, and they do not include felony 
murder as a basis for imposing the death penalty.
322
  The Commission did 
not suggest ―any particular formula,‖ leaving the specifics of the list ―to the 
legislative process,‖ but it did caution that ―the list must be carefully 
measured to actually achieve the benefits of narrowing that have been 
identified.‖
323
  The Commission found that if the death penalty statute had 
been so narrowed previously, the present enormous death row population 
would have been reduced by half.
324
  If the death penalty was to be so 
narrowed, the Commission recommended that those whose death judgments 
were not based upon one of the narrower special circumstances should have 
their sentences commuted to life without possibility of parole.
325
  This 
would reduce the current death row population from its then level of 670 to 
368, and result in a capital system that would cost California about $130 
 
321 CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 139. 
322 Id.; cf. CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 62–67 (reviewing the 
recommendation of the 2002 Governor‘s Commission in Illinois that the eligibility for 
capital punishment be reduced similarly and recommending that the Illinois General 
Assembly address the issue). 
323 CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 139–41.  The Commission pointed out that 
―the current list of special circumstances could still be utilized to impose sentences of life 
without possibility of parole.‖  Id. at 141. 
324 Id. at 139 (―[S]ince 1978, one of the five special circumstances identified by the 
Constitution Project was found in 55% of California death cases, or a total of 451 of the 
cases examined.  This means that if the California death penalty law had limited itself to the 
‗worst of the worst‘ as identified by the Constitution Project and the Illinois Commission, we 
would have approximately 368 on death row, rather than 670.‖).  As of September 13, 2010 
the California death row population stood at 697, sixteen of them women.  DPIC State by 
State, supra note 16. 
325 As a practical matter, this  
would actually have little impact for the death row inmates involved.  Most of them will never be 
executed, but will die in prison.  Changing their sentence . . . would only change the location in 
which they will serve their sentence.  But just that change could save the State of California $27 
million dollars each year over the current cost of confining these prisoners on death row.  
Id. at 141.  Presumably the Governor would perform these commutations as Article V, 
Section 8(a) of the California constitution grants the governor the power to commute a 
death sentence. 
2010] CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN ILLINOIS 183 
million a year going forward, which, it is estimated, is roughly the same as 
the current, broken system.
326
 
The second alternative the California Commission proposed is for 
California to follow the lead of New Jersey by abolishing capital 
punishment and commuting the sentence of all inmates at present on death 
row to life in prison.  The Commission estimates this would save the State 
of California roughly $126 million every year.
327
  While there is no 
evidence that California has executed an innocent person, six inmates on 
death row have been exonerated of the murders for which they had been 
sentenced to death.
328
  If this ―New Jersey approach‖ were used in 
California, there would be no risk of wrongful executions.
329
  The death 
penalty backlog would also disappear, freeing up state judicial resources 
and allowing all appeals to be handled more expeditiously.
330
 
D. THE NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION 
The New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission was created by 
statute in 2006 and published its Final Report in January 2007.
331
  Like the 
California Commission, the 2002 Governor‘s Commission, and the Illinois 
Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee, it included both men and 
women from the community who were not lawyers, as well as persons with 
extensive experience with the legal system, judges, former prosecutors and 
legislators, as well as Senator John F. Russo, the ―father of the death 
penalty in New Jersey.‖  Former Senator Russo was the lone dissenter to 




In creating the New Jersey Commission, the New Jersey legislature 
found: 
[T]he experience of this State with the death penalty has been characterized by 
significant expenditures of money and time; the financial costs of attempting to 
 
326 Id. at 117, 142.  
327 Id. 
328 Id. at 126 n.40.  Between 1989 and 2003, there were 205 exonerations of defendants 
convicted of murder nationwide.  Fourteen of them were in California, and six of those had 
been sentenced to death.  Id.
 
329 Id. at 143. 
330 Id. 
331 See NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 31; see also Mary E. Forsberg, Money for 
Nothing? The Financial Cost of New Jersey‟s Death Penalty, N.J. POL‘Y PERSP., Nov. 2005, 
available at www.njpp.org/rpt_moneyfornothing.html.  Mary Forsberg is the Research 
Director of New Jersey Policy Perspective, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization established 
in 1997 to conduct research on state issues. 
332 NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 31, at 79. 
184 LEIGH B. BIENEN [Vol. 100 
implement the death penalty statutes may not be justifiable in light of other needs of 
this State; There is a lack of any meaningful procedure to ensure uniform application 
of the death penalty in each county throughout the State; There is public concern that 
racial and socio-economic factors influence the decision to seek or impose the death 
penalty.  There has been increasing public awareness of cases of individuals 
wrongfully convicted of murder, in New Jersey and elsewhere in the nation . . . .
333
 
The New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission was established to 
―study all aspects of the death penalty as currently administered,‖ including: 
whether the death penalty serves a legitimate penological intent such as deterrence; 
whether there is a significant difference between the cost of the death penalty from 
indictment to execution and the cost of life in prison without parole . . . whether the 
death penalty is consistent with evolving standards of decency, whether the selection 
of defendants in New Jersey for capital trials is arbitrary, unfair, or discriminatory in 
any way and there is unfair, arbitrary, or discriminatory variability in the sentencing 
phase or at any stage of the process; whether there is a significant difference in the 
crimes of those selected for the punishment of death as opposed to those who receive 
life in prison . . . .
334
 
The New Jersey Commission was composed to be representative of the 
diversity of the population of New Jersey and to include representatives 
from crime victim groups as well as representatives of the county 
prosecutors, the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the Public 
Defender, and others.
335
  The enabling legislation for the New Jersey 
Commission also put in place a moratorium on executions in the state for 
the duration of the Commission.
336
  At the time of the moratorium, there 
were nine men on death row in New Jersey.  However, in February 2004, 
prior to the 2006 effective date of the statutory moratorium on executions, 
in response to a challenge to the legality of the procedures for lethal 
injection in New Jersey, a unanimous New Jersey appellate court had 




333 Id. at 118 (original formatting omitted). 
334 Id. at 118–19. 
335 Id. at 119.  As with the California Commission and the Illinois Commission, the New 
Jersey Commission solicited testimony from the public and institutional representatives.  The 
Commission was ordered to report its findings and recommendations, including 
recommended legislation, to the Governor and legislature, with the assistance of staff from 
the Office of Legislative Services.  Members were to serve without compensation, as was 
also the case in Illinois and California. 
336 Id. at 120.  The resulting legislation was C: 2c: 49 – 3, effective Jan. 12, 2006, which 
provides: ―Beginning on the effective date of this act, if a defendant has been sentenced to 
death pursuant to subsection c. of N. J. S. 2c: 11 – 3, the sentence of death will not be 
executed prior to 60 days after the issuance of the commission‘s report and 
recommendations.‖  NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 31, at 60.   
337 In re Readoption with Amendments of Death Penalty Regulations, N.J.A.C. 10A-23, 
by the New Jersey Department of Corrections, 842 A.2d 207, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2004).  In New Jersey, the decisions of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court are 
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The New Jersey Commission recommended that the death penalty be 
abolished and replaced with life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole, to be served in maximum security prison.
338
  The New Jersey 




Among its major findings, and one basis for the recommendation to 
repeal the death penalty, was the finding that the Office of the Public 
Defender alone would save approximately $1.46 million per year if the 
death penalty were eliminated.
340
  At that point, the New Jersey Office of 
the Public Defender had nineteen pending death cases.
341
  The savings 
would come from not having to investigate in preparation for a penalty 
phase trial, as well as savings in additional attorney and staff time for 
capital trial jury selection and the preparation of motions that are only 
required in capital cases. 
The New Jersey Report is particularly useful because the state 
Department of Corrections provided estimates for the money that it would 
save by the abolition.
342
  The Department of Corrections in New Jersey 
estimated that eliminating the death penalty would save the State of New 
Jersey $947,430 to $1,299,240 over the lifetime of each inmate sentenced to 
death.
343
  These figures were based upon the Department of Corrections‘ 
own estimate that it cost $72,602 to house an inmate in the capital 
 
binding upon the entire state, even though the intermediate appellate court is divided into 
parts and hears cases by region.  See State v. Rembert, 383 A.2d 747 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1978) (―Decision of an intermediate appellate court is the law of the State until reversed 
or overruled by the court of last resort.‖). 
338 NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 31, at 2. 
339 Act of December 17th, 2007, 2007 N.J.Ch. 204 (abolishing the death penalty and 
providing for life in prison without the possibility of parole).  As was the case with the Ryan 
commutations, unpredictable, idiosyncratic political events and external circumstances 
contributed to this dramatic outcome.  The statute was enacted during a brief period in 
December of 2007 before the new legislature was sworn in and when none of the legislators 
were up for reelection.  Robert J. Martin, Killing Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The 
First State in Modern History to Repeal Its Death Penalty Statute, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 485, 
530–31 (2010). 
340 NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 31, at 31. 
341 Id. 
342 Id. at 33.  In many states the Department of Corrections has not provided such figures.  
However, the New Jersey Commission also cited studies in Tennessee, Kansas, Indiana, 
Florida, and North Carolina, which all concluded that the costs associated with death penalty 
cases are higher than those associated with life without parole cases.  Id. 
343 Id.  These studies further illustrate that each study and every state computes cost 
differently.  In New Jersey the Department of Corrections estimated cost by taking the 
projected life span of each capital defendant, instead of totaling the entire cost of death row 
and dividing by the number of persons on death row. 
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sentencing unit, $32,481 more than to house an inmate in the general 
population of that same maximum security prison. 
This figure was based upon an assumption that an inmate sentenced to 
death in New Jersey would spend decades on death row.
344
  That 
assumption is reasonable given the experience in New Jersey and other 
states.  Take, for example, Robert O. Marshall, who spent more than 
twenty-five years on death row as his case was reviewed in multiple state 
and federal appeals before the final decision not to re-prosecute him for 
capital murder was made at the county level after a reversal of his death 
penalty by the Third Circuit.
345
 
The New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts submitted its 
internal finding that with the abolition of the death penalty, reduced trial 
court costs and savings from not having to conduct the required 
proportionality review of each death penalty imposed would lead to savings 
to the operation of the court system.
346
  The Administrative Office of the 
Courts estimated that it cost the courts and court staff $93,018 to conduct 
the mandated proportionality review of each death sentence imposed.
347
  
The Administrative Office of the Courts did not include a separate estimate 
for the extra days of trial time for capital cases, or the extra time required 
for death qualification and jury selection in capital cases. 
The attorney general of New Jersey reported that the abolition of the 
death penalty would result in little cost saving in that office since local 
prosecutors would have to prepare for guilt determinations in murder cases 
with or without the death penalty.
348
  The New Jersey Commission noted 
that while there might not be a savings to the central Attorney General‘s 
Office or to the operation of the county prosecutors‘ offices, presumably 
there would be a change in the allocation of staff resources.
349
  Those 
attorneys and their support staff now spending time and resources on the 
preparation of capital cases would be able to devote themselves to other 
cases, or to other areas.  Since all public defenders and county prosecutors 
work under financial constraints and against a substantial backlog of cases, 





344 Id. at 32. 
345 See Marshall v. Cathel, 428 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 2005); Bienen, supra note 9, at 102. 
346 NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 31, at 32.  Like the Department of Corrections, it is 
common for the Administrative Office of the Courts to separately estimate the costs of the 
death penalty within its budget. 
347 Id. 
348 Id. at 32–33. 
349 Id. at 33. 
350 Id. at 32–34. 
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The New Jersey Commission took note of the emotional and 
psychological costs of the death penalty for victims, their families, and the 
families of defendants, as well as the effects upon third parties, the staff of 
courts and justice and corrections departments, and others.
351
  The New 
Jersey Commission further found that rationales for maintaining the death 
penalty were inadequate,
352
 and that the death penalty was inconsistent with 
evolving standards of decency.
353
  The Commission did not find invidious 
racial bias in the application of the death penalty in New Jersey.
354
  
However, the Commission noted that there was county-by-county 
variability in the application of the death penalty, and perhaps that 
variability was related to the race or socioeconomic status of the victim.
355
 
Former Senator John Russo expressed the minority opinion that the 
cost of the death penalty should not be considered in the decision regarding 
its retention.
356
  He also dissented from the majority‘s characterization of 
how the New Jersey capital punishment system operated in practice.  His 
view was that the death penalty should continue as ―an expression of 
society‘s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.  This function 
may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered society that 
asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate 
their wrongs . . . .‖
357
 
The attorney general of New Jersey abstained from the Commission‘s 
recommendation to abolish capital punishment on the ground that the 
attorney general, as the chief law enforcement officer of the state, is sworn 
to uphold the laws of the state, and that the legislature has come to a 
consensus that capital punishment is an appropriate penalty in certain 
egregious circumstances.  Therefore, as attorney general, his official 
 
351 Id. at 34–35, 62.  The Commission made an additional finding that ―sufficient funds 
should be dedicated to ensure adequate services and advocacy for the families of murder 
victims.‖  Id. at 62.  This is analogous to the 2010 recommendations of the CPRSC in 
Illinois.  See CPRSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 150–56. 
352 NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 31, at 51, 56.  The Commission found that the 
penological interest in executing a small number of persons guilty of murder is not 
sufficiently compelling to justify the risk of making an irrevocable mistake.  Id. at 51.  The 
Commission also found that the alternative of life imprisonment in a maximum security 
institution without the possibility of parole would sufficiently ensure public safety and 
address other legitimate social and penological interests, including the interests of the 
families of murder victims.  Id. at 56. 
353 Id. at 35–40. 
354 Id. at 41. 
355 Id. at 42. 
356 Id. at 78–83. 
357 Id. at 79–80 (The Honorable John F. Russo, Minority View) (quoting Justice Potter 
Stewart in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). 
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position must be to support and uphold the existing law.
358
  The attorney 
general, however, noted that in the twenty-four years since the reenactment 
of the death penalty, not one person had been executed:  
The death penalty is irreversible, and that fact alone demands that the sanction be 
pursued with extraordinary care and circumspection.  But delay and uncertainly in the 
imposition of sentence undermine its deterrent effect.  Also, when after so many years 




Whether to do nothing, to make the investments necessary to fix the current system, to 
replace the current system with a narrower death penalty law, or to replace capital 
punishment with lifetime incarceration are ultimately choices that must be made by 
the . . . electorate, balancing the perceived advantages gained by each alternative 
against the potential costs and foreseeable consequences.  We hope the balancing 
required can take place in a climate of civility and calm discourse.  Public debate 
about the death penalty arouses deeply felt passions on both sides.  The time has come 
for a rational consideration of all alternatives based upon objective information and 
realistic assessments.  As U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens observed . . . 
―The time for a dispassionate, impartial comparison of the enormous costs that death 
penalty litigation impose on society with the benefit that it produces has certainly 
arrived.‖360 
Had Illinois abolished the death penalty in 2000 instead of imposing a 
moratorium on executions, the State of Illinois would not have spent the 
$122 million from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund, nor would it have 
spent the tens of millions of dollars of other expenditures incurred by 
keeping the capital punishment system in Illinois going over the following 
decade.  Not only is the amount of the expenditure a budgetary concern, but 
also much of the money seems to have been spent without societal 
justification, purpose, or benefit.  Some state actors with the discretionary 
power to do so have made unilateral decisions to prosecute a few cases 
capitally.  As a result, more than $150 million, at the most conservative 
estimate, was spent to put seventeen people on death row, where some of 
them will likely remain for years.  At the same time, there have been at least 
2,000 defendants eligible for capital prosecution under the statutory 
definitions of death eligibility, and many of those murders were heinous 
and aggravated, and yet death was not sought at the discretion of the county 
state‘s attorney. 
The economic and bureaucratic pressures encourage political actors to 
spend public money when it is made easily available and to continue prior 
 
358 NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 31, at 85. 
359 Id. at 86. 
360 CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 117–18 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 81 
(2008) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
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legal practices, no matter how dysfunctional or counterproductive they may 
be.  The political incentives seem equally uncontroverted: state‘s attorneys, 
state legislators, elected judges, and other elected officials are afraid to 
come out and say that maintaining the present capital punishment system is 
dysfunctional and irrational at best, and at worst destructive of the legal 
principles that are the bedrock of our system of due process of law and 
other constitutional guarantees.  What is the justification for a capital 
punishment system that metes out sentences arbitrarily?  Or one in which 
systemic disparities are documented?  Such concerns are before the 
question of sending innocent persons to death row is even reached.  Should 
capital punishment remain in effect so that the present, flawed system can 
send more innocent people to jail, so that when their innocence is 
discovered—which it may never be—they can then successfully sue and 
collect millions of dollars from the already bankrupt State of Illinois? 
It is not just that this is a waste of taxpayer dollars, at a time when 
Illinois needs every dollar for other services, but that the money has been 
spent foolishly, cynically, heedlessly, and without a discernible indication 
of responsibility to the state or the public.  If one family feels vindicated by 
a death sentence imposed a quarter of a century after a brutal murder, does 
that justify the waste of state resources, or the wrongful conviction and 
arbitrary prosecutions of others?  The rule of law is based upon something 
other than the personal revenge of individuals.  A public that sees some 
murders prosecuted capitally does not see the thousands of other murders 
that were, by comparison, never avenged. 
For example, the state of Illinois wasted millions imposing a death 
sentence on Brian Dugan, who was already serving life in prison without 
possibility of parole for another murder.  This is not a wise or sober use of 
public monies.  It is no solace to the public, to the thousands of other 
murder victims‘ families, or to the professionals committed to a principled 
criminal justice system.  To make matters worse, this prosecution came 
only after two other people were wrongfully convicted, retried, and 
convicted again for the crime Dugan admitted to having committed.  The 
state spent millions of dollars prosecuting these capital cases, and then paid 
out millions more to the men it had wrongfully sentenced to death. 
When a legal system‘s legitimate authority to prosecute, to convict, to 
punish, and even to take a life is perverted and exploited for personal or 
political expediency, the state loses, and the community loses.  We are all 
the poorer when the legal system we trust, and the law enforcement 
agencies and the lawyers whom we expect to protect us and act in our best 
interests, are locked into a self-perpetuating system where irrational 
incentives encourage decision making which results in systemic disparities 
with no checks or monitors on aberrant individual choices.  Those 
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responsible for maintaining the present system must justify its continuation 
on grounds consistent with constitutional principles in the interests of all of 
us, taxpayers, citizens, and members of a legal community and a criminal 
justice system deserving of, and dependent upon, our respect. 
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The Illinois State‘s Attorney‘s Association and the Illinois Attorney 
General, acting pursuant to the Illinois‘ First Degree Murder Statute, have 
consulted and hereby recommend these ―voluntary guidelines for 
procedures governing whether or not to seek the death penalty,‖ 720 ILCS 
5/9-l(k).  These guidelines reflect the policies and practices already in place 
in many counties across the state.  The drafters also incorporated relevant 
recommendations of the various task forces and committees that reviewed 
Illinois‘ capital punishment system.  These guidelines do not have the force 
of law, but they are intended to assist State‘s Attorneys in exercising their 
discretion in conformance with the highest standards of justice. 
The Illinois State‘s Attorneys and the Attorney General recognize that 
seeking the death penalty is the most difficult decision within the criminal 
justice system and appreciate the awesome responsibility vested in them by 
the citizens of Illinois.  The ―exercise of informed discretion by the State‘s 
Attorney after a review of all available information, including information 
that might be mitigating, is an important safeguard against injustice in the 
administration of capital punishment.‖  (Supreme Court Committee on 
Capital Cases, Supplemental Findings and Recommendations, page 71). 
We recognize that the primary expression of public and social policy 
of this state emanates from the legislature and that as the elected 
prosecutors we have a responsibility to respect society‘s judgment which 
allows for the imposition of the death penalty for the most heinous murders.  
720 ILCS 5/9-l(b).  The primary factors in making a decision to seek a 
death sentence are the need to not only have absolutely no doubt regarding 
the defendant‘s guilt but also his/her eligibility for the imposition of death 
pursuant to the first degree murder statute.  The basis of both the charging 
decision and the decision to seek death must be fundamentally fair and 
consistent with the law.  The decision to seek death should not be automatic 
simply because the defendant appears to be clearly guilty and clearly 
eligible.  In making this decision, State‘s Attorneys should be focused on 
the strength of the case and the background and character of the defendant.  
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,49 L.Ed.2d 859, 903 (1976). 
When deciding whether or not to seek the death penalty, the State‘s 
Attorney should have the benefit of as much information as possible about 
the offense and the offender and a reasonable time to make the decision.  
 
* Prepared by the Office of the Illinois Attorney General and the Illinois State‘s 
Attorneys Association.  Promulgated Febuary 22, 2006. 
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Prosecutors recognize that because the decision is so visible to the public 
and vital to the administration of justice that it will reflect on the legal 
system as a whole.  Through these guidelines prosecutors seek to ensure 
that in cases where the death penalty is sought, trials are fair and justice is 
done.  In exercising discretion, the State‘s Attorney is responsible for 
protecting the rights of society and the rights of the defendant. 
These proposed guidelines are not intended to be a substitute for 
adopting appropriate policies and procedures at a local level.  These 
guidelines are illustrative of certain basic factors which should be 
considered in the exercise of discretion. 
CHARGING 
The probability of a conviction is the central factor in any charging 
decision.  This is especially true in first degree murder cases in which the 
defendant may be exposed to the death penalty.  While the concept of 
―residual doubt‖ has been held not to be a ―mitigating circumstance‖, 
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988); and People v. 
Edgeston, 157 Ill.2d 201, 623 NE 2d 329 (1993); the strength of the case 
and the likelihood of a conviction must be clear based upon the available 
evidence.  Charging decisions, which may be modified as the State‘s 
Attorney gains additional information about the offense and offender, 
should appropriately reflect both the nature of the offense and the 
culpability and eligibility of the offender.  The State‘s Attorney should file 
charges which adequately encompass the offenses believed to have been 
committed by the defendant.  The State‘s Attorney should be confident in 
the quality of the evidence and its ability to meet, and even surpass, the 
burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt.  The observations of the 
United State‘s Supreme Court in 1976 are instructive regarding the exercise 
of discretion in capital cases.  ―Thus defendants will escape the death 
penalty through prosecutorial charging decisions only because the offense is 
not sufficiently serious; or because the proof is insufficiently strong.‖ 
Gregg 428 U.S. 153, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 903 (1976). 
In order to make an appropriate charging decision, it is crucial that the 
State‘s Attorney takes steps to ensure that investigative personnel have 
provided all material and information relevant to the accused and the 
offenses under consideration.  See Supreme Court Rule 412(f) and 725 
ILCS 114-13.  The failure to obtain and evaluate all relevant evidence can 
have a detrimental effect on not only the charging decision, but the ultimate 
disposition of a case.  Investigative power and responsibilities of State‘s 
Attorneys are inherent and incidental to our prosecutorial powers.  People v. 
Thompson, 88 Ill.App.3d 375 (1980).  We have a continuing duty in all 
cases, but especially in capital cases, to evaluate and investigate the facts of 
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a case.  All reports, items of evidence and other relevant material should be 
evaluated in order to determine whether additional evidence is necessary in 
order to reasonably assure that a conviction may be obtained.  The strengths 
and weaknesses of a case should be evaluated in light of anticipated 
defenses. 
THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE 
The State‘s Attorney must determine whether the murder is the type of 
crime that calls for the ultimate punishment.  Factors such as pre-
meditation; torture; dismemberment and other depraved conduct should be 
considered.  However, State‘s Attorneys must resist the temptation or 
public pressure to seek a death sentence based solely on the brutality of the 
crime without reference to other relevant factors. 
ELIGIBILITY (STATUTORY FACTORS IN AGGRAVATION) 
The existence of aggravating factors which make the defendant 
eligible for the death penalty pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/9-l(b) must be 
carefully evaluated in light of the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  In cases where the death penalty is sought, the factors relied upon 
must be included in the notice provided to the defense pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 416 (c).  Statutory aggravating factors should be evaluated in 
light of both the proofs and an examination of the decisions of the United 
States and Illinois Supreme Courts.  The following examples demonstrate 
the importance of careful evaluation of potential aggravation: 
a.  720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) of the Illinois statute makes a defendant eligible for death if 
―the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and pre-meditated manner pursuant 
to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life. . .‖  State Courts 
interpreting this factor have determined that time is a critical element in assessing 
whether this factor is satisfied.  A substantial period of reflection or deliberation is 
required.  The prosecutor must prove more than that the murder was technically pre-
meditated.  By applying this type of analysis the Courts properly narrow the class of 
death eligible defendants and provide a ―meaningful basis for distinguishing the few 
cases in which (the death penalty) is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.‖  
Gregg, 49 L.Ed.2d at 883. 
b.  To be eligible based upon murder of a peace officer (or for that matter any special 
class of victims) the evidence must show that the defendant knew or should have 
known that the victim was a peace officer.  720 ILCS 5/9-l(b)(l). 
c.  Eligibility under the multiple murder provision may depend upon the proofs and 
findings supporting the prior conviction.  For example, evidence of a prior conviction 
based on accountability, without more, is not sufficient for eligibility under 720 ILCS 
5/9-1(b)(3).  It must be certain that the prior conviction is for murder.  The date of the 
murders is generally of no significance.  The case in which the defendant is being 
sentenced may be considered for multiple-murder eligibility.  He is ―convicted‖ under 
9-l(b)(3) once the court enters judgment on the verdict.  A defendant is also eligible 
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under 9-l(b)(3) if he has killed more than one victim in the case for which he is being 
sentenced. 
d.  Under the felony murder provision (section 9-1(b)(6)) a number of factors must be 
considered.  Generally, timing of the acts which cause death does not affect eligibility 
as long as it can be shown that the murder was in the "course of" the other felony.  In 
an accountability case, it must be proven that the defendant‘s mental state and 
participation satisfy the Court‘s interpretation of the statute.  See Tison v. Arizona, 481 
U.S. 137 (1987). 
e.  Murder of a victim under age 12 (9-l(b)(7)) must be accompanied by 
―exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.‖  Murder by 
suffocation almost immediately after injuries that could have been inflicted by a single 
blow does not satisfy this requirement.  People v. Lucas, 132 Ill.2d 399, 548 N.E. 2d 
1003 (1989).  Deliberate starvation and exposure satisfies this requirement.  People v. 
Banks, 161 Ill.2d 119, 641 N.E. 2d 331 (1994). 
f.  Generally, the murder of a witness provision (9-1 (b)(8)) does not include 
investigation or prosecution for offenses which occurred in the course of commission 
of the murder, including the murder itself.  In People v. Brownell, 79 Il1.2d 508, 404 
N.E. 2d 181 (1980) the Court said: 
Otherwise, were we to adopt the trial court‘s finding, this aggravating factor could 
apply in every prosecution for murder where another offense contemporaneously 
occurs because the victim could have been a witness against the defendant.  Or, 
even more broadly, this aggravating factor could apply to every prosecution for 
murder since every victim, obviously, is prevented from testifying against the 
defendant.  We do not think the General Assembly intended the death penalty to be 
applied in every murder case, and, if it did, the General Assembly could certainly 
find a more direct way to express its intent than through this aggravating factor.‖  
In other cases, the courts have held that this factor is satisfied where the evidence 
clearly shows that the defendant contemplated killing the victim for the specific 
purpose of preventing his/her testimony, even when the murder is in the course of 
various felonies.  See People v. Hernando William, 97 Il1.2d 252, 454 N.E. 2d 220 
(1983), Williams v. Chrans, 945 F 2d 926 (7th Circuit 1991). 
While evidence supporting a single statutory aggravating factor is 
sufficient to support a decision to seek death, the number of aggravating 
factors should be considered.  Similarly, the State‘s Attorney should 
consider each potential mitigating factor and while more than one 
mitigating factor may exist, it is the weight of such evidence compared to 
the nature and circumstances of the murder that should guide the decision to 
seek or not to seek the death penalty. 
CAPITAL LITIGATION COMMITTEE 
It has long been recognized that the State‘s Attorney is entrusted with 
exclusive discretion to decide which charges shall be brought, or whether to 
prosecute at all.  This discretion extends to the decision of whether or not to 
seek the death penalty in a first degree murder case.  ―Each capital case is 
unique and must be evaluated on its own facts, focusing on whether the 
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circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant are such that 
the deterrent and retributive functions of the ultimate sanction will be 
served by imposing the death penalty.‖  People v. Johnson, 128 Ill.2d 253 
(1989).  While the death penalty decision rests exclusively with the State‘s 
Attorney, it is advisable that the State‘s Attorney seek input from 
experienced prosecutors in making necessary decisions regarding potential 
capital cases.  State‘s Attorneys in counties with an adequate number of 
sufficiently experienced Assistant State‘s Attorneys should form a 
committee, which includes the Assistants assigned to the case, to consult 
and assist the State‘s Attorney in making death penalty decisions.  State‘s 
Attorneys in counties without an adequate number of sufficiently 
experienced prosecutors, if they choose to do so and so request, may 
consult with a committee of experienced State‘s Attorneys appointed by the 
President of the State‘s Attorneys Association in making death penalty 
decisions.  A fact sheet is helpful to committee members.  Appended to 
these guidelines is a sample Capital Litigation Fact Sheet.  Notes of the 
committee that pertain to the State‘s theories, opinions or conclusions, 
should not be discoverable, as they qualify as work product pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 412(j)(i). 
Experienced capital litigators from the Office of the Illinois Attorney 
General and the State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutors Office are 
resources available to assist State‘s Attorneys in all counties.  All 
prosecutors appearing as lead or co-counsel in a capital case must be 
members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar as provided in Supreme Court 
Rule 714. 
VICTIM‟S FAMILY 
Under 725 ILCS 120/4, family members of murder victims, like all 
victims of crime, have specific rights which include: 
1.  The right to be treated with fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy 
throughout the criminal justice process. 
2.  The right to be notified of all court proceedings. 
3.  The right to communicate with prosecutors. 
4.  The right to make a statement to the court at sentencing. 
5.  The right to information about the conviction, sentence, imprisonment and release 
of the accused. 
6.  The right to a timely disposition of the case. 
7.  The right to be reasonably protected from the accused during the criminal justice 
process. 
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8.  The right to be present at the trial and all other court proceedings on the same basis 
as the accused, unless the victim is to testify and the court determines that the victim‘s 
testimony would be materially affected if the victim hears other testimony at trial. 
9.  The right to have present at all court proceedings, subject to the rules of evidence, 
an advocate or other support person of the victim‘s choice. 
10.  The right to restitution. 
The State‘s Attorney or his/her representative should consider the 
views expressed by the victim‘s family in making the decision to seek or 
not seek the death penalty.  The family should be advised that the decision 
regarding what penalty to seek is the State‘s Attorney‘s and although the 
family‘s views are important, their views are only one factor in making the 
decision.  See People v. Mack, 105 Ill.2d 103,473 N.E.2d 880, 85 
Ill.Dec.281 (1985). 
DEFENSE COUNSEL INPUT AND MITIGATION 
Prior to announcing a decision to seek death, the State‘s Attorney 
should provide defense counsel with an opportunity to present matters in 
writing and/or in person, which might affect the decision to seek or not seek 
death.  This communication should not be used to negotiate a disposition, 
but give defense counsel a fair opportunity to present valid reasons why the 
death penalty should not be sought in his/her client‘s case.  It is important 
that the offer to the defense be an open offer and that the State‘s Attorney 
be willing to review information presented by the defense at any reasonable 
time. 
In addition to information provided by the defense, the State‘s 
Attorney should carefully assess all potential mitigating factors; both 
statutory and non-statutory, and evaluate them in light of the nature of the 
offense. 
The investigation of the defendant‘s background should include a 
review of any and all information concerning the defendant.  The 
defendant‘s prior criminal record, including police reports and jail records, 
should be evaluated and witnesses interviewed.  All other available 
information relevant to the defendant‘s life history and character should be 
considered. 
FACTORS THAT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED 
The basis of a State‘s Attorney‘s decision to charge and to seek the 
death penalty must be grounded upon the strength of the case, the 
background and character of the accused and other relevant factors. 
a.  The race, ethnicity, religion, sex, social or economic standing of the defendant or 
the victim should play no role in the prosecutor‘s decision. 
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b.  The wealth of the defendant or the quality of his/her representation should not be 
factors in the decision. 
c.  The prosecutor should not seek a death sentence solely because the defendant 
refuses to plead guilty.  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the conscious exercise 
of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a Federal constitutional violation 
absent a showing that the selection (offer) is based on an unjustifiable standard such 
as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.  See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 72 
Ed.2d 446 (1962).  A plea of guilty entered by the defendant to avoid a possible death 
sentence is not compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.  North 
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 167 (1970).  The record must clearly 
establish that ―the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the 
alternative courses of action open to the defendant.‖  Alford, 27 L.Ed. 2d at 168.  It is 
critical to protecting the integrity of judgments that Supreme Court rules governing 
guilty pleas are followed.  If a plea offer is communicated and rejected, it is important 
to make a record.  In many cases, the defendant who receives the death sentence will 
later claim ineffective assistance of counsel.  The objective of making- a complete 
record is to avoid providing the defendant with grounds in support of post-conviction 
proceedings.  For a particularly compelling example of why a clear record is essential 
read People v. Montgomery, 192 Ill.2d 642, 736 NE 2d 1025, 249 Ill.Dec. 587 (2000). 
State‘s Attorneys must always be mindful of the impact the 
prosecutor‘s decisions will have on the administration of justice and respect 
for the rule of law in this State. 
TIMING OF THE DECISION AND NOTICE 
The purpose of providing notice to the defense is to allow for 
meaningful preparation and representation of the defendant by counsel in 
good standing with the Capital Litigation Trial Bar pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 714.  Illinois Supreme Court Rule 416(c) requires: 
―The State‘s Attorney or Attorney General shall provide notice of the State‘s intention 
to seek or reject imposition of the death penalty by filing Notice of Intent to Seek or 
Decline Death Penalty as soon as practicable.  In no event shall the filing of said 
notice be later than 120 days after arraignment, unless for good cause shown, the 
Court directs otherwise.  The Notice of Intent to seek imposition of the death penalty 
shall also include all of the statutory aggravating factors enumerated in section 9-l(b) 
of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)) which the State intends to 
introduce during the death penalty sentencing hearing.‖ 
In cases where the State‘s Attorney has decided early on to seek the 
death penalty, it is prudent to inform defense counsel informally of the 
decision and complete all follow up investigation before formally filing 
timely notice pursuant to Rule 416.  There is always the possibility that new 
information may develop which causes the State‘s Attorney to change the 
decision that ―death is the appropriate sentence.‖  The State‘s Attorney 
should not lead defense counsel to believe that the death penalty will not be 
sought unless that actually reflects a formal decision.  State‘s Attorneys 
should be aware of the possibility of de-certification of a capital case by the 
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trial court following conviction.  Under 720 ILCS 5/9-1(h-5), the trial court, 
on its own motion or on written motion of the defendant, may decertify the 
case as a death penalty case if the court finds that the only evidence 
supporting the defendant‘s conviction is the uncorroborated testimony of an 
informant witness concerning the confession or admission of the defendant 
or that the sole evidence against the defendant is a single eyewitness or 
single accomplice without any other corroborating evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The fair and impartial administration of Capital Punishment in this 
State depends largely on the decisions of the State‘s Attorneys and the 
Illinois Attorney General. In those few cases in which the death penalty is 
successfully sought and actually imposed the citizens of Illinois must, at all 
times, be assured that the process was fair and that the conclusion was just. 
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APPENDIX B: TABLES SUMMARIZING THE SENTENCING OF FIRST DEGREE 




In an effort to examine the patterns of death penalty imposition across 
Illinois, researchers from Loyola University obtained detailed, offender-
level data from the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) that included 
information pertaining to the 9,592 offenders convicted of first-degree 
murder and admitted to prison in Illinois from July 1988 through June 2010, 
or state fiscal year (SFY) 1989 (which covers the period from July 1, 1988 
to June 30, 1989) to SFY 2010.  During this twenty-two-year period, a total 
of 150 individuals were convicted and sentenced to death. 
The tables on the following pages summarize the total number of 
offenders convicted of first degree murder in Illinois and the number and 
proportion of these offenders who received a death sentence across different 
regions of Illinois and across different time periods.  The time periods used 
in the analyses were the ―Pre-Moratorium‖ (July 1988 to December 1999), 
the ―Moratorium & Governor‘s Capital Punishment Commission‖ period 
(January 2000 to June 2005) and the ―Post-Reform passage‖ period (July 
2005 to June 2010). 
Over the time periods examined, the proportion of first-degree 
murderers sentenced to death statewide fell from 1.9 percent in the pre-
moratorium period to 0.6 percent in the post-reform passage period (Table 
A).  In purely statistical terms, this decrease from 1.9 percent to 0.6 percent 
translates to roughly a 66 percent reduction in the likelihood of the death 
penalty being imposed over these time periods.  Across all separate 
geographic regions of Illinois examined (Tables B through F), the 
proportion of first degree murderers sentenced to death fell between the pre-
moratorium and post-reform passage periods. 
Separate tables are included that summarize the sentences imposed on 
convicted murders across different regions of Illinois, including Cook 
County (Chicago), the suburban Collar Counties (Lake, McHenry, Kane, 
DuPage, and Will counties), other urban areas outside of Cook and the 
Collar Counties (counties that fall within a metropolitan statistical area 
based on U.S. Bureau of the Census classifications) and the remaining rural 
counties in Illinois. 
 
* Prepared for the Illinois Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee in September 
2010 by David E. Olson, Ph.D., Donald Stemen, Ph.D., and Jordan Boulger of Loyola 
University. 
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Table A 
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Table C 
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Sentences Imposed on Convicted Murderers in Illinois‟ “Collar Counties” 
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Table E 
Sentences Imposed on Convicted Murderers in Illinois‟ Urban Counties, 
Excluding the Cook and “Collar” County Region 
 Non-Death 
Sentence 
Death Sentence Total 
Pre-Moratorium 
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Sentences Imposed on Convicted Murderers in Illinois‟ Rural Counties 
 Non-Death 
Sentence 
Death Sentence Total 
Pre-Moratorium 
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(July 2005 through 
June 2010) 
79 
(96.4%) 
3 
(3.6%) 
82 
(100%) 
Total 
552 
(95.6%) 
25 
(4.4%) 
577 
(100%) 
 
